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Abstract 
[Excerpt] Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (hereinafter Wal-Mart) is the second-largest company in the world. It has 
more annual revenue than the GDP of Switzerland. It sells more DVDs, magazines, books, CDs, dog food, 
diapers, bicycles, toys, toothpaste, jewelry, and groceries than any other retailer does worldwide. It is the 
largest retailer in the United States, Mexico, and Canada, the second-largest in the United Kingdom, and 
the third largest in Brazil, With its partners, it is the largest retailer in Central America. Wal-Mart is also the 
largest private employer in the United States, Mexico, and Canada, and it has 1.8 million employees 
around the globe. 
Wal-Mart is so huge that it effectively sets the terms for large swaths of the global economy, from retail 
wages to apparel prices to transoceanic shipping rates to the location of toy factories. Indeed, if there is 
one single aspect to understand about the company, it is the fact that Wal-Mart is transforming the 
relations of production in virtually every product category it sells, through its relationships with suppliers. 
But its influence goes far beyond the economy. It sets social policy by refusing to sell certain types of 
birth control. Its construction of supercenters molds the landscape, shapes traffic patterns, and alters the 
local commercial mix. The retail goliath shapes culture by selling the music of patriotic country singer 
Garth Brooks but not the critical (and hilarious) The Daily Show with Jon Stewart Presents America (the 
Book): A Citizen’s Guide to Democracy Inaction. It influences politics by donating millions to conservative 
politicians and think tanks. Wal-Mart is, in short, one of the most powerful entities in the world. 
Not surprisingly, Wal-Mart has developed a long list of critics, including unions, human rights 
organizations, religious groups, environmental activists, community organizations, small business groups, 
academics, children’s rights groups, and even institutional investors. These groups have exposed the 
company’s illegal union-busting tactics, its many violations of overtime laws, its abuse of child labor, its 
egregious healthcare policies, its super-exploitation of immigrant workers, its rampant gender 
discrimination, the horrific labor conditions at its suppliers’ factories, and its unlawful environmental 
degradation. They have also chronicled the deleterious effect Wal-Mart has on the public coffers and the 
quality of community life. New Wal-Mart stores and distribution centers often swallow up government 
subsidies and tax breaks, take public land, create more congestion, reduce overall wages, destroy retail 
variety, and increase public outlays for healthcare. To its critics, Wal-Mart represents the worst aspects of 
21st-eentury capitalism. 
Wal-Mart usually counters any criticism with two words: low prices. It is a powerful mantra in a 
consumerist world. The company does make more products affordable to more people, and that is 
nothing to sneeze at when wages are stagnant, jobs insecure, pensions disappearing, and health 
coverage shrinking. With low prices, Wal-Mart helps working men and women get more from their meager 
paychecks, more necessities like bread, and more luxuries, like roses, too. It is a brilliant and 
incontrovertible argument, and Wal-Mart’s most ardent defenders take it even farther. They say its 
obsession with low prices makes the entire economy more efficient and more productive. Suppliers and 
competitors have to produce more and better products with the same resources, and that redounds to 
everyone. In the micro, it means falling prices and rising product quality. In the macro, it means economic 
growth, more jobs, and higher tax revenues. To its defenders, Wal-Mart represents the best aspects of 
21st-century capitalism. 
Despite their radical opposition, critics and defenders of the world’s largest corporation agree on one 
thing: Wal-Mart represents 21st-century capitalism. It symbolizes a system of increasing market 
penetration and decreasing social regulation, where more and more aspects of life around the world are 
subject to economic competition. Wal-Mart’s success rests upon the ongoing destruction of social power 
in favor of corporate power. It takes advantage of the conditions of the neo-liberal world, from the 
availability of instant and inexpensive global communication to the continuing collapse of agricultural 
employment around the world to the rapid diffusion of technological innovation to the oversupply of 
subjugated migrant labor in nearly every country to the continued existence of undemocratic and 
corporate-dominated governments. For some, this is as it should be, all part of capitalism’s natural and 
ultimately benign development. For the rest of us, Wal-Mart is at the heart of what is wrong with the 
world. 
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1. Executive Summary
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (hereinafter Wal-Mart) is the second-largest company in the world. It has 
more annual revenue than the GDP of Switzerland. It sells more DVDs, magazines, books, CDs, 
dog food, diapers, bicycles, toys, toothpaste, jewelry, and groceries than any other retailer does 
worldwide. It is the largest retailer in the United States, Mexico, and Canada, the second-largest 
in the United Kingdom, and the third largest in Brazil, With its partners, it is the largest retailer 
in Central America. Wal-Mart is also the largest private employer in the United States, Mexico, 
and Canada, and it has 1,8 million employees around the globe,
Wal-Mart is so huge that it effectively sets the terms for large swaths o f the global economy, 
from retail wages to apparel prices to transoceanic shipping rates to the location of toy factories. 
Indeed, if  there is one single aspect to understand about the company, it is the fact that Wal-Mart 
is transforming the relations o f production in virtually every product category it sells, through its 
relationships with suppliers. But its influence goes far beyond the economy. It sets social policy 
by refusing to sell certain types o f birth control. Its construction o f supercenters molds the 
landscape, shapes traffic patterns, and alters the local commercial mix. The retail goliath shapes 
culture by selling the music o f patriotic country singer Garth Brooks but not the critical (and 
hilarious) The Daily Show with Jon Stewart Presents America (the Book): A Citizen’s Guide to 
Democracy Inaction. It influences politics by donating millions to conservative politicians and 
think tanks. Wal-Mart is, in short, one o f the most powerful entities in the world.
Not surprisingly, Wal-Mart has developed a long list o f critics, including unions, human rights 
organizations, religious groups, environmental activists, community organizations, small 
business groups, academics, children’s rights groups, and even institutional investors. These 
groups have exposed the company’s illegal union-busting tactics, its many violations of overtime 
laws, its abuse o f child labor, its egregious healthcare policies, its super-exploitation of 
immigrant workers, its rampant gender discrimination, the horrific labor conditions at its 
suppliers’ factories, and its unlawful environmental degradation. They have also chronicled the 
deleterious effect Wal-Mart has on the public coffers and the quality o f community life. New 
Wal-Mart stores and distribution centers often swallow up government subsidies and tax breaks, 
take public land, create more congestion, reduce overall wages, destroy retail variety, and 
increase public outlays for healthcare. To its critics, Wal-Mart represents the worst aspects of 
21st-eentury capitalism,
Wal-Mart usually counters any criticism with two words: low prices. It is a powerful mantra in a 
eonsumerist world. The company does make more products affordable to more people, and that 
is nothing to sneeze at when wages are stagnant, jobs insecure, pensions disappearing, and health 
coverage shrinking. With low prices, Wal-Mart helps working men and women get more from 
their meager paychecks, more necessities like bread, and more luxuries, like roses, too. It is a 
brilliant and incontrovertible argument, and Wal-Mart’s most ardent defenders take it even 
farther. They say its obsession with low prices makes the entire economy more efficient and 
more productive. Suppliers and competitors have to produce more and better products with the 
same resources, and that redounds to everyone. In the micro, it means falling prices and rising 
product quality. In the macro, it means economic growth, more jobs, and higher tax revenues. To 
its defenders, Wal-Mart represents the best aspects of 21st-centuiy capitalism.
Despite their radical opposition, critics and defenders o f the world’s largest corporation agree on 
one thing: Wal-Mart represents 21st-century capitalism. It symbolizes a system of increasing 
market penetration and decreasing social regulation, where more and more aspects of life around 
the world are subject to economic competition. Wal-Mart’s success rests upon the ongoing 
destruction o f social power in favor o f corporate power. It takes advantage of the conditions of 
the neo-liberal world, from the availability of instant and inexpensive global communication to 
the continuing collapse o f agricultural employment around the world to the rapid diffusion of 
technological innovation to the oversupply of subjugated migrant labor in nearly every country 
to the continued existence o f undemocratic and corporate-dominated governments. For some, 
this is as it should be, all part of capitalism’s natural and ultimately benign development. For the 
rest of us, Wal-Mart is at the heart of what is wrong with the world.
As we detail in Section 3,2 Organization o f Production and Services, Wal-Mart’s model 
represents three transformations that are reshaping capitalism. In the first, Wal-Mart efficiently 
and ruthlessly has subordinated manufacturing to retailing. In the second, it has used the most 
advanced technologies to create an international logistics organization that integrates tens of 
thousands of suppliers in dozens o f countries providing hundreds of thousands of items. And in 
the third, it has simplified marketing to price cutting. The result is a system in which the 
corporation’s marketing-driven demand for low prices at the checkout counter reverberates back 
through the supply chain to mean low wages and horrendous conditions for millions of workers 
around the world.
Wal-Mart is a quintessential^ American firm, but it is an international corporation. Not only 
does it have stores on four continents, it has suppliers on five. So integrated are these suppliers 
that Wal-Mart determines packaging, pricing, and, in many cases, profit. This integration poses a 
particular challenge for any union campaign at Wal-Mart, especially a cross-border campaign. In 
effect, it means Wal-Mart employs millions more workers than the 1,8 million on its payroll. To 
see the implications o f this, imagine a unionized Wal-Mart that still had the slogan Always Low 
Prices. Always. Unionized store and distribution center workers would owe their improved 
wages and conditions to the continued exploitation o f workers in factories in China, Indonesia, 
Guatemala, and the United States, to name just four countries, Wal-Mart would still drain public 
coffers with its demands for cheap land, loan guarantees, and tax breaks. It would still erect giant 
stores that blight the landscape, increase traffic, and degrade the environment. Thus, any union 
campaign at Wal-Mart has to address the company’s behavior beyond its own workforce. To do 
so will build solidarity and increase the pressure on the company. It will also stimulate the social 
regulation required to blunt the worst aspects of 21st-century capitalism, perhaps enough actually 
to change it,
1.1 Description and Operations
Sam Walton founded Wal-Mart in 1962. He ineoiporated Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. in 1969 and first 
sold some of it to the public in 1970. The company has its headquarters in Bentonville, in the 
northwest comer of Arkansas, near Oklahoma, Missouri, and Kansas. The area has put its stamp 
on the company, not least as the birthplace o f Sam Walton and most o f the other men that run it. 
Walton died in 1992, but his family still controls 40% of the company.
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Wal-Mart has three segments: Wal-Mart Stores, Sam’s Club, and International. Wal-Mart Stores 
includes all Wal-Mart’s stores in the United States, except Sam’s Club membership warehouse 
stores, which fall in the Sam’s Club segment. The International segment includes all stores in 
fifteen countries.2 In fiscal 2005 (ending January 31,2005), approximately 67% of Wal-Mart’s 
revenue came from the Wal-Mart Stores segment, 13% from Sam’s Club, and 20% from stores 
outside the United States.
Wal-Mart has four basic store formats.3
Discount Stores are the original stores. They sell a wide range o f  merchandise, from diapers 
to dental floss, from apparel to automotive accessories, from sporting goods to small • 
appliances. They average 98,079 square feet, employ an average o f 225 workers, and sell 
62,500 items, Wal-Mart is in the process o f converting many Discount Stores into 
Supercenters, either through expansion or by moving them to larger sites.
Super centers are Wal-Mart’s sweet spot, the current focus o f its attention. They combine a 
larger version o f the Discount Store with a groceiy store, and often add a restaurant, an auto 
repair shop, a bank, and a hair salon. Because they sell consumables (groceries), they receive 
more frequent traffic, and because they carry both merchandise and groceries they generate 
cross-shopping, where customers come in for milk and toilet paper but end up buying a CD, 
some batteries, and a t-shirt, too. Supercenters are 186,077 square feet, employ 350 workers, 
and sell 116,000 items. Much o f Wal-Mart’s current growth in the United States comes from 
Supercenters.
Neighborhood Markets are grocery stores that have a limited selection o f general 
merchandise. The average Neighborhood Market is 42,286 square feet, employs 95 workers, 
and sells 38,845 items. This is a relatively new store format for Wal-Mart, which appears to 
be tweaking and testing the formula. It is a way for the company to enter urban markets 
inconspicuously.
Sam’s Club membership warehouse stores target small business. Merchandise includes hard 
goods, some soft goods, fresh groceries, and institutional-size items. Membership fees are 
$35 per year for businesses and $40 per year for individuals, The average Sam’s Club is 
128,000 square feet, employs 160-175 people, and offers 6,000 items. Wal-Mart hopes to 
convince more small businesses to become members and shop at Sam’s Club,
Outside the United States, Wal-Mart and its joint-venture partners operate the four U.S. store 
formats under the Wal-Mart and Sam’s Club brand names, plus they have formats specific to the 
locality. In Mexico, Wal-Mart has the four U.S. store formats, plus Superama, a traditional
2 Wal-Mart owns or has joint ventures for stores in Argentina^ Brazil, Canada, China, Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Nicaragua, Puerto Rico, and United Kingdom. Wal-Mart 
plans to expand into other countries; see its website, www.walmartstores.com. for the latest list.
3 Wal-Mart, "Our Retail Divisions,” httP.7/www,walmartfacts.eom/newsdesk/article.aspx?id-769. accessed January 
6,2006.
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supermarket; Bodega, a combination o f discount store and grocery store; Suburbia, a specialty 
department store; and Vips, a restaurant. In Brazil the company has Todo Dia, which combines a 
discount store and grocery store; Balaios, a discount food and general merchandise store; and the 
newly acquired Nacional Supermarkets and BIG Hypermarkets, In the United Kingdom, Wal- 
Mart owns ASDA, which combines grocery and apparel, and George, an apparel store. In Puerto 
Rico, Wal-Mart operates Amigo supermarkets.
Wal-Mart’s basic operations involve the purchasing o f goods from suppliers (procurement), the 
transportation o f those goods to its distribution centers and stores (logistics), and the sale of the 
goods at its stores (marketing). While it sounds simple enough, Wal-Mart has more than 5,000 
stores selling 50,000 to 100,000 different items from 60,000 suppliers,
Wal-Mart meets its procurement challenges by using its massive buying power to squeeze its 
suppliers to the bone. It has continually grown and altered its procurement organization to take 
advantage o f new areas o f supply, such as Central America in the 1990s, South China in the late 
1990s, and North China currently. Its buyers have become increasingly sophisticated and, with 
access to more and more suppliers, they can usually find a better price for its goods. If they can’t, 
they simply pit suppliers against each other. Each year, Wal-Mart demands that suppliers cut 
their prices, even if  the product has not changed, and they comply, or face the loss of their largest 
single customer by far. This reverberates far beyond Wal-Mart’s own suppliers, since their 
competitors too must meet Wal-Mart’s efficiency standards.
To meet its logistical challenges, Wal-Mart owns a fleet o f trucks, a network o f distribution 
centers, a global satellite communications system, and the largest private database in the world. 
Continuous technological and organizational improvements increase the velocity and decrease 
the cost of moving Wal-Mart’s goods. They also increase what Wal-Mart knows about its goods, 
such as how long they are on store shelves and when they can be delivered to distribution center 
docks. With more knowledge, comes operational improvement, such as cross docking, in which 
trucks arrive at distribution centers precisely when other trucks are ready to bring their contents 
to the stores, thereby reducing warehouse costs and increasing turnover, the Holy Grail of 
discount retailing. Wal-Mart’s newest technological improvement, radio frequency identification 
(RFID) tags, demonstrated its logistical prowess and its power over suppliers, The tags, which go 
on pallets, and eventually will go on cartons and perhaps even individual items, allow Wal-Mart 
to know the location o f its goods at all times, reducing spoilage, cutting theft, speeding 
movement, and cutting costs. Wal-Mart’s suppliers, not Wal-Mart, must pay for the tags.
Wal-Mart dramatically simplifies marketing, down to three words; everyday low prices, which it 
abbreviates as EDLP, It has few of the price promotions, periodic sales, rebates, or other price- 
related marketing popular at other retailers. It uses many o f the merchandising tactics that the 
competition uses, such as store events, signs, and displays, but, until very recently, these were 
only the cheapest possible activities. Wal-Mart’s identity equates to low prices. It is not a brand 
like Coca-Cola, which sells its products on taste, quality, and lifestyle and must continually 
convince people that it is better than its competitors, who sell essentially the same product. This 
is not to say Wal-Mart is an unsophisticated marketer. Far from it, Wal-Mart has a rich store 
culture, including greeters, crowded aisles, and Wal-Mart television, and it has created an
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incredibly strong brand, But this brand rests on its ability to sell for less the same goods that 
other stores sell,
1,2 Profit Centers
There are two ways to think about where Wal-Mart’s profits originate. The first reflects 
traditional thinking. It looks at which stores, segments, and geographic areas are the most 
profitable. The second, less traditional approach broadens the search for Wal-Mart’s profit 
centers.
Of the four store formats, on a per store basis, Supercenters produce the greatest amount of 
profit, simply because they are the biggest stores. Next come Discount Stores, Sam’s Clubs, and 
Neighborhood Markets. Discount Stores have slightly higher operating profit margins than 
Supercenters because they carry few groceries, which have lower margins than general 
merchandise. Sam’s Club stores have lower operating margins because they are warehouse 
stores, which, by definition, must sell at lower prices.4
The Wal-Mart Stores segment, which includes all stores in the United States other than Sam’s 
Clubs, produces the mass of Wal-Mart’s profits. The segment had $14,2 billion in operating 
profit in fiscal 2005 (ending January 31,2005), compared to $3,0 billion for International and 
$1,3 billion for Sam’s Club. The operating profit margin o f the Wal-Mart Stores segment was 
also higher, 7.4%, versus 5.3% for International and 3.5% for Sam’s Club. These figures further 
demonstrate that the United States is the most profitable location o f Wal-Mart’s business.
Thinking less traditionally, Wal-Mart derives its profit from two complex sets of relationships. 
The first set is its unequal relationships with its suppliers and the second is the intricate 
relationships that make up its logistics system.
Suppliers. Wal-Mart is a virtual monopsony, which is a single buyer who faces multiple 
suppliers. That market power allows it to set the prices it will pay for the goods it receives 
from its .suppliers. Perhaps equally important, it can dictate many other aspects o f those 
goods, as well, including their design, their manufacture, and their packaging. This gives 
Wal-Mart an enormous edge over its competition, because it can have a supplier provide 
exactly the type of product it knows it can sell at a cost it knows is profitable. This is a key 
source o f Wal-Mart’s profit.
Logistics. The profitability of Wal-Mart’s logistics system derives from the speed at which it 
moves goods. Put simply, the more rapidly goods move from supplier to distribution center 
to store to consumer the faster Wal-Mart’s profits increase. As long as Wal-Mart has no 
trouble selling stuff, the faster it can get stuff to its shelves the more often it can fill them, 
and the more often consumers can empty them. In industry parlances, efficient logistics 
increase turnover, a fundamental way to increase profit in low-margin discount retailing. 
Wal-Mart’s logistics system further increases profitability, because its continually improving
4 Pankaj Ghemawat, Ken A. Mark, Stephen A. Bradley, “Wal-Mart Stores in 2003,” Harvard Business School Case 
Study, no. 9-704-430, revised January 30,2004.
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just-in-time chain-link operations cut down on costs associated with inventory, 
transportation, storage, spoilage, and shrinkage (theft). This is another key source of Wal- 
Mart’s profit.
Thought about this way, Wal-Mart’s profit centers are only partly within Wal-Mart’s control. 
Supplier relationships and logistics systems involve a series o f  complex links, each one o f which 
requires certain conditions. For example, Wal-Mart suppliers in South China rely on the lax 
social regulation o f Guangdong Province for their control of labor. As another example, Wal- 
Mart’s transoceanic logistics system relies on a network of trucking companies, railways, 
shipping lines, ports, stevedores, roads, warehouses, and government agencies. Contrary to 
voguish management theory, Wal-Mart eschews outsourcing in favor o f exercising control over 
as much o f its business as possible. Yet, some o f the most important sources of its profit lie 
outside its control,
1.3 Growth Plan
Wal-Mart grows revenue two ways, Either it sells more goods through its existing stores or it 
gets more stores. To get more stores, it builds or buys them. The company has more ways to 
grow profits, as the discussion of profit centers demonstrates. Wal-Mart is open about its revenue 
and profit growth plans, laying them out regularly at quarterly conference calls, annual 
shareholder meetings, and periodic analyst meetings. Wal-Mart has acknowledged 
disappointment with its same-store sales growth, which has trailed that of rivals. It has discussed 
numerous plans to remedy this problem. But the acceleration o f its expansion program indicates 
growth will increasingly come from new stores.
W al-Mart Growth Plans5
2005 2006
Supercenters 240-250 270-280
Discount Stores 40-45 20-30
Neighborhood Markets 25-30 15-20
Sam's Club 30-40 30-40
Subtotal U.S. 335-365 335-370
International 155-165 220-230
Total 490-530 555-600
Wal-Mart has been growing internationally for the last fifteen years and it does not plan to stop. 
Its goal is to derive one third o f sales and earnings from international operations, up from the 
current one fifth. As a step towards achieving this goal, it will open approximately 225 new 
stores outside the United States in 2006, nearly one third more than in 2005. As it has in the past, 
the company will continue acquiring stores as a way to enter a market. Once there, the plan is to 
expand the number of stores and integrate them with the company’s global purchasing and 
logistics networks. India is an obvious next step, and the company is lobbying the government to
5 Deborah Weinswig and Charmaine Tang, “WMT: Details o f the 2005 Wal-Mart Analyst Meeting,” Citigroup 
Global Markets, October 30,2005.
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relax rules that restrict foreign direct ownership o f companies in the retail business.6 Wal-Mart 
views its global organization as an opportunity to increase productivity and profitability by 
sharing best practices across borders and extending the supplier network.
Within the United States, Wal-Mart’s growth plans center on Supercenters, the company’s most 
profitable format. It has 1,400 approved real estate projects in its pipeline, o f which 900 to 1,000 
are Supercenters. Only eight Supercenters are currently in locations with 40,000 people within 
one mile, that is, inner cities. The company wants to increase this number. To overcome the 
increasing political and community-opposition to this plan, Wal-Mart will do more “upfront 
work” with communities, tailor its stores to community sensibilities, and increase the number of 
managers living in each community. It will also adopt a more flexible store design. Wal-Mart 
plans five more distribution centers in 2006, after building seven in 2005.
Wal-Mart has dozens o f plans to increase existing store sales. Many o f them involve 
merchandising tactics familiar to high-end retailers, such as offering “trend-forward” and 
expensive merchandise, holding celebrity-based promotions, installing attractive displays in the 
apparel department and practical displays in the home furnishings section, and selecting a mix of 
products tuned to particular communities. The company’s marketing bag o f tricks also comes 
from its competitofs and includes market research, audience targeting, gift cards, public relations 
campaigns, and celebrity advertising, including in Vogue magazine.
To increase profitability across the company, Wal-Mart will increase SG&A leverage; that is, 
decrease the percentage o f sales soaked up by sales, general, and administrative costs. This 
involves everything from better procurement to reengineering store operations to re-aligning the 
incentives for store personnel. Wal-Mart believes its global procurement operation could double 
the percentage o f imports it purchases over the next five years. Through a program called 
Network Remix, the company will shrink inventory (thereby increasing both gross margins and 
return on investment) by improving the backroom operations o f each store. For management, it 
will implement a “new field structure to promote ownership and accountability,” realign rewards 
and incentives “to drive desired behaviors,” and make “in-store operational changes to drive 
discipline and efficiency.” New logistics technology, including RFID, will save money and 
increase turnover.7
In sum, growth will come from the addition of new Supercenters in the United States, the 
addition o f new stores (again, mostly Supercenters) outside the U.S., and expansion into new 
geographic markets, most likely through acquisitions in Italy and either acquisition or direct 
investment in India. Improved profitability will come from global procurement (squeezing 
suppliers), new upmarket merchandising efforts, and continuous re-engineering o f eveiy step of 
the supply chain.
1.4 Key Decision Makers
6 Eric Bellman and Kris Hudson, "Wal-Mart Trains Sights on India’s Retail Market,” Wall Street Journal, January 
18,2006.
7 Deborah Weinswig and Charmaine Tang, “WMT; Details o f  the 2005 Wal-Mart Analyst Meeting,” Citigroup 
Global Markets, October 30,2005.
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Ultimate control o f Wal-Mart rests with the Walton family, Sam Walton’s widow, Helen Robson 
Walton; their first and third sons, Samuel Robson (Rob) Walton and James (Jim) Carr Walton; 
their daughter, Alice Louise Walton; and the family of her recently deceased second son, John 
Thomas Walton, own Walton Enterprises in five equal shares. Through Walton Enterprises, they 
own 40% of Wal-Mart’s outstanding stock, along with numerous other assets. Given the wide 
dispersal o f the rest o f the company’s shares, there are no other shareholders o f significance and 
the Walton’s 40% ownership gives them practical control over the company. Two seats on the 
Wal-Mart board o f directors further enhance the family’s power: Rob Walton is chairman and 
Jim Walton is director,8 As shareholders, the family makes decisions by consensus.
The Waltons have generally left the day-to-day operations of Wal-Mart to management, but they 
keep a keen interest in the company’s progress. No major strategic decisions, such as the hire of 
a chief executive officer or the purchase o f a major asset, take place without their input. The 
family, as a whole, meets regularly with management.
H. Lee Scott is the chief executive officer of Wal-Mart. He is the second CEO since Sam Walton 
died in 1992. David Glass, the previous CEO, served until 2000, and he remains on the board of 
directors, with influence. Scott has responsibility for Wal-Mart’s entire global operations and its 
profitability. He has worked at Wal-Mart since 1979, and has experience leading both the 
company’s distribution operations and its merchandising and procurement efforts. Despite 
slower revenue growth and the relatively poor performance of Wal-Mart’s stock, Scott appears to 
have little internal opposition and remains in good standing with the board and the Waltons. He 
has made it his mission to improve Wal-Mart’s reputation.
Below Scott are a group o f three men who have responsibility for the most important aspects of 
the corporation. One is Thomas Schoewe, the Chief Financial Officer. He is a relative outsider, 
having joined the company in 2000. The other two are John B. Menzer and Michael T. Duke. 
They are vice chairmen o f Wal-Mart, but they recently switched jobs, a seeming demotion for 
Duke. Menzer is now head of the Wal-Mart Stores segment, with responsibility for global 
procurement, information systems, benefits, logistics, real estate, financial services, and strategic 
planning, Duke is now head of the International segment, with operational responsibility for 
Wal-Mart in fifteen countries. Both joined Wal-Mart in 1995.
Other important executives at Wal-Mart include Eduardo Castro-Wright, the former head of 
Wal-Mart Mexico who is now the president and CEO of Wal-Mart Stores, USA, and C. Douglas 
McMillon, president and CEO of Sam’s Club, Lawrence V. Jackson is head of the People 
Division, Wal-Mart’s euphemism for personnel. Linda M, Dillman, executive vice president and 
chief information officer, heads the company’s technology efforts. M. Susan Chambers is 
executive vice president o f risk management and benefits administration. Rollin L. Ford is 
executive vice president, logistics and supply chain.
I. 5 Key Relationships
8 Jim Walton joined the Wal-Mart board in September 2005, replacing his brother John Walton, who died in a plane 
crash in late June 2005.
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If we could ask Sam Walton which relationships matter at Wal-Mart, he probably would say, 
“Only one: our relationship with our customers.” And he would be right, if  incomplete. Sure, 
Wal-Mart must please its customers. But to do so, it takes advantage o f many other important 
relationships, most obviously those with its suppliers and within its vast logistics system.
Wal-Mart relies on more than 60,000 suppliers for the goods it sells. No single supplier accounts 
for an economically significant share of its revenue, but certain suppliers, such as Procter & 
Gamble or Disney, carry cultural importance. And P&G is close to being economically 
significant. Including its purchase o f Gillette, P&G’s goods account for approximately $11 
billion, or 3.5%, of Wal-Mart’s revenue, making it probably one o f the retailer’s biggest 
suppliers. Other, smaller suppliers, such as the Lucid Garments factory in Bangladesh, carry 
symbolism of another kind and reflect differently upon Wal-Mart. They illustrate the company’s 
complicity in the violation o f human, child, and labor rights standards,9
To move its goods, Wal-Mart relies on trucking, railway, shipping, and stevedoring companies, 
as well as a series o f port operators and the government agencies that oversee them. These 
include, among others, Maersk Sealand for shipping, UTi Worldwide for logistics, Burlington 
Northern Santa Fe for railway, and J. B. Hunt for trucking. Plus, port workers and port truckers 
handle much o f Wal-Mart’s goods as they arrive in the United States.
Beyond these operational relationships, Wal-Mart relies on a series o f political relationships to 
carry out its business. As Good Jobs First has demonstrated, the company receives tens of 
millions of dollars worth o f subsidies from state and local governments in the United States. 
Most o f these help it acquire land and build new stores,10 Wal-Mart also relies on state and local 
governments to provide welfare and health care for its workers. Until recently, Wal-Mart and the 
Waltons were not active players in national politics, but since 2004 Wal-Mart has built the 
second-largest corporate lobby in Washington and become one o f the largest donors to the 
Republican Party, while the Waltons have given even more to the most conservative politicians 
and causes.
Government inaction allows Wal-Mart to violate myriad workforce-related laws, such as those 
against unpaid overtime, union busting, gender discrimination, unfair wages, and child labor, to 
name a few. For a time, the Bush administration, through the Department o f Labor, even had an . 
agreement to give Wal-Mart fifteen days’ advance notice before inspecting for child-labor 
violations.11 These are just some o f the examples o f how Wal-Mart’s success rests on the 
continuing destruction o f social regulation,
1,6 Possibilities for Union Cross-Border Comprehensive Campaigns
9 International Labor Rights Fund, Jane Doe v. Wal-Mart, complaint in Superior Court o f the State o f California for 
the County o f Los Angeles, Central District, filed September 13, 2005, http://www.laborrights.org/.
10 Philip Mattera and Anna Purinton, “Shopping for Subsidies: How Wal-Mart Uses Taxpayer Money to Finance Its 
Never-Ending Growth,” Good Jobs First, May 2004.
11 Ann Zimmerman, “U.S. Deal with Wal-Mart Expires,” Wall Street Journal, January 19,2006.
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Wal-Mart is daunting opposition for any union activist. Yet its size and reach creates many 
opportunities for confrontation and many potential allies. With its sprawl-generating expansion, 
environmental destruction, workplace totalitarianism, and racial, gender, and disability 
discrimination, Wal-Mart provokes activists into action. Virtually every group o f Wal-Mart 
stakeholders has its share o f angry protestors, including disgruntled institutional shareholders, 
religious leaders, homeowners and block associations, and government officials. The breadth of 
the opposition (it must get much deeper) means that a cross-border campaign at Wal-Mart truly 
can be comprehensive, taking on the company in every aspect of its operation.
Wal-Mart’s global footprint makes for natural international alliances, most obviously between 
employees in different countries. Unionized workers can share their collective-bargaining 
experience and their contracts, which might provide templates for the demands of non-union 
workers. Cross-border worker-to-worker and union-to-union combinations can be powerful, 
especially if  they can connect with other stakeholder groups in joint activities. The obvious 
connections here are with community, environmental, and labor rights groups, whose combined 
pressure with workers’ organizations could move Wal-Mart management to reconsider its 
policies. Such coalitions have already stopped Wal-Mart from entering dozens of communities. 
The next step is to internationalize their work.
Two less obvious but equally important stakeholder groups are the workers at Wal-Mart 
suppliers and at its logistics partners. These workers are part o f  the web o f relationships that 
generate Wal-Mart’s profit. For this reason, they hold strategic importance. Clearly, well 
organized and supported logistics workers, inside or outside Wal-Mart, could disrupt key nodes 
in the supply chain. Their actions would reverberate throughout the company, just as shutting 
down one or two engine or chassis plants used to bring an automaker to a grinding halt. Already, 
mostly Latino port truck drivers (troqueros) have started organizing at the Los Angeles/Long 
Beach port and the Longshore Workers Coalition is trying to reinvigorate the International 
Longshoremen’s Association at ports along the Eastern seaboard. And, o f course, the 
International Longshore Workers Associations has repeatedly stood up to port companies.
Workers at supplier companies cannot have quite the same operational impact, but their 
organization would be an important source o f solidarity for workers inside Wal-Mart. More 
importantly, their organization would reverberate not just through Wal-Mart’s profit statements, 
but also through much o f the economy by eliminating a key linchpin through which corporations 
compete in the race to the bottom. Wal-Mart supplier workers are already fighting back. There 
were more than 900 workers’ protests in Guangzhou, China, in 2004. Labor rights groups, such 
as the Institute for Contemporary Observation in Shenzhen, China; the Hong Kong Christian 
Industrial Committee; and China Labor Watch, could facilitate connections between Wal-Mart 
workers and workers at its Chinese suppliers,12 In another example, the International Labor 
Rights Fund organized a tour (ongoing at the time o f this writing) o f international Wal-Mart 
supplier workers, including Flory Arevalo, who works at a Korean-owned garment factory in the 
Philippines, and Damaris Meza Guillen, a Nicaraguan garment worker who makes Wal-Mart- 
brand Faded Glory jeans.
12 www.ric.org.hk: www.Chinalaborwatch.org:
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An international perspective to organizing at Wal-Mart is important for another reason and, 
ironically, the strongest evidence for this perspective comes from the local successes anti-Wal- 
Mart activists have had. They have produced miniature social movements that have mobilized all 
the stakeholder groups in their communities in myriad forms o f protest and action, from recall 
elections to court cases to coalition building to procedural interventions to street demonstrations 
to petitions. The lesson seems clear. To have an impact on Wal-Mart, unions and their allies 
must build a social movement that includes all the stakeholders, and in the Wal-Mart 
“community” that means international organizing.
2. Introduction
2.1 Basic Information
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (hereafter referred to as Wal-Mart) is a private sector, for-profit employer. 
Its primary business is operating discount retail stores under a variety o f formats, including 
general merchandise stores, combination general merchandise and grocery stores, and discount 
warehouse clubs. It operates its stores throughout the U.S., Puerto Rico, and fifteen other 
countries. Wal-Mart has principal executive offices located at 702 Southwest 8th Street, 
Bentonville, Arkansas, 72716, with phone number (479) 273-4000 and fax number (479) 273- 
4053. The corporate informational website is www.walmartstores.com. Additional company 
websites include www.Walmart.com. the Wal-Mart online store; www.Samsclub.com. the online 
member warehouse store; www.Walmartfoundation.org. the company’s foundation; and 
www.Walmartfacts.com. a company propaganda site.
Wal-Mart is a publicly-traded company. Its shares trade under the symbol WMT on the New 
York Stock Exchange and the XETRA and Frankfurt Stock Exchange in Germany. On the 
London Stock Exchange, the company’s symbol is WAL. Each share has a par value o f $0,10, 
There were 4,163,490,196 shares of common stock outstanding as o f November 22,2005.13 
Wal-Mart is a component o f the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the Dow Jones Composite Index, 
the S&P 500 Index, the S&P 100 Index, and the American Stock Exchange Major Market Index.
Wal-Mart is the largest corporation in the world by revenue, reporting net income o f more than 
$10.2 billion on revenue of more than $288 billion for the fiscal year ending January 31,2005.
Its domestic revenues o f $229 billion comprised an estimated 2% of U.S. GDP. It is the largest 
non-govemment employer in the world, with 1.8 million employees worldwide, 1.4 million of 
them in the United States.14 Despite its size, Wal-Mart is, essentially, a family-owned company. 
The Walton family owns 40% of the company
Wal-Mart’s auditor is Ernst & Young LLP, 5414 Pinnacle Point Dr., Suite 102, Rogers, 
Arkansas, 72758.
2.2 Company History
13 Wal-Mart, Form 10-Q (2006), December 2 ,2005, p. 1.
14 Wal-Mart, 2005 Annual Report, p. 22; Jason Asaeda, “Industry Surveys-Retailing: General,” November 17, 
2005, p. 6; Wal-Mart, Form 10-K (2005), March 31,2005, p. 13.
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Company founder Sam Walton began his career as a management trainee with retailer J.C. 
Penney, but soon left to set up a small group o f Ben Franklin variety store franchises under the 
name Walton 5 & 10, beginning in 1945, Even as a franchisee, Walton sought to cut costs by 
sourcing his goods directly from suppliers, thus bypassing Ben Franklin’s 25% markup. By the 
1960s, his fifteen stores made him the largest single Ben Franklin franchisee and the largest 
independent variety store operator in the U.S, Nevertheless, Walton sought to expand his 
business further.15
Inspired by observations made while traveling in the Northeast, Walton sought to move into 
what he saw as the next wave in retailing, the discount format. This format, which emerged in 
the U.S. in the 1950s, typically involved high-volume operations selling a wide array o f general 
merchandise at prices lower than competing department stores in simply appointed stores with a 
limited number o f staff. To make the low-price model work, costs had to be lower and volume 
had to be higher. Ben Franklin management turned down Walton’s proposal to develop a line of 
new discount stores, leading him to strike out on his own. In 1962, he opened the first Wal-Mart 
store in Rogers, Arkansas, along with his brother Bud.16 178
Walton’s business model differed from other retailers, not only in terms o f the new discount 
format, but also in his focus on opening stores in small towns. He initially remained close to 
home, opening more stores in Arkansas, Later, Wal-Mart expanded to Missouri and Oklahoma in 
1968. Wal-Mart stores remained limited to the South and lower Midwest (Missouri and Kansas) 
until 1982, when the company opened stores in Nebraska, then Indiana and Iowa in 1983. The 
company would only develop a significant presence in the Northeast and West in the early 
1990s.
Walton relied heavily on the economic, social, and political conditions o f the post-war American 
South. Agricultural automation meant thousands of mostly white men and women were moving 
off farms and looking for work in the 1950s and 1960s. They provided a needy and pliable 
workforce. Massive highway building allowed for the emergence o f commercial centers, such as 
Rogers, Arkansas, home o f the first Wal-Mart, and for the construction o f conveniently located 
warehouse and distribution centers.38
15 Pankaj Ghemawat, Ken A. Mark, and Stephen P. Bradley, “Wal-Mart Stores in 2003,” Harvard Business School 
Case Study, September 18,2003, revised January 30,2004; Hoover’s Company Records, “Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,” 
October 15,2005, p. 11600; Wal-Mart, ‘Timeline”
http://walmartstores.com/GlobalWMStoresWeb/navigate.do7catF6. accessed January 17,2006.
16 Pankaj Ghemawat, Ken A. Mark, and Stephen P. Bradley, “Wal-Mart Stores in 2003,” Harvard Business School 
Case Study, September 18,2003, revised January 30,2004; Hoover’s Company Records, “Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,” 
October 15,2005, p. 11600; Wal-Mart, “Timeline”
http://walmartstores.com/GlobalWMStoresWeb/navigate.do7catF6. accessed January 17,2006; Sandra S. Vance 
and Roy V. Scott, “Sam Walton and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.: A Study in Modem Southern Entrepreneurship,” Journal 
o f Southern History, Vol. 58 (1992), p. 231-252.
17 Sandra S, Vance and Roy V. Scott, “Sam Walton and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.: A Study in Modem Southern 
Entrepreneurship,” Journal o f Southern History, Vol. 58, No. 7? (1992), p. 231-252.
18 This, and the next few paragraphs, rely on Nelson Lichtenstein, “Wal-Mart: A Template for Twenty-First-Century 
Capitalism,” in Wal-Mart: The Face o f Twenty-First-Century Capitalism (New York: New Press, 2006); idem., 
“Supply Chains, Workers’ Chains and the New World o f  Retail Supremacy,” New Labor Forum (forthcoming
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Economic regulation was weak in the South, and Walton took advantage. He consciously broke 
overtime and minimum-wage laws by setting up a series o f businesses that each kept its revenue 
below the threshold at which they would be required to pay the federal minimum wage. As 
Nelson Lichtenstein points out, this was crucial, since the minimum wage reached its 20th- 
century peak in 1968. Courts eventually ruled that Walton’s corporate structure was a ruse to 
avoid the law, but by then inflation was eating way at the minimum wage.
Walton also took advantage o f weak labor laws and their even weaker enforcement in the South. 
He even took advantage o f differences within the South. He was the first discount retailer to 
build his own warehouse and distribution centers. He built the first ones in Arkansas, not in 
Missouri, even though it was “Wal-Mart’s growth frontier all through the 1970s,” according to 
Lichtenstein, because the Teamsters were strong in Missouri, Still, Wal-Mart’s growth was so 
rapid that it took a toll on warehouse workers in Bentonville and sparked several wildcat strikes 
and unionizing drives during the 1970s, Walton crushed these by hiring John Tate, an anti-union 
lawyer skilled in the latest union avoidance techniques, Tate convinced Walton to introduce a 
profit-sharing scheme for hourly employees as a way to avoid new union organizing drives. 
Employees had to work two years to qualify, but with wages so low and turnover so high, few 
qualified, saving Walton millions of dollars. Tate later developed the anti-union squads that 
Walton regularly deployed to Wal-Mart stores at the first sign o f union activity.
With low prices and folksy marketing, Walton’s chain proved popular. To expand, he 
consolidated the varied corporate shells he had created and incorporated them as Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. in 1969, In 1970, he took the company public, and by 1972 its stock traded on the 
New York Stock Exchange. With the influx o f outside capital, Walton grew rapidly through the 
1970s, moving from 38 stores with $44.2 million in sales and 1,500 employees in 1970 to 276 
stores with $1.2 billion in sales and 21,000 associates by 1979. The company’s stock split three 
times in those ten years. Walton phased out all o f his Ben Franklin franchises by 1976. Despite 
the growth, Walton did not give up on his paternalistic approach to his workforce; after a visit to 
Korea, he introduced the “Wal-Mart Cheer.”19
The cheer was just one aspect o f the distinctive corporate culture Walton developed and diffused 
throughout his company during the 1970s and 1980s. Even today, nearly fourteen years after his 
death, the company’s publicity emphasizes its homespun style inherited from “Mr. Sam.” All 
employees are "associates,” a term Walton got from his days at J.C. Penny. Management recites 
and enforces Walton’s rules, such as the “Three Basic Beliefs” (Respect for the Individual,
2006); Bob Ortega, In Sam We Trust: The Untold Story o f Sam Walton and How Wal-Mart is Devouring America 
(New York: Times Business/Random House, 1998); and Sam Walton with John Huey, Sam Walton: Made In 
America (New York: Bantam Books, 1992).
19 Pankaj Ghemawat, Ken A. Mark, and Stephen P. Bradley, “Wal-Mart Stores in 2003,” Harvard Business School 
Case Study, September 18,2003, revised January 30,2004; Hoover’s Company Records, “Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,” 
October 15,2005, p. 11600; Wal-Mart, "Timeline”
http://walmartstores.com/GlobalWMStoresWeb/navigate.do?catg=6. accessed January 17,2006. The cheer: Give me 
a W! Give me an A! Give me an L! Give me a squiggly! Give me an M! Give me an A! Give me an R! Give me a T! 
What’s that spell? Wal-Mart! Whose Wal-Mart is it? It’s my Wal-Mart! Who’s number one? The customer!
Always!
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Service to Our Customers, and Strive for Excellence), the “Sundown Rule” (always resolve 
problems before the sun goes down), and the “ten-foot rule” (which requires employees to smile 
and greet any customer that comes within ten feet). Everyone still does the cheer, too.
Wal-Mart grew even more dramatically through the 1980s, reaching 1,525 stores with sales of 
$25.8 billion and 271,000 employees at the close o f the decade.20 By that time, it had established 
a presence in 26 states, and its stock had split another four times. Additionally, Wal-Mart began 
moving to acquire rival retailers more aggressively, swallowing up Kuhn’s Big K, Woolco, and 
Grand Central Stores. The company also began introducing new store formats, opening its first 
Sam’s Club warehouse store in 1983 (following the model o f Costco), and its first 
Hypermart *US A, a hybrid general merchandise and grocery format later re-branded as Wal-Mart 
Supercenters, in 1987. The Neighborhood Market, a relatively small 40,000-square-foot format 
arrived in 1998.21
Perhaps even more importantly, the 1980s marked the time when Wal-Mart began to distinguish 
itself as a leader in technological innovation. It mainstreamed the use o f Uniform Product Codes 
on grocery and general merchandise products, and led the introduction and diffusion of 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) technology. This provided an unprecedented capacity to mine 
sales data and, in combination with Wal-Mart’s growing network of distribution centers, enabled 
more efficient inventory and supply chain management.22 In 1987 the company also launched 
the Wal-Mart Satellite Network, which it claims to be the “largest private satellite 
communication system in the U.S.” This network connects every single Wal-Mart store and 
distribution center to the home office in Bentonville via voice, data, and video communication, 
allowing a high level of centralized coordination.23
In 1988, founder Sam Walton passed control of the company to new CEO, David Glass. Walton 
had hired Glass away from a competitor, bringing him on as Executive Vice President of Finance 
and Distribution in 1976. Glass was a major force in persuading Walton to invest in the new 
information technologies (IT) that helped to transform the retail industry in the 1980s. Sam 
Walton died in 1992, followed by co-founder Bud Walton in 1995.24
Wal-Mart began the 1990s as the nation’s largest retailer, and then expanded aggressively into 
the Northeastern and Western regions of the U.S., establishing stores in all fifty states and Puerto 
Rico by 1995. It also continued to buy up smaller competitors. In 1990, Wal-Mart bought 
wholesale distributor McLane Company and 91 Pace Warehouse stores a year later.
20 Wal-Mart, 1990 Annual Report. '
21 Hoover’s Company Records, “Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,” October 15,2005, p. 11600; Wal-Mart, "Timeline” 
httP://walmartstores.com/GlobalWMStoresWeb/navigate.do?catg=6. accessed January 17,2006; Sandra S. Vance 
and Roy V. Scott, “Sam Walton and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.: A Study in Modem Southern Entrepreneurship,” Journal 
o f  Southern History, Vol. 58, (1992), p. 231-252.
22 Robert H. McGuckin, Matthew Spiegelman, and Bart van Ark, “The Retail Revolution -  Can Europe Match U.S. 
Productivity Performance?” 2005.
23 Wal-Mart, “Timeline” http://walmartstores.com/GlobalWMStoresWeb/navigate.do?catg=6. accessed January 17, 
2006.
24 Pankaj Ghemawat, -Ken A. Mark, and Stephen P. Bradley, “Wal-Mart Stores in 2003,” Harvard Business School 
Case Study, September 18,2003, revised January 30, 2004.
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After an initial foray into Mexico in 1991, Wal-Mart set up an International Division in 1993, 
quickly establishing a strong international presence through acquisitions, joint ventures, and 
expansions, Even before the International Division’s launch, Wal-Mart expanded in Mexico 
through a joint venture with the country’s largest retailer, Ciffa (renamed Wal-Mart de Mexico in 
2000), Wal-Mart bought 122 former Woolco stores in Canada in 1994, and built three stores in 
Argentina and five in Brazil in 1995. In 1996, it entered China through a joint venture. To get 
into Germany in 1997, Wal-Mart bought the 21-store Wertkauf chain and the 74-unit Interspar 
hypermarket chain a year later. In 1998, the company launched a joint venture in Korea, and a 
year later it bought Asda, the third-largest grocery chain in the U.K. Wal-Mart finally entered 
Japan in 2002, by buying a 36% stake in retailer Seiyu, with options for up to 67% by 2007. By 
the close of fiscal year 2000 (January 2000), it had reached 3,989 stores in nine countries, with 
sales of $165 billion and 1,140,000 employees. In addition to being the largest retailer in the 
U.S., it is now the largest in Canada and Mexico.25
In 2000, CEO David Glass handed the reins to former COO H. Lee Scott. The next year, 
following the bankruptcy and closure of Montgomery Ward, Wal-Mart offered to replace Ward 
credit cards with Wal-Mart cards. It formed an alliance with America Online to offer Internet 
access and later launched its No Boundaries private-label cosmetics for pre-teens and teenagers.
It laid off 100 employees at its corporate headquarters and eliminated 300 unfilled positions. In 
August 2001, it tested the sale of Sealy and private-label mattresses in some o f its superstores, 
and it began offering college textbooks discounted up to 30% at its online College Bookstore,
In April 2002, Fortum magazine crowned Wal-Mart America’s largest corporation, but the news 
was not all good. In a rare defeat, Wal-Mart closed its first store in Germany, and 2,000 workers 
there went on a two-day strike over wages. The company had already scrapped plans to open 
fifty more Supercenters in Germany by 2003. Also in 2002, Wal-Mart Puerto Rico acquired 
Supermercados Amigo, the #1 supermarket chain on the island. Overall in 2002, Wal-Mart 
opened 178 supercenters, 33 discount stores, and 25 Sam’s Club stores. It opened 107 
international units, with two in Brazil, 22 in Canada, eight in China, two in Germany, three in 
South Korea, 59 in Mexico, two in Puerto Rico, and nine in the U.K, The company's attempt to 
open a state industrial bank in California in 2002 failed, however, after legislators barred retailers 
from owning banks.26
In May 2003, in a rare divestment, Wal-Mart sold its McLane grocery distribution business to 
Berkshire Hathaway, In July, it opened its first store in Beijing and acquired the 118-store 
Bompre90 chain o f Brazilian supermarkets from Royal Ahold for $300 million. In March 2003, 
Wal-Mart opened its online music store, which sells digital downloads for 11 cents less than 
major competitors, such as Napster and Apple iTunes. Two years later, Wal-Mart signed Garth 
Brooks to a multi-year exclusive contract under which only Wal-Mart-owned stores will sell the
25 Wal-Mart, “Timeline” http://waImartstores.com/GlobalWMStoresWeb/navigate.do?catg=6. accessed January 17, 
2006; Wal-Mart, Form 10-K (2000), p, 2, 9; Tim Weiner, “Wal-Mart Invades, and Mexico Gladly Surrenders,” The 
New York Times, December 6 ,2003, p. 1.
26 Hoover’s Company Records, “Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,” October 15,2005, p, 11600.
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country music star’s music. The deal marked the first time an artist contracted himself and his 
entire catalog o f music with a single chain.27
In December 2005, Wal-Mart acquired 140 stores in Brazil from Portuguese retailer Sonae for 
about $757 million, increasing the number of outlets it operates in Brazil to nearly 300.
Wal-Mart grew less rapidly after 2000. In January 2005, it had 5,289 stores in nine countries, 
with sales o f $288 billion and 1.7 million employees over the previous twelve months.28 Wal- 
Mart now opens approximately one new store every single day, including as many as 165 stores 
internationally in 2005.29 Moreover, in recent years Wal-Mart has transcended its position as 
simply the dominant retailer in the U,8. to become a model for U.S, corporations as a whole. 
Fortune magazine named Wal-Mart “America’s Most Admired Company” for both 2003 and 
2004, and the company has now replaced General Motors as the archetypal case study at top U.S. 
business schools.30
Wal-Mart’s success is not unalloyed. Since the turn o f the century, the company has faced a 
number o f embarrassing episodes and, more importantly, concerted opposition from a number of 
groups. In June 2001 a group o f six current and former female Wal-Mart employees filed a sex- 
discrimination lawsuit seeking to represent up to 500,000 current and former Wal-Mart workers 
against the company. In June 2004, a U.S. District Court Judge certified the class action in Dukes 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, Wal-Mart has appealed the class action certification and the case is in 
limbo until the U.S. Court o f Appeals rules.31
In February 2004, a federal judge ruled that Wal-Mart should pay workers for overtime hours 
after workers said the company forced them to work unpaid overtime between 1994 and 1999. 
Two months later, voters in Inglewood, California, overwhelmingly rejected Wal-Mart's 
proposal to build a supercenter. Wal-Mart sought to bypass local development and 
environmental regulations by spending more than $1 million to take its case to the voters. Then
27 Hoover’s Company Records, “Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,” October 15,2005, p. 11600.
28 Wal-Mart, 2005 Annual Report, March 31, p. 22.
29 Jerry Useem, Julie Schlosser, and Helen Kim, "One Nation Under Wal-Mart,” Fortune, Vol. 147, Iss. 4, March 3, 
2003, p. 64; Evelyn Iritani, “Unions go abroad in fight with Wal-Mart; As the giant retailer expands to other 
countries, labor leaders are there to greet it,” Los Angeles Times, August 24,2005, p. 1.
30 Wal-Mart slipped to number 4 on Fortune ’s  list in 2005. Jerry Useem, “America’s Most Admired Companies 
Falling prices. Squeezed margins. Brutal competition. For this elite set o f corporations, it's the perfect time to do 
business. Here’s why the best prevail,” Fortune, March 7 ,2005, p, 66; Ann Harrington, “America’s Most Admired 
Companies Recent bad press hasn’t dimmed the business world’s affection for Wal-Mart. Plus, once-sluggish IBM 
surges onto the top ten list,” Fortune, March 8,2004, p. 80; Nicholas Stein, “America’s Most Admired Companies; 
All hail Starbucks, P&G, Dell -  and o f course new No. 1 Wal-Mart,” Fortune, Vol. 147, Iss. 4, March 3,2003, p.
81; Constance L. Hays, “The Wal-Mart Way Becomes Topic A in Business Schools,” New York Times, July 27, 
2003, p. 10.
31 http://www.walmartclass.com/walmartclass casedevelooments.html: The Impact Fund, “Federal Judge Orders 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the Nation’s Largest Private Employer, to Stand Trial for Company-Wide Sex 
Discrimination; Class Certification Creates Largest Civil Rights Class Action Ever,” Press Release, June 22,2004, 
http://www.walmartclass.com/staticdata/press releases/classcertpressrelease06222004.htmL accessed January 17, 
2006.
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in May 2004, Wal-Mart agreed to pay $3.1 million in fines for violating the Clean Water Act at 
24 sites in nine states.32
In January 2005, Wal-Mart agreed to pay $135,540 to settle federal charges that it violated child 
labor laws. The 24 violations, which the retailer denied, involved teenage workers in three states 
using hazardous equipment such as chain saws, paper balers, and fork lifts. Soon after, a judge 
ordered Wal-Mart to pay $7.5 million in damages to a disabled former employee who claimed 
the retailer unfairly reassigned him. In March the retailer settled a high-profile lawsuit by 
agreeing to pay $11 million to the U.S, government to close an investigation into the use of 
illegal immigrants by Wal-Mart contractors to clean its stores.
Also in March 2005, vice chairman Tom Coughlin resigned prematurely from the Wal-Mart 
board of directors following an internal investigation that uncovered “unauthorized use of 
corporate-owned gift cards and personal reimbursements,” In June the company rescinded 
Coughlin’s retirement agreement, including stock awards and incentive payments, which could 
total as much as $12 million. In January 2006, newspapers reported that Coughlin would plead 
guilty to federal charges that he defrauded Wal-Mart o f at least $350,000,33
Thus, while Wal-Mart continues to grow and retains the admiration o f the business community, 
it faces a growing number o f challenges from workers, consumers, and community and 
environmental activists.
3, Operations
Wal-Mart’s operations are immense and beyond easy characterization. Nevertheless, a few 
general conclusions are possible. First, Wal-Mart, has a relatively simple corporate structure, 
especially in the United States. Its “reported” list o f subsidiaries includes only Wal-Mart Stores 
East LP, Wal-Mart Property Company, Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust, and ASDA Group 
Limited (England). All its other subsidiaries are too small, under 10% of sales or assets, to 
require reporting under SEC guidelines.34 Second, the company is highly centralized, especially 
in the United States. Management at headquarters controls as much as it possibly can at every 
one of its stores, right down to setting the thermostat and ambient music,35 Third, Wal-Mart 
relies heavily on technology to control its operations, including the world’s largest private 
satellite network to communicate with its stores, universal product codes to track its sales, and 
radio frequency identification chips to follow its merchandise through its supply chain.36
32 Hoover’s Company Records, “Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,” October 15,2005, p. 11600.
33 Michael Barbato, “Ex-Wal-Mart Executive Expected to Plead Guilty to Fraud,” New York Times, January 7,2006, 
p. C3; James Bandler, “Former No. 2 at Wal-Mart Set to Plead Guilty,” Wall Street Journal, January 7 ,2006, p, A 1.
34 Wal-Mart, Form 10-K (2005), March 31,2005, “Exhibit 21 -  Subsidiaries o f  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc,,” p. 2. We 
discuss the international subsidiaries below,
35 Victoria Brett, “Retailers embrace technology to control costs and ambiance,” Associated Press State & Local 
Wire, June 29,2001; Anita French, “Wal-Mart Finds It’s Not Easy Being Green,” February 9 ,2005 , The Morning 
News (Northwest Arkansas), http://www.nwaonline.net/articles/2005/02/09/business/01wmgreenstore.prt. accessed 
January 6,2006,
36 Wal-Mart, “Timeline,” httD://walmartstores.com/GlobalWMStoresWeb/navigate.do?catg=6. accessed January 17, 
2006.
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3.1 Business Segments
Wal-Mart divides its business into three segments: Wal-Mart Stores, Sam’s Club, and 
International, Wal-Mart Stores is the largest o f the three segments, accounting for 67,3% of 
fiscal 2005 sales. The segment has four store formats: Supercenters, Discount Stores, 
Neighborhood Markets, and www.wal-mart.com, Sam’s Club comprises the remainder of Wal- 
Mart’s domestic retail activity, accounting for 13% of fiscal 2005 sales. It includes warehouse 
membership clubs and www.samsclub.com.
W al-Mart U.S. Stores by Format37
Discount Stores 1,209
Supercenters 1,980
Sam's Clubs 567
Neighborhood Markets 101
The International segment accounts for the remaining 19.7% o f fiscal 2005 sales. This segment 
includes all Wal-Mart operations outside the U.S. It includes Puerto Rico, Wal-Mart uses several 
ownership structures for its international operations. It operates wholly-owned subsidiaries in 
Argentina, Canada, Germany, Puerto Rico, South Korea, and the United Kingdom, majority- 
owned subsidiaries in Brazil and Mexico, and joint ventures in China. It also holds a 54% stake 
in Japanese supermarket retailer Seiyu, and a 33.3% stake in Central American Retail Holding 
Company (CARHCO), with operations in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua.38
Wal-Mart came by most o f its wholly-owned and majority-owned subsidiaries through 
acquisition, including Bompre9o and Sonae in Brazil, Woolco in Canada, Wertkauf and Interspar 
in Germany, ASDA in Great Britain, Ciffa in Mexico, Amigo in Puerto Rico, and Makro in 
South Korea.39 In some countries, the stores use the name Wal-Mart, while in others they keep 
the acquired .company’s name.
Wal-Mart’s operations in China, Japan, and Central America are somewhat different. In China, 
the company initially formed a partnership with the Thailand-based Charoen Pokphand Group. 
However, that relationship quickly fell apart.40 It now operates in China with a joint-venture 
agreement between Wal-Mart East China Stores Co, and CITIC Pacific Limited, a Hong Kong- 
based holding company. On March 11, 2005, CITIC Pacific shifted its 35% equity stake in the 
joint venture from its CITIC Trust & Investment Co., Ltd. subsidiary, which is incorporated in
37 As o f  January 31,2006. httP://investor.walmartstores.com/phoenix.zhtml?c= 112761 &p=irol-irhome. accessed 
February 3,2005.
38 Wal-Mart, “Always Growing, Wal-Mart Adds More.Than 50,000 Jobs,” Press Release, December 16,2005; 
idem., “Wal-Mart Announces Central American Investment,” Press Release, September 20,2005.
39 David Yoffie and Barbara J. Mack, “Wal-Mart,” Harvard Business School Case Study, January 4,2005; David 
Liang, “The Big Store Goes Global: What retailers can learn from Wal-Mart’s international expansion,” 
SternBusiness (NYU), Spring/Summer 2003,
http://www.stem.nvu.edu/Stembusiness/spring summer 2003/bigstore.html. accessed January 17, 2006.
40 David Yoffie and Barbara J. Mack, “Wal-Mart,” Harvard Business School Case Study, January 4,2005.
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China as a subsidiary o f CITIC Beijing, to its Sky Rich Investments Ltd, subsidiary, which is 
incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, The transaction was valued at $3.6 million.41
In Japan, Wal-Mart has purchased a progressively larger stake in domestic retailer Seiyu, which 
operates approximately 403 stores throughout Japan, with 35,426 employees. In 2004, the 
company reported a loss o f $119.5 million on sales o f more than $10 billion.42 On September 30, 
2005, Wal-Mart announced it would exercise its option to purchase a 54% share o f Seiyu, 
making the company a full Wal-Mart subsidiary, Seiyu shareholders approved the purchase on 
December 15,2005.43 Based on the schedule o f when the warrants are exercisable, Wal-Mart 
projects that it will own approximately 70% of Seiyu stock by December 2007,44
Wal-Mart purchased its interest in CARHCO from Dutch supermarket giant Royal Ahold in 
September 2005. CARHCO is Central America’s largest retailer, with 363 supermarkets and 
other stores in the following countries: Guatemala (120), El Salvador (57), Honduras (32), 
Nicaragua (30) and Costa Rica (124), CARHCO has approximately 23,000 employees. Its sales 
during 2004 were approximately $2.0 billion. The other owners o f CARHCO are the Paiz family, 
which is the majority shareholder in Guatemalan retail conglomerate La Fragua; and the 
Corporation de Supermercados Unidos (CSU), based in Costa Rica.45
3.1,1 Products and Services
Wal-Mart discount retail activities fall into the following categories, as defined by SIC and 
NAICS codes:
U.S. SIC Codes 
Core code:
53 General Merchandise Stores 
Primary Codes:
5331 Variety Stores
5411 Grocery Stores
5311 Department Stores
5399 Misc. General Merchandise Stores
5812 Eating Places
5912 Drug Stores and Proprietary Stores
41 CITIC Pacific Limited, Annual Report 2004, p. 5 ,76 .
http://www.citicpacific.com/eng/inv/report/pdfyannual/2004/citic04ar.pdf. accessed January 18,2006; CITIC Pacific 
Limited, "Connected Transaction: Acquisition O f Interest In Wal-Mart East China Stores Co., Ltd.,”
Announcement, March 14,2005, http://www.citicpacific.eom/upload/en/20050314ADV-E.pdf. accessed January 18, 
2006.
42 Hoover’s Company Records, October 15,2005, p. 52331.
43 Fackler and Bayot 2005; Hudson and Woods 2005; Obayashi and Inoue 2005; Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 2005c.
44 Wal-Mart did not include financial information for Seiyu in its International segment in fiscal year 2005. Rather, 
Wal-Mart reports Seiyu in a category entitled Other. See Wal-Mart, 2005 Annual Report, March 31,2005, p. 48. 
Now that Wal-Mart is the majority owner o f  Seiyu, it will probably consolidate its results in the International 
segment.
45 Wal-Mart, "Wal-Mart Announces Central American Investment,” Press Release, September 20,2005.
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NAICS Codes 
Core eode:
453 General Merchandise Stores 
Primary code:
452990 All Other General Merchandise Stores
445110 Supermarkets and Other Grocery (except Convenience) Stores
446110 Pharmacies and Drug Stores
452111 Department Stores (except Discount Department Stores)
452910 Warehouse Clubs and Superstores 
722110 Full-Service Restaurants
Wal-Mart sells thousands o f products and dozens of services. Just what it sells varies with the 
“format” it uses. The company has four basic domestic formats: Discount Stores, Supercenters, 
Neighborhood Markets, and Sam’s Clubs. It also sells items via several web sites.
Discount Stores sell a broad range o f products, such as apparel for women, girls, men, boys and 
infants; shoes, fabrics and notions; stationery and books; CDs; housewares and hardware, 
electronics; home furnishings; small appliances; automotive accessories; horticulture and 
accessories; sporting goods and toys; pet food and pet accessories; cameras and supplies; health 
and beauty aids; pharmaceuticals; jewelry; glasses and contact lenses; and photo processing 
services. Most Discount Stores carry a limited assortment o f dry grocery merchandise, while a 
number of larger Discount Stores in some markets carry a broader assortment o f grocery items, 
including perishable items. The discount stores average 98,079 square feet, employ an average of 
225 workers, and sell 62,500 items.46 Wal-Mart is the process o f converting many of its 
Discount Stores into Supercenters, either through expansion or by moving them to larger sites.
Supercenters are the largest format in the Wal-Mart Stores segment. They carry the full line of 
general merchandise items that the Discount Stores carry, plus a full line of grocery items, 
including meat, produce, deli, bakery, dairy, frozen foods, and dry grocery. Many include 
specialty shops, such as vision centers, Tire & Lube Expresses, Radio Grill, McDonald’s or 
Subway restaurants, portrait studios and one-hour photo centers, hair salons, banks, and 
employment agencies. On average, Supercenters are 186,077 square feet, employ 350 workers, 
and sell 116,000 items.47
Neighborhood Markets are smaller-scale stores that carry a full line o f grocery items, along 
with a limited selection o f general merchandise. They are generally organized into departments, 
including dry grocery, meat, produce, deli, bakery, dairy, frozen foods, pharmaceuticals, photo 
processing, health and beauty aids, household chemicals, paper goods, general merchandise and 
pet supplies. The average Neighborhood Market is 42,286 square feet, employs 95 workers, and
46 Wal-Mart, “Our Retail Divisions,” http://www.walmartfaets,com/newsdesk/article.aspx?id=769. accessed January 
6, 2006.
47 Wal-Mart, “Our Retail Divisions,” http://www.walmartfacts.com/newsdesk/article.aspx?id=769. accessed January
6,2006.
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sells 38,845 items.48
Sam’s Clubs are warehouse clubs that require membership dues. Wal-Mart aims them at small 
businesses. Merchandise includes hard goods, some soft goods, and institutional-size grocery 
items. Generally, each Sam’s Club carries software, electronics, computers and cameras, home 
furnishings and appliances, lawn and garden and other outdoor items, jewelry, sporting goods, 
apparel, pet needs, movies and CDs, toys, tires, stationery and books, hardware, and automotive 
accessories. Most clubs have fresh departments, which include bakery, meat, produce, floral, and 
Sam’s Cafe. Members can also purchase mobile phones and calling plans, as well as tickets to 
entertainment and sporting events, attractions, and theme parks. Membership fees are $35 per 
year for businesses and $40 per year for individuals. The average Sam’s Club is 128,000 square 
feet, employs 160-175 people, and offers 6,000 items.
W al-Mart Store Formats49
Store Format Average Size (square feet) Average Employees Average Products
Discount Stores 98,079 225 62,500
Supercenters 186,077 350 116,000
Neighborhood Markets 42,286 95 38,845
Sam’s Club 128,000 175 6,000
All Wal-Mart store formats offer a large and growing variety o f services. Nearly all Wal-Mart 
stores o f all formats feature photo processing services and pharmacies, as well as money order 
purchasing and domestic and international money transfers. Many also feature vision centers, 
portrait studios, tire & lube centers, gas stations, and mobile phone and calling plan centers. Wal- 
Mart also offers a variety of financial services, including branded credit and debit/ATM cards, 
payroll check cashing, check printing, express bill payment, credit report ordering, and birth 
certificate ordering. It operates vacation-planning centers at eleven Supercenters in four states 
(Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, and Texas).
In addition to nationally-branded merchandise, Wal-Mart offers private-label goods under store 
brands such as “Sam’s Choice,” “Member’s Mark,” “Bakers & Chefs,” “One Source,” “Great 
Value,” “Everstart,” Everactive,” “OP Roy,” “Puritan,” “Equate,” “No Boundaries,” “George,” 
“Athletic Works” and “Kid Connection.” Wal-Mart also markets lines o f merchandise under 
licensed brands, some o f which include “Faded Glory,” “General Electric,” “Disney,”
“Catalina,” “McDonald’s,” “Mary-Kate and Ashley” and “Starter,”
According to a company policy known as “store of the community,” Wal-Mart varies the mix of 
merchandise depending on the demographic composition o f the region in which a given store is 
located.
48 Wal-Mart, “Our Retail Divisions,” http://www,walmartfacts,com/newsdesk/article.aspx?id=769. accessed January
6,2006.
49 Wal-Mart, “Our Retail Divisions,” http://www.walmartfacts.com/newsdesk/article.aspx?id=769. accessed January
6,2006.
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W al-Mart Sales by Category50
Grocery, candy and tobacco 28%
Hardgoods 19%
Softgoods and domestics 16%
Pharmaceuticals 9%
Electronics 9%
Health and beauty aids 7%
Sporting goods and toys 6%
Stationery and books 3%
Photo processing ' 1%
Jewelry 1%
Shoes 1%
Total 100%
Outside the United States, Wal-Mart and its joint-venture partners operate the four U.S. store 
formats under their brand names, plus formats specific to the locality,51 In Mexico, Wal-Mart has 
the four U.S. store formats, plus Superama, a traditional supermarket; Bodega, a combination of 
discount store and grocery store; Suburbia, a specialty department store; and Vips, a restaurant.
In Brazil the company has Todo Dia, which combines a discount store and grocery store; and 
Balaios, a discount food and general merchandise store. In the United Kingdom, Wal-Mart owns 
ASDA, which combines grocery and apparel, and George, an apparel store. In Puerto Rico, Wal- 
Mart operates Amigo supermarkets.
Merchandise in the International segment stores is similar in its scope and variety to that Wal- 
Mart offers in its U,S, stores. However, the company varies the mix o f merchandise by country 
to reflect regional and cultural preferences. This entails offering national-branded goods 
characteristic o f that country, and private-label products under brand names not found in U.S. 
stores. It also involves sourcing merchandise from local vendors in some cases.
3,2 Organization o f Production and Services
Wal-Mart has three basic activities: 91) buying a wide array of finished goods from suppliers 
around the world (procurement); (2) moving those finished goods to their stores around the 
world (logistics); and (3) selling them (marketing). Sounds simple, but Wal-Mart has more than 
5,000 stores selling 50,000 to 100,000 different items from 60,000 suppliers. This complicated 
logistical challenge, combined with the company’s zeal to cut prices and costs, has made Wal- 
Mart both an innovator and a mimic o f the most advanced techniques in “supply chain 
management,” the series of tasks and relationships involved in procuring, transporting, and 
selling goods.
In the area o f procurement, the most important aspect of Wal-Mart’s evolution is its ability to 
dictate to suppliers, Wal-Mart’s logistics revolution has come through a series o f technological 
and organizational innovations that lower the costs o f moving and storing goods. And finally, its
50 For U.S. Discount Stores and Supercenters only. Wal-Mart, Form 10-K (2005), March 31, 2005, p. 10.
51 See table “Wal-Mart International Stores by Country and Format” in the Appendix.
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religious zeal to sell goods at the lowest prices has transformed retail marketing. Of course, Wal- 
Mart is not the only company revolutionizing the retail industry, but in each o f these areas -  
procurement, logistics, and marketing -  it is at the forefront of a series of trends that have 
reshaped world capitalism.
Over the past several decades, concurrent with Wal-Mart’s rise, retailers have turned the tables 
on manufacturers. In the past, in what Edna Bonacich and Khaleelah Hardie call the “supply- 
push” model, manufacturers filled the various channels of the supply chain with the goods that 
they wanted to sell at a price that would make them profitable. Retailers navigated a web of 
manufacturers’ representatives, jobbers, and middlemen to procure the stock for their shelves. 
Wherever possible, manufacturers made sure retailers were on the hook for unsold goods. If the 
retailers could not sell what they bought, they had little recourse. Today, manufacturers, not Wal- 
Mart, are on the hook. An example comes from an oft-repeated story. Wal-Mart sells Huffy 
bicycles, made in China. Wal-Mart tells Huffy to import 50,000 bicycles and store them in its 
distribution center. Wal-Mart delivers the bikes to its stores in small lots “just in time,” 
according to a schedule determined by the company’s extensive sales database. At the end of the 
season, Wal-Mart has sold only 30,000 bikes, and Huffy must scramble to sell the rest. Bonacich 
and Hardie call the new, retailer-dominated model “demand-pull.”52
Wal-Mart’s logistics revolution rests on the intense exploitation o f information technology. The 
company has the largest private satellite system in the world and the largest private electronic 
database in the world. Using information gathered about every aspect of the business, the 
company continually tweaks each link in the supply chain, from supplier packaging to shipping 
to trucking to distribution centers to store shelves. To gather information, the company was one 
of the first to implement the Universal Product Code (bar code), which provides extraordinarily 
useful data about shopping patterns. The company is also the first to demand that its top 100 
suppliers use Radio Frequency Identification tags for their pallets (at first) and goods (later), so it 
knows where its products are at all times. Information gathered and analyzed from UPC and 
RFID provides the basis for innovations like just-in-time (JIT) delivery, in which small lots 
arrive precisely when store shelves empty to receive them, or automated purchase orders in 
which suppliers learn immediately when they must have goods ready for shipment. The goal is 
always the same -  get the right goods to the right places at the right times at the lowest possible 
cost -  and Wal-Mart continually squeezes more out o f its supply chain,
Wal-Mart’s marketing innovation involved selling low-price goods to rural Americans. Again, it 
was not the first, but it perfected the process. By opening stores in rural areas, Wait-Mart 
avoided urban tastes, city planning officials, federal New Deal legislation, and, most importantly, 
unions and competition. Consistently low prices produced loyal customers, and a rich corporate 
culture reinforced that loyalty, Wal-Mart culture identified workers (including executives) and 
customers as members o f the same community, holding similar values o f thrift and service. The 
company, particularly its leader Sam Walton, projected an image o f entrepreneurial paternalism 
in which the entrepreneur, and by extension his store, acted as the father o f the community of 
workers and customers. Remarkably, Wal-Mart has managed to retain much o f that corporate
52 Edna Bonacich and Khaleelah Hardie, “Wal-Mart and the Logistics Revolution,” in Wal-Mart: The Face o f  
Twenty-First-Century Capitalism, edited by Nelson Lichtenstein (New York: New Press, 2005), p. 163-187.
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culture and build new customer loyalty even as it has moved beyond its original territory. The 
low prices help, no doubt.53
Wal-Mart has accomplished these changes using a highly centralized model of organization, with 
corporate headquarters in Bentonville directly controlling all activity at all stores and warehouses 
worldwide, right down to the temperature and music o f every U.S, store. Even with the very 
recent management reorganization, every week a cadre of Wal-Mart executives fan out from 
Bentonville on private company jets to visit individual stores and distribution centers, along with 
the competition. They meet with store managers, department heads, and employees to gather 
intelligence on store-level sales, and then fly back to Bentonville on Thursday night to compare 
notes on Friday, as well as make decisions about product sales and promotions for the following 
week. On Saturday, the company has its famous “Saturday morning meeting,” a meeting o f more 
than 500 top Bentonville executives, combined with a teleconference linking all U.S. stores via 
the company private satellite network. At the meeting, headquarters lays out strategy for the 
coming week. Each meeting ends with the Wal-Mart cheer,54
While acknowledging the high level of centralization at Wal-Mart, it is worth noting that store- 
level management does have a certain degree of autonomy. Top management allows them access 
to detailed sales information for their stores, department by department, and allows them to make 
some o f their own decisions about in-store promotions and pricing -  as long as it’s lower than 
recommended.55 Also, under the rubric o f “Store o f the Community,” Wal-Mart allows store- 
level managers to make decisions about stocking items to cater to the local community,56
Wal-Mart’s highly centralized organizational structure rests on information technology, which 
provides data about and control of company operations. Satellite and telecom networks link 
every Wal-Mart store, distribution center, and regional office to headquarters.57 In addition to 
monitoring in-store climates, management can keep close tabs on store-level management, 
including monitoring weekly payroll data and union activity.58 It can also disseminate 
information to the stores quickly and efficiently, ensuring a uniform and consistent corporate
53 Nelson Lichtenstein, “Wal-Mart: Template for Twenty-First-Century Capitalism,” and Bethany E. Moreton, “It 
Came from Bentonville: The Agrarian Origins o f Wal-Mart Culture,” both in Wal-Mart: The Face o f  Twenty-First- 
Century Capitalism, edited by Nelson Lichtenstein (New York: New Press, 2006).
54 Andreas Knorr and Andreas Amdt, "Why Did Wal-Mart Fail in Germany?" (Bremen, Germany: Institute for 
World Economics and International Management, 2003); Brad Seligman, "Patriarchy at the Check-out Counter," 
New Labor Forum 14, no. 1 (2005). For a detailed description o f  Wal-Mart’s centralized management hierarchy, see 
William T. Bielby, "Expert Report o f  William T, Bielby, Ph.D. In Betty Dukes et al. V. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.," 
(Berkeley: 2003); Ron Ashkenaz, "Breaking Down Barriers,” Industrial Management (1999); "Wal around the 
World," Economist 361, no. 8251, December 6,2001.
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56 Wal-Mart Stores Inc., "Form 10-K (Annual Report)," (Bentonville, Ark.: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2005).
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[accessed August 22 2005]); available from
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culture.59 Not surprisingly, several top Wal-Mart executives, including the two CEOs who 
followed founder Sam Walton, David Glass and Lee Scott, came out of the logistics and 
distribution.60
Wal-Mart’s central units o f operation are the store and the distribution center. The store is the 
focus o f a management hierarchy that Wal-Mart calls store operations. The distribution center is 
the focus of what Wal-Mart calls logistics and supply chain. Ordinarily, we would discuss 
distribution along with procurement, but because Wal-Mart has separated these functions and 
because it has tightly-integrated stores and distribution centers, we group the discussions 
together in the following subsections.
3.2.1 Store Operations
The basic workforce of a Wal-Mart store is composed o f “associates,” or hourly employees.
They unload the trailers coming in the back o f the store, stock the shelves, clean up, greet the 
customers, run the checkout counters, collect the shopping carts, construct the displays, and 
perform numerous other duties. Department managers are employees with responsibility for 
particular areas o f the store. Customer relationship managers and assistant store managers 
oversee their work, handling things like job assignments, register refilling, and customer 
complaints. Store managers have responsibility for store operations, including sales and 
profitability.
At the store level, the basic operational division is between “back room” and “front room” 
operations. Back room operations involve the coordination of shipments from the distribution 
centers (DCs); loading dock operations, such as unloading merchandise from trucks; inventory 
management, including figuring out where to store the seemingly mounting number of boxes in 
the seemingly shrinking storage area; and breaking down shipments to create the merchandise 
mix that will move to the sales floor. Much of the work is physical, but computer-driven data 
analysis provides guidance and store managers give the direction.61 Front room operations 
include everything related to putting merchandise on the sales floor and out the front door in 
customers’ shopping carts. It also includes shaping the customers’ “in-store experience.” This set 
of operations includes product display and shelf stocking, cleanup and maintenance, greeting, 
loss prevention, customer service, checkout, and more. Stores also handle a variety of 
administrative tasks such as human resources, accounting, and public relations, although 
Bentonville has traditionally taken an active role in directing these activities.
Groups o f stores form districts, and districts form regions. Managers at each level oversee all the 
operations of each district. Districts and regions have a number o f supporting functions. 
Merchandising takes care of buying the goods that will stock the shelves. Real estate handles the 
purchase and leasing of new stores. Loss prevention, compliance, corporate affairs, and human 
resources manage their respective responsibilities.
59 Bielby, "Expert Report o f  William T. Bielby, Ph.D. In Betty Dukes Et Al V. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc."
60 Bonacich and Hardie, "Wal-Mart and the Logistics Revolution.”
61 As described in section 3.2.2-Distribution, this last function is currently being moved up the supply chain to the 
Distribution Center level.
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Wal-Mart is currently redesigning its store operations and management hierarchy to achieve 
greater management ownership and accountability, improve the discipline and efficiency of in­
store operations, and get “closer to the customer,” as the company describes it. The belief, 
largely taken from the International segment, seems to be that the creation of smaller, regional- 
based organizations, each headed by a manager with operational and financial responsibility, will 
enhance motivation and increase efficiency.
Eduardo Castro-Wright, executive vice president and chief executive officer of Wal-Mart Stores, 
U.S.A., is in charge of this drive, known internally as “Six Flights.” Proposed changes include:
• Store cash office redesign, which amounts to reducing cash office employment by several 
thousand workers.
• “Customer needs scheduling,” in which management determines workers’ schedules 
using not just sales volume, but the types of sales going on at different times o f day, such 
as the level o f grocery vs. general merchandise purchases, the method of payment 
customers use, and the size of the purchases.
• Better merchandise flow, which means adjusting the product mix to move goods off the 
shelf more quickly without markdowns, Castro-Wright said, “I don’t think there’s 
anything that will drive our business more than flowing the merchandise from the 
background to the checkout counter,” Doing so boosts profits by increasing sales and 
cutting inventory.
• Increasing customer touch points, the locations in store operations where customers come 
into contact with the company, including customer service, advertising, store greeters, 
and checkout.
On top o f the in-store changes, Wal-Mart changed its field organization. The nine regional vice 
presidents became “regional general managers.” These RGMs have support teams made up of 
people responsible for particular functions on a regional basis, including finance, human 
resources, corporate affairs, compliance, loss prevention, and real estate. The RGMs will report 
directly to Pat Curran, executive vice president for store operations. Importantly, the nine RGMs 
and their support teams will move to their regions from Bentonville, a major departure from past 
practice in which control emanated from headquarters.
The district level organization essentially mirrors the regional organization. District managers are 
now “market managers,” They have expanded operational responsibility for a greater number of 
stores and more support to handle the load. The market manager team includes merchandisers for 
food, hard goods, and apparel, an HR manager, and an asset protection (loss prevention) 
manager. Market managers will focus on strategic tasks, mostly streamlining store operations, as 
well as figuring out the market trends in their area and what the competition is doing. The 
problem Wal-Mart identified under the previous system was that district managers were 
spending large amounts o f time on non-sales-related tasks, particularly personnel problems. A 
dedicated HR manager should help.62
62 Bernard Sosnick, "Wal-Mart Stores: Bold Changes, Big Potential," (New York: Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 2005), 
Wal-Mart Stores Inc., "2005 Wal-Mart Twelfth Annual Analysts' Meeting Day 2 - Final," (Bentonville, Ark.: Wal-
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3.2.2 Distribution Centers
Contrary to most other retailers, Wal-Mart manages its own network o f 117 domestic and 58 
international Distribution Centers (DCs), serviced by its own private fleet o f more than 3,000 
trucks and 12,000 trailers, driven by a staff o f more than 8,000 drivers.63 Wal-Mart’s fleet 
handles deliveries for most of its purchases, except for fresh produce and some dry groceries 
handled by contracted common carriers.64 For fiscal year 2005, 81% of Wal-Mart Stores 
segment purchases, 62% o f Sam’s Club segment purchases, and 76% of International segment 
purchases shipped through the DCs.65 The remainder o f purchases went directly to the stores. 
Although Wal-Mart maintains separate DC facilities for its Wal-Mart Stores and Sam’s Club 
segments, it is moving, where practical, to integrate the two networks,66
A typical distribution center is 400,000 to 1 million square feet, the size o f ten Supercenters. 
More than two hundred and fifty dock doors serve the fleet o f center trucks that wait in the vast 
parking lots surrounding the buildings, DCs employ 150 to 1,000 people, making up about 3% of 
Wal-Mart employees. Most are in rural areas, close to interstate highways, and many are in right- 
to-work-states. The DCs in California use employment agency labor.67
Wal-Mart’s growth rests on the location of its DCs, When it moves into an area, it begins by 
opening a DC, then opening new stores around the DC, creating a hub-and-spoke network. Each 
DC serves roughly 150 stores within an average radius o f 150 miles. The result is that no store is 
more than one day’s drive from a DC, allowing for rapid order fulfillment and stock 
replenishment. Wal-Mart’s goal is to reduce the distance from DC to store as much as possible,68
In addition to ensuring its stores are near to its DCs, Wal-Mart is also very careful about ensuring 
that merchandise does not sit idle in the DCs themselves. Most merchandise moves through DCs 
within 48 hours o f arriving. Some never touches the floor. Through a technique known as “cross­
docking,” Wal-Mart unloads deliveries from suppliers, breaks the contents apart if  necessary, 
and, using a series o f conveyor belts, immediately loads the contents onto trucks heading to the
Mart Stores, Inc., 2005), Deborah Weinswig and Charmaine Tang, "Wmt: Roic Driving Decisions - Details from 
Meetings with Management," (New York: Citigroup, 2005),
63 Vijay Govindarajan and Julie B. Lang, "Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.," (Hanover, N.H.: William F, Achtmeyer Center 
for Global Leadership, Tuck School o f  Business at Dartmouth, 2002), Wal-Mart Stores Inc., "2005 Wal-Mart 
Twelfth Annual Analysts’ Meeting Day 2 - Final," (Bentonville, Ark,: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2005), Wal-Mart 
Stores Inc., "Form 10-K (Annual Report)," (Bentonville, Ark.: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2005).
64 Wal-Mart Stores Inc., "Form 10-K (Annual Report).”
65 Ibid.
66 Wal-Mart Stores Inc., ”2005 Analysts' Meeting Day 2 .”
67 James Hoopes, “Growth Through Knowledge: Wal-Mart, High Technology, and the Ever Less Visible Hand o f  
the Manager,” in Wal-Mart: The Face o f  Twenty-First Century Capitalism, edited by Nelson Lichtenstein (New  
York: New Press, 2006), p 90; Edna Bonacich with Khaleelah Hardie, “Wal-Mart and the Logistics Revolution,” in 
Wal-Mart: The Face o f  Twenty-First-Century Capitalism, edited by Nelson Lichtenstein ( New York: The New  
Press, 2006), p. 183. See 3.2,4 Facilities, for more on distribution centers.
68 Pankaj Ghemawat, Ken A. Mark, and Stephen P. Bradley, "Wal-Mart Stores in 2003," (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard Business School Case Study, 2004), Wal-Mart Stores Inc., "2005 Analysts’ Meeting Day 2."
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* 69appropriate stores.
Wal-Mart’s latest move in streamlining its distribution network is the implementation of what it 
calls its “network remix” program. The program is part o f the company’s effort to move from a 
“category-based” distribution system to a “velocity-based” distribution system. The goal is to 
speed the transfer of goods from the store loading dock to the sales floor upon their arrival at the 
store, reduce back room inventories, and free up additional floor space for sales.
Under its current setup, each Wal-Mart DC handles a certain type o f  product, i.e. general 
merchandise, specialty, and grocery. Within the DC, employees organize products by category, 
i.e. consumables, hardgoods, softgoods, etc. Suppliers would ship goods by full truckload to the 
DC, which would then load up outbound trailers for the stores filled with merchandise from the 
different categories handled by that DC. Once the trailer arrived at the store, it would be up to the 
store management to figure out what was needed on the sales floor, what to keep in the back 
room, and in what quantities.
With the implementation o f network remix, employees arrange products by “velocity,” or how 
frequently they must be replenished at the store. So-called “high-velocity” items sit together in 
an extra-wide “super-highway” aisle, built for heavy forklift traffic. The company plans to move 
all DCs to the network remix model, with separate facilities only for apparel and refrigerated 
goods.
In terms of incoming traffic, Wal-Mart now requires shippers to make smaller, more frequent 
deliveries to the DCs. To expedite the process and reduce shipping costs, it contracted with 
numerous third-party logistics providers (3PLs) to consolidate inbound shipments for suppliers, 
since the suppliers are no longer shipping goods by the full truckload.69 70 By using the 3PLs, Wal- 
Mart allows suppliers to pay cheaper full-truckload rates for less-than-truckload (LTL) service, 
and ensures that it is receiving a constant stream of full trailers with the right mix of merchandise 
at its DCs. On the outgoing end, trailers carry merchandise sorted by velocity, so that store 
management doesn’t have to figure out what goes on the floor and what stays in the back, and 
fast-moving items can move from trailer to sales floor in less than minutes.71
The key to understanding how Wal-Mart coordinates such a vast logistics network is its mastery 
of information technology (IT). The heart of Wal-Mart’s logistics IT infrastructure is its supply 
chain management database, known as Retail Link. It originally developed out o f Wal-Mart’s 
efforts to create Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) technology in the 1970s and 1980s. Since 
then, Retail Link has grown to become the largest civilian database in the world, second only to
69 Ghemawat, Mark, and Bradley, "Wal-Mart Stores in 2003.", Govindarajan and Lang, "Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.", 
George Stalk, Philip Evans, and Lawrence E. Shulman, "Competing on Capabilities: The New Rules o f Corporate 
Strategy," Harvard Business Review 70, no. 2 (1992).
70 Some o f  the 3PL providers include DSC Logistics, Prime Distribution Services, Commodity Logistics, and 
CaseStack. (William Cassidy, "At Wal-Mart, Less Is More," Journal o f Commerce, November 7 2005.)
71 Ibid, Mike Troy, "High-Tech Dc Streamlines Supply Chain," DSN Retailing Today, May 9 2005, Wal-Mart 
Stores Inc., "2005 Analysts' Meeting Day 2,"
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the Pentagon’s,72 According to an announcement by the company that manages the data for Wal- 
Mart, NCR’s Teradata division, the database surpassed the 500-terabyte mark in late 2004,73 The 
system allows Wal-Mart to monitor global sales in real time on a store-by-store basis, and make 
purchasing and delivery decisions accordingly,74
Through the Retail Link Private Hub, Wal-Mart implemented a Vendor Managed Inventory 
(VMI) system, whereby 10,000 o f Wal-Mart’s largest vendors can log into the system, track 
point-of-sale data for their products, and automatically trigger re-stocking orders as needed.75 All 
invoicing and payment happens electronically, dramatically reducing paperwork and transaction 
times. The VMI system is part o f a larger logistics known as Collaborative Planning,
Forecasting, and Replenishment (CPFR), This initiative is a set o f standards and best practices 
initiated by Wal-Mart for other companies in 1995,76 and coordinated by a trade group known as 
Voluntary Interindustry Commerce Standards (VICS).77 It aims to increase information sharing 
among all supply chain participants, from manufacturers to transportation companies to retailers.
The efficiency and predictability o f the VMI and CPFR systems, combined with the 
unprecedented data-mining capabilities that the Retail Link data network enables, dramatically 
reduces inventory costs by minimizing stockpiled goods. Wal-Mart increased inventory turns 
from 3.2 in 1973 to 4.4 in 1983,4.5 in 1993, and 7.6 at the beginning o f 2003. Target and Kmart 
turned their inventory 6.1 and 5.4 times, respectively. Wal-Mart has also shaved distribution 
costs to an estimate 2% to 3% of revenue, compared to 4% to 5% for competing retailers.78
Retail Link allows Wal-Mart to tailor its merchandise mix to changing situations, as famously 
demonstrated in the aftermath o f the September 11,2001, attacks. On the day o f the attacks, it 
mobilized its vendor network to purchase every American flag it could find, leaving Target and 
other competitors empty-handed on September 12.79 In the following days, it tracked and
72 Andreas Knorr and Andreas Arndt, "Why Did Wal-Mart Fail in Germany?" (Bremen, Germany; Institute for 
World Economics and International Management, 2003).
73 Evan Schuman, "At Wal-Mart, World's Largest Retail Data Warehouse Gets Even Larger," eWeek, October 13 
2004.
74 Robert H. McGuckin, Matthew Spiegelman, and Bart van Ark, "The Retail Revolution - Can Europe Match U.S. 
Productivity Performance?" (New York: The Conference Board, 2005).
73 Jacqueline Emigh, Vendor Managed Inventoiy [Website] (Computerworld Magazine, 1999 [accessed January 6 
2006]); available from http://www.computerworld.com/news/1999/story/0,l 1280,36744,00.html, Ravi Kalakota and 
Marcia Robinson, "From E-Business to Services: Why and Why Now?" in Services Blueprint: Roadmap for 
Execution, ed. Ravi Kalakota and Marcia Robinson, Addison-Wesley Information Technology Series (Boston: 
Addison Wesley Professional, 2003).
76 The four other companies are consulting firm Benchmarking Partners, manufacturer Warner-Lambert, and 
software companies SAP and Manugistics Theodore P. Stank, Patricia J. Daugherty, and Chad W. Autry, 
"Collaborative Planning: Supporting Automatic Replenishment Programs," Supply Chain Management 4, no. 2 
(1999)..
77 John Femie and Stephen J. Arnold, "Wal-Mart in Europe; Prospects for Germany, the U.K., and France," 
International Journal o f  Retail & Distribution Management 30, no. 2 (2002), Stank, Daugherty, and Autry, 
"Collaborative Planning; Supporting Automatic Replenishment Programs.", Voluntary Interindustry Commerce 
Standards, "Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment: An Overview," (Lawrenceville, N.J.: 
Voluntary Interindustry Commerce Standards, 2004),
78 Ghemawat, Mark, and Bradley, "Wal-Mart Stores in 2003."
79 Jerry Useem, Julie Schlosser, and Helen Kim, "One Nation under Wal-Mart," Fortune 147, no. 4 (2003).
29
responded to consumers’ erratic buying patterns, as shoppers went from hoarding canned goods, 
guns, and gas canisters, to staying away from stores, to stocking up on patriotic gear. The 
company anticipated a rush on stores over the weekend, increasing staff and inventory across the 
country. Sure enough, sales on the Saturday immediately following 9/11 were 25% higher than 
the previous year, as shoppers stocked up on groceries and electronics.80
Retail Link has also allowed Wal-Mart to streamline its procurement and contracting procedures. 
Instead of using the traditional “sealed bid” method, which involves extensive negotiation with 
many potential contractors via phone and fax, Wal-Mart places contracts out for bid using online 
“reverse auctions” on the Retail Link website. Under this system, a selected group of vendors 
compete with each other online to offer the lowest price on a given Wal-Mart contract. Not only 
does this greatly streamline the bid process, it also allows Wal-Mart to retain greater control over 
its suppliers.81
Wal-Mart embarked on the latest phase of supply chain improvement in June 2003, when it 
required its top 100 suppliers to equip their cases and pallets with radio frequency identification 
(RFID) tags by January 2005. Thirty-seven other suppliers subsequently volunteered to meet the 
deadline. Eight o f Wal-Mart’s largest suppliers82 agreed to participate in the initial 2004 pilot 
project, which involved seven Wal-Mart Supercenters and one Distribution Center in the 
Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas area,83
RFID tags, known as Electronic Product Codes (EPCs), contain detailed information about 
product attributes, much like UPC barcodes. However, EPCs have the major advantage of 
transmitting the product information from a distance, using radio waves.84 This precludes the 
need to “scan” anything, thus making it much easier to monitor inventory and reduce inventory 
errors. Developed during World War II to keep track o f Allied aircraft, RFID should become 
ubiquitous with the Wal-Mart mandate, just as Wal-Mart’s imprint popularized the UPC barcode 
in the 1970s.85
RFID technology remains expensive, and both Wal-Mart and its suppliers have encountered 
numerous challenges in bringing the technology “live.” Some Wal-Mart suppliers have 
expressed resistance to the plan, claiming that it benefits Wal-Mart, while providing them with 
little return on investment,86 As such, some observers have noted that Wal-Mart’s goal of “‘100
80 Ann Zimmerman and Emily Nelson, "In Hour o f Peril, Americans Bought Guns, Tv Sets-Wal-Mart's Giant 
Computers Detected ’Pantry Loading' Giving Way to 'CNNEffect,'" Wall Street Journal, September 18 2001.
81 Marco Iansiti and Roy Levien, "The New Operational Dynamcs o f  Business Ecosystems: Implications for Policy, 
Operations and Technology Strategy," Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Business School Working Paper, 2002), H.K. 
Sehgal, "Reverse Auction: Will It Change the Way Sourcing Is Done?" Apparel Online, January 16-31 2003.
82 The eight suppliers were The Gillette Company (NYSE:G), HP (NYSE, NASDAQ:HPQ), Johnson & Johnson, 
Kimberly-Clark (NYSE:KMB), Kraft Foods (NYSE;KFT), Nestle Purina PetCare Company, The Procter & Gamble 
Company (NYSErPG) and Unilever (NYSE: UN, UL) Wal-Mart Stores Inc., "Wal-Mart Begins Roll-out o f  
Electronic Product Codes in Dallas/Fort Worth Area," (Bentonville, Arkansas: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2004)..
83 The Supercenters are located in The Colony, Decatur, Denton, Hickory Creek, Lewisville and Plano, Texas, and 
the Distribution Center is located in Sanger, Texas Ibid..
84 Just as an example, RFID tags are already widely used as transponders for cars traveling on toll highways.
85 McGuckin, Spiegelman, and Ark, "Retail Revolution."
86 William Hoffman, "Shippers Still Reject Rfid," Traffic World, November 14 2005.
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percent compliance’ has become more o f a moving target than the original target o f January l ,”87 
Nevertheless, Wal-Mart remains firmly committed to the technology, touting a recent University 
of Arkansas study o f twelve RFID-enabled Wal-Mart stores and twelve control stores, which 
showed a 16% reduction in stockouts (empty shelves) at RFID-enabled stores,88 Current plans 
require Wal-Mart’s next tier o f 200 suppliers to be RFID-compliant by the end of January 
2006,89 90and the company expects that more than 600 o f its suppliers will be using the technology 
by the end o f 2007. It also expects to have more than 1,000 RFID-enabled stores and Distribution 
Centers by the end o f 2006,9Q
Further down the road, Wal-Mart hopes to get rid o f inventory altogether through technologies 
such as “scan-based trading,” or SBT, Under this system, suppliers maintain ownership o f  
merchandise on the retailer’s shelves until a customer pays for it and the product scans at the 
cash register. Some retail analysts estimate that SBT could ultimately save Wal-Mart upwards of 
$50 billion in inventory costs, but the technology remains in the pilot stages,91
3.2,3 Facilities
In 2006, Wal-Mart will open a new store in the United States at the rate o f one per day, making 
an exact count o f it stores difficult. As o f January 31,2006, Wal-Mart had 1,209 Discount 
Stores, 1,980 Supercenters, 567 Sam’s Clubs, and 101 Neighborhood Markets in the United 
States, Internationally, the company had the following stores: Argentina (11), Brazil (295), 
Canada (263), Central America (363), China (56), Germany (88), Japan (404), Mexico (774), 
Puerto Rico (54), South Korea (16) and the United Kingdom (315). The total is 6,496,92
As of January 31, 2006, Wal-Mart’s stores covered 663,217,000 square feet, with 3,702 stores 
covering 529,835,000 square feet in the United States and 1,587 stores covering 133,382,000 
square feet internationally. For the Sam’s Club segment, there were 551 warehouses. An average 
Sam’s Club warehouse is 127,776 square feet.93
As o f October 2005, Wal-Mart operated 168 distribution centers (DCs), 110 in the U.S. and 58 
internationally. A typical Wal-Mart DC covers about 1 million square feet,94 However, recent
87 Neil Shister, "Rfid: Taking Stock o f the Wal-Mart Pilot," World Trade, August 2005.
88 Emily Retiring, "Wal-Mart Tags Rfid Benefits," Traffic World, October 31 2005.
89 Bert Moore, "The Wal-Mart Mandate: Compliance and Beyond," Material Handling Management, September 
2005.
90 Hoffman, "Shippers Still Reject Rfid."
91 Ibid, Hays, "What They Know About You.", Jeff Woods, "Why Wal-Mart Is Still Excited About Rfid," (Global 
Logistics & Supply Chain Strategies, 2005).
92 Wal-Mart, “Corporate Profile,” http://investor.walmartstores.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=112761&n=irol-irhome. 
accessed February 3,2005; and http://walmartstores.com/GlobalWMStoresWeb/navigate.do?catg=371. accessed 
February 3,2006. Note that the Central American stores are minority holdings and are not consolidated with Wal- 
Mart’ s other operations. Additional facilities information can be found in the Appendix.
93 Wal-Mart Stores Inc., "Form 10-K (Annual Report)." With Wal-Mart’s purchase o f Sonae in Brazil in December 
2005, the number o f  stores in the International segment increased to 1,841. Including Wal-Mart’s Japanese and 
Central American holdings, the International segment store count increases to 2,609 (see appendix), but square 
footage figures for these stores are not available.
94 Kenneth E. Stone, "Competing with Mass Merchandisers," Small Business Forum (1991).
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trends suggest that the company is moving towards a distribution system involving much larger 
DCs, with the recent opening of a 4-million-square-foot facility in Baytown, Texas, and the 
announcement o f plans to build a 3.4-million square-foot facility in Elwood, Illinois.95
The domestic DCs have a certain degree o f specialization. Ninety-nine o f the DCs are part of the 
Wal-Mart Stores segment. Of these, 37 are for general merchandise, 34 are for grocery (these 
also furnish some perishable goods to Sam’s Club warehouses), seven axe for clothing, sixteen 
are “specialty” DCs (stocking jewelry, tires, optical, and pharmacy-related goods), four are 
regional import consolidation facilities, and one furnishes orders placed through the 
walmart.com website. Seven o f the DCs are part o f the Sam’s Club segment. Additionally, 
twelve third-party-owned-and-operated DCs service Sam’s Club warehouses.96 While a 
complete listing of all third-party operators is unavailable, some names include Distribution 
Technology, Inc. (DTI) in North Carolina; United Warehouses in Seattle, Washington; UTI 
Integrated Logistics (formerly Standard Corporation) in Charleston, South Carolina; Kane is 
Able in Scranton, Pennsylvania, and Hagerstown, Maryland; and Wagner Industries.97
Sixty-two o f the DCs are part of the International segment. Of these, 58 are located 
internationally, in Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, Mexico, Puerto Rico, and the 
United Kingdom. Four are U.S.-based regional export consolidation facilities, located in 
California, Florida, Pennsylvania, and Texas.98 More specific information is also available for 
Wal-Mart’s Chinese operations. There, the company has purchasing centers in Shenzhen and 
Dalian, as well as four DCs in Dongguan, Fuzhou, Shanghai, and Tianjin.99 In Canada, Wal- 
Mart has subcontracted to Supply Chain Management, Inc. (SCM), a subsidiary o f British 
logistics giant Tibbett & Britten, to operate at least three DCs, in Cornwall and Mississauga, 
Ontario, and in Calgary, Alberta.100
In the U.S., Wal-Mart continues to build on its long-term strategy o f expanding outward from its 
Bentonville headquarters, ringing its stores around DCs, and replacing or upgrading Discount 
Stores with Supercenters. While it now has a presence in all fifty states, the company remains 
heavily concentrated in the South, with 41% of all stores and 52% of Supercenters located in
95 Bill Hensel, "Magnetic Attraction: The Retail Giant’s New Distribution Center near Baytown Promises to Draw in 
a Wealth o f Other Businesses Riding Wal-Mart's Piggyback Power," Houston Chronicle, June 5 2005, Bob Tita, 
"Big Wal-Mart Depot Headed for Joliet," Cram’s Chicago Business, August 31 2005.
96 Wal-Mart Stores Inc., "Form 10-K (Annual Report)."
97 Information about third-party operators is taken from the following websites: Distribution Technology, Inc. (DTI): 
http://distributiontechnologv.com/divisions.asp. United Warehouses:
http://www.unitedwarehouses.com/wholesale distribution channel.aso. UTI Integrated Logistics: 
http://www.inboundlogistics.com/articles/features/0702 feature02,shtml and 
http.7/www.southeastrebusiness.com/articles/SEP01/highlightl.html. Kane is Able: 
http://www.kaneisable.com/website/kaneweb.nsf/html/SAMSClubAwards. and Wagner Industries: 
http://www.wagnerindustries.com/wagner/faqs/services.html.
98 Wal-Mart Stores Inc., "Form 10-K (Annual Report)."
99 Jie Liu, "Wal-Mart Makes Moves to Expand Its Stores," China Daily, January 6 2004.
100 Tibbett & Britten, Case Study: Canada Wal-Mart [Website] (Tibbett & Britten, 2006 [accessed January 21 
2006]); available from http://www.tibbett-britten.com/cs/walm-can.php,
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those eleven states.101 As such, it sees plenty of room to grow, particularly in the West and 
Northeast.
In keeping with its vertically integrated structure, Wal-Mart has an internal division for handling 
the acquisition, leasing, and disposal o f its real estate holdings, known as Wal-Mart Realty.
Trade website Buildings.com ranks Wal-Mart Realty at the top o f  its 2005 list o f "Who’s Who in 
the Buildings Market” in the "Corporate Real Estate” category. Its portfolio o f more than 530 
million square feet o f property dwarfs those o f other corporate giants such as Ford, Home Depot, 
and Sears.102 While specific information about the exact value o f these holdings is unavailable, 
Wal-Mart had $48,9 billion in long-lived assets at the end o f fiscal year 2005. Most of this was 
its buildings,103 Wal-Mart Realty has an entire in-house staff to handle all aspects o f its real 
estate business, including accountants, architects, attorneys, construction managers, engineers, 
property managers, real estate agents, and store planners.104 Wal-Mart also lists approximately 
70% of its properties with brokers. The company generally contracts with real estate giants 
Rockwood Exchange ('http://www.rockwoodexchange.eom/l and CB Richard Ellis 
('http://www.cbre.eom/l to handle these transactions.105 Again, Wal-Mart is able to use its 
purchasing power to cap broker fees and keep costs to a minimum.106
The division operates its own website, at http://www.walmartrealtv.com. which lists detailed 
information about all properties available for purchase and lease. The site lists approximately 
380 buildings for sale or lease and about 350 parcels o f land. It also lists opportunities for in­
store leasing of high-traffic space at the front of its Supercenters, a desirable location for service- 
oriented businesses.
Although Wal-Mart Realty is clearly a major figure in the world o f corporate real estate, the 
company operates the division as a means to an end, namely operating and expanding its retail 
business. As such, its properties consist entirely o f its current and former stores, DCs, and 
offices, along with land immediately surrounding them, known as "outparcels.” It uses its real 
estate purchasing power to control the business environment around its stores, often buying 
several acres more than required for its store and then leasing the excess land to other businesses, 
often fast food franchises.107 It also exerts control over who can move into its abandoned 
properties, blocking potential buyers who could be potential competitors. This, along with the 
many other problems associated with finding suitable uses for properties o f the size Wal-Mart
101 Wal-Mart Stores Inc., "Form 10-K (Annual Report),"
102 Buildings.com, Who’s Who in the Buildings Market 2005: Corporate Real Estate [Website] (Buildings.com, 
2005 [accessed January 20,2006]); available from 
http://www.buildings.com/Articles/detailBuildings.asp?Articlen>=2723.
103 Wal-Mart, 2005 Annual Report, March 31,2005, p. 48.
104 Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Our Retail Divisions: Realty [Website] (Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2006 [accessed January 21 
2006]); available from http://walmartstores.com/GlobalWMStoresWeb/navigate.do?catg=:282.
105 Wal-Mart Realty, Wal-Mart Buildings for Sale [Website] (Wal-Mart Realty, 2006 [accessed January 21 2006]); 
available from http://www.wal-martrealty.com/ExSales/EX_Sale_Home_Page.html,
106 Curt Hazlett, "The Wal-Mart Way," Retail Traffic, July 1 2004.
107 Ibid.
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leaves behind, can often create long-term building vacancies, which in turn can contribute to 
blight108
3.3 Workforce
With 1,385,090 U.S. employees and 1,873,729 employees worldwide as o f December 2005, 
Wal-Mart is the largest private employer in the U.S., and by extension one o f the largest 
employers in the world. 09 While detailed Wal-Mart workforce information is generally difficult 
to obtain,110 the company had to divulge extensive payroll data related to its U.S. operations due 
to Dukes et al v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the employment discrimination lawsuit. From this 
lawsuit, one source o f information is the expert testimony o f Dr. Richard Drogin, which uses 
data from 2002.111
As Wal-Mart has grown, it has had to expand its workforce at an exponential rate. Between 1996 
and 2005, Wal-Mart employment grew by almost 200%, from 600,000 to nearly 1.8 million. As 
of the end o f 2001, approximately 38% of U.S, Wal-Mart employees worked in Wal-Mart 
Discount Stores, 52% worked in Supercenters, nearly 10% worked in Sam’s Club stores, and less 
than 1% worked in Neighborhood Markets. Given the trend in subsequent years o f Wal-Mart 
replacing Discount Stores with Supercenters, we would expect that the percentage of Discount 
Store employees would have dropped, accompanied by a corresponding increase in the 
percentage of Supercenter employees. The proportion o f Neighborhood Market employees 
should also have increased slightly.
W al-Mart Workers By Country112
United States 1,385,090
Argentina 4,573
Brazil 50,000
Canada 70,000
China 27,000
Costa Rica 6,990
El Salvador 3,150
Germany 12,000
Guatemala 7,390
Honduras 1,460
Japan 35,426
Korea (South) 3,600
Mexico 112,000
Nicaragua 1,050
108 R. Sean Randolph et al., "Supercenters and the Transformation o f  the Bay Area Grocery Industry: Issues, Trends, 
and Impacts," (San Francisco, CA: Bay Area Economic Forum, 2004), Kortney Stringer, "Wal-Mart’s Surge Leaves 
Dead Stores Behind," Wall Street Journal, September 15 2004.
109 Wal-Mart Stores Inc., "Form 10-K (Annual Report).", Zellner and Bernstein, "Up against the Wal-Mart."
110 Emek Basker, "Job Creation or Destruction: Labor Market Effects o f Wal-Mart Expansion," Review of 
Economics and Statistics 87, no. 1 (2005).
111 Richard Drogin, "Statistical Analysis o f Gender Patterns in Wal-Mart Workforce," (Berkeley, Calif.: Drogin, 
Kakigi & Associates, 2003). Much o f  the following discussion draws on the Drogin testimony.
112 As o f January 2006, http://www.walmartfacts.com/communitv:
http://walmartstores.com/GlobalWMStoresWeb/navigate.do?catg=369, accessed February 3,2006.
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Puerto Rico 14,000
United Kingdom 140,000
TOTAL: 1,873,729
3.3.1 Part-Time vs. Full-Time Employees
Wal-Mart claims that 74% of its hourly employees work full-time.113 By comparison, data from 
the 2004 Current Population Survey indicates that 75.8 percent o f retail workers work full-time. 
As such, Wal-Mart’s claim that its percentage o f full-time workers compares favorably to “the 
20% to 40% [rate o f full-time workers] typically found in the retail industry”114 is somewhat 
misleading. The proportion o f full-time workers has increased markedly in the last several years 
and at least some Wall Street analysts are concerned. The company reassured them that it would 
adjust staffing to meet shopping patterns. As Eduardo Castro-Wright put it, “weTl see some 
changes in full-time/part-time ratio.”115 Most likely, Wal-Mart will return to its pattern of more 
part-timers.
3.3.2 Gender and Racial Distribution
As with many retail sector employers, Wal-Mart’s workforce is predominantly female (65%), 
and includes significant numbers o f workers o f color (17% African-American and 12% 
Latina/o).116 Indeed, Wal-Mart proudly proclaims its commitment to workplace diversity, stating 
that:
[our] commitment to diversity starts with our board o f directors and extends 
throughout the organization. Our fourteen-member board o f directors includes a 
female, two African-Americans and two Hispanics. Wal-Mart is a leading 
employer o f Hispanics in the U.S. with more 139,000 Hispanic associates; a 
leading employer o f  African Americans with more than 208,000 African 
Americans; an employer o f more than 775,000 females; and an employer o f more 
than 220,000 seniors who are 55 and older.117
It also points to several policies and practices that it claims demonstrate its commitment to 
workplace diversity. These include establishing an Office o f Diversity, recruiting at diversity job 
fairs, and tying officer compensation to meeting diversity recruitment goals.118
113 Wal-Mart Stores Ine., "Wal-Mart Is Working for Everyone. Some o f Our Critics Are Only Working for 
Themselves," (Bentonville, Ark.: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2005).
114 Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Walmartfacts.Com Fact Sheets [Website] (Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2005 [accessed October 
8 2005]); available from http://www.walmartfacts.con7doyouknow/default.aspx#al36.
115 Bernard Sosnick, “Wal-Mart Stores: Big Changes, Big Potential,” Oppenheimer Equity Research, November 15, 
2005; Eduardo Castro-Wright, presentation, “2005 Wal-Mart Twelfth Annual Analysts' Meeting Day 2 -  Final,” 
(transcript) October 26,2005, Voxant Fair Disclosure Wire.
116 Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Walmartfacts.Com Fact Sheets [Website] (Wal-Mart Stores, Inc,, 2005 [accessed October 
8 2005]); available from http://www.walmartfacts.eom/doyouknow/default.aspx#al36.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
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What is most notable about these company initiatives is their recent vintage. The Office of 
Diversity opened in 2003, following a brief experiment with a diversity committee in the late 
1990s whose recommendations fell on deaf ears.119 None o f the five women or people of color 
on Wal-Mart’s board began their service earlier than 1998, with three joining since 2001.120 The 
proposal to tie executive pay to meeting diversity hiring targets arose only at the June 2004- 
shareholders meeting.121
By the admission of Wal-Mart’s own chief diversity officer, a major catalyst for these changes 
has been the Dukes et at v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. class action lawsuit, which has been winding 
its way through the courts since 2001.122 The suit alleges a systematic pattern o f discrimination 
against female Wal-Mart employees in hiring and promotion.123 Proceedings related to Dukes et 
ah have forced the company to divulge embarrassing information about their personnel policies, 
including payroll data that shows systematic discrepancies between the number of female hourly 
workers and the number o f female managers, as well as pay discrepancies between men and 
women at all levels of the company.124 The company has also released internal memos and 
provided testimony indicating that it was aware of these problems to some degree, and yet failed 
to address them.125
3.3.3 Employee Turnover
Employee turnover at Wal-Mart is extremely high, even for the high-tumover retail industry. 
According to company reports, it has stood at around 50% for several years.126 By comparison, 
annual turnover for the retail industry as a whole in 2004 was just over 29 percent.127 Some 
critics have put Wal-Mart’s annual employee turnover at closer to 70 percent.128 129Concretely, this 
means that the company must hire and train close to 700,000 new employees in the U.S. every 
year just to stand still, 9 But given Wal-Mart’s plans for expansion, they must hire even more 
employees.
3.3.4 Wages
119 Bloomberg, "Wal-Mart Didn't Act on Internal Sex-Bias Alert, Documents Show," Bloomberg, July 15 2005, 
Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Walmartfacts.Com Fact Sheets.
120 Datamonitor, "Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Company Profile," (New York: Datamonitor, 2005), Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 
"Form 10-K (Annual Report)."
121 Ann Zimmerman, "Wal-Mart Plans Changes to Wages, Labor Practices," Wall Street Journal, June 7 2004.
122 Bloomberg, "Wal-Mart Didn't Act on Internal Sex-Bias Alert, Documents Show."
123 More detailed information about the Dukes et al case can be found in Section 7.3 o f this report, 
“Regulatory/Legal.”
124 Drogin, "Statistical Analysis o f  Gender Patterns in Wal-Mart Workforce."
125 Bloomberg, "Wal-Mart Didn't Act on Internal Sex-Bias Alert, Documents Show."
126 Head, "Inside the Leviathan.", Moira Herbst, "The Costco Challenge: An Alternative to Wal-Martization?" (New 
York: Labor Research Associates, 2005).
127 Bureau o f Labor Statistics, "Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey," ed. U.S. Department o f Labor (U.S. 
Department o f Labor, 2005).
128 Dan Bianchi and Dan Swinney, "Wal-Mart; A Destructive Force for Chicago Communities and Companies," 
(Chicago, 111.: Center for Labor and Community Research (CLCR), 2004).
129 John Dicker, The United States o f Wal-Mart (New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher/Penguin, 2005), Douglas P'. Shuit, 
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Wal-Mart claims that its average hourly rate for full-time employees as o f January 2006 is 
$10.11, up from $9.68 the year before. It also claims that average hourly rates are slightly higher 
in urban areas, ranging from $10.29 in Los Angeles to $11.58 in Denver.130 It is careful to note 
that its average compensation rate is “almost double the federal minimum wage,” 131
Critics have long charged Wal-Mart with paying sub-standard wages, leading a “race to the 
bottom” for American workers.132 Using Drogin’s133 analysis ofWal-Mart’s 2001 payroll data, 
Dube and Jacobs134 estimate that 54% of Wal-Mart employees earn less than $9.60 per hour, and 
only 9% of Wal-Mart employees earn more than $11,72 per hour, using 2004 CPI-adjusted 
dollars. Again using Drogin’s data, the average annual earnings for hourly Wal-Mart employees, 
who constitute 94% of its workforce, are $18,986, This is just barely above the federal poverty 
line for a family o f four: $18,850.135 It is also close to the threshold earnings level to qualify for 
Medicaid benefits o f $18,621 for a family o f four, and well below the threshold earnings level to 
qualify for food stamps o f either $19,602 for a family o f three or $23,584 for a family o f four.136
Furthermore, an examination by University o f California Berkeley researchers of retail sector 
wages from the 2005 March Current Population Survey shows that Wal-Mart’s wages are 
substantially lower than both their unionized and non-unionized competition across the board. 
Wal-Mart imposes a “wage penalty” ranging from 7,5% for grocery workers to 25,6% for large 
general merchandise retailers as a whole, excluding Wal-Mart.
W al-M art W ages v. Retail Sector W ages137
Adjusted 
Average Wage
W al-Mart
Wage Difference % Difference
Large Retail $11.08 $9.68 $1.40 14.5%
130 Wal-Mart Stores Inc., "Wal-Mart Creates over 125,000 New Jobs in 2005," (Bentonville, Arkansas: Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 2006).
131 Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Walmartfacts.Com Fact Sheets.
132 Bianchi and Swinney, "Wal-Mart: A Destructive Force for Chicago Communities and Companies.", Neil 
Buckley and Caroline Daniel, "Wal-Mart Vs. The Workers: Labour Grievances Are Stacking up at the World's 
Biggest Company," Financial Times, November 20 2003, Liza Featherstone, "Will Labor Take the Wal-Mart 
Challenge?" The Nation, June 28 2004, Head, "Inside the Leviathan.", Miller, "Everyday Low Wages: The Hidden 
Price We All Pay for Wal-Mart.", A1 Swanson, "Analysis: Wal-Mart's Growing Pains," Washington Times, July 6 
2004.
133 Drogin, "Statistical Analysis o f Gender Patterns in Wal-Mart Workforce."
134 Arindrajit Dube and Ken Jacobs, "Hidden Cost o f Wal-Mart Jobs: Use o f Safety Net Programs by Wal-Mart 
Workers in California," (Berkeley, Calif.: University o f  California, Berkeley Center for Labor Research and 
Education, 2004).
135 Obtained from the Department o f  Health and Human Services website, 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/povertv/04povertv.shtml. Accessed October 10, 2005.
136 Annette Bernhardt, Anmol Chaddha, and Siobhan McGrath, "What Do We Know About Wal-Mart? An 
Overview o f Facts and Studies for New Yorkers," (New York, New York: Brennan Center for Justice, New York 
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All Retail $10.88 $9.68 $1.20 12.4%
Large Grocery $11.37 $9.68 $1.69 17.5%
All Grocery $10.41 $9.68 $0.73 7.5%
Large General Merchandise $10.41 $9.68 0.73 7.5%
All General Merchandise $10.44 $9,68 0.76 7.9%
Large General Merchandise* $12.16 $9.68 $2.48 25.6%
All General Merchandise* $11.36 $9.68 $1.68 17.4%
* Excluding Wal-Mart employees
While the evidence shows that Wal-Mart’s wages lag behind their competitors, recent research 
suggests that the effect o f the “wage penalty” resonates beyond Wal-Mart’s own workforce. 
According to a statistical analysis of the effect of Wal-Mart market entry on retail sector wages 
at the county level during the economic expansion o f the 1990s, Wal-Mart’s entry into 
metropolitan area labor markets had a negative effect on wages throughout the retail sector in 
those markets. The researchers estimate that in 2000, Wal-Mart’s presence reduced total earnings 
of retail workers nationwide by $10.0 billion.138
Critics also charge that Wal-Mart’s low wages create a hidden cost to taxpayers, as a 
disproportionate number of Wal-Mart workers must turn to public assistance programs to make 
ends meet.139
3.3.5 Employee Benefits
Wal-Mart claims that it “offers affordable health care coverage to both its full- and part-time 
associates.” It emphasizes the low cost of its cheapest plans, the variety of its eighteen different 
health plans, that both full- and part-time employees are eligible for coverage, that there are no 
lifetime maximums for coverage, and that the company pays for about two thirds o f plan costs.
In addition to health care benefits, Wal-Mart also touts its 401(k) and profit sharing plans. 
Overall, it claims to have spent $4.2 billion on employee benefits in fiscal year 2005,140
Wal-Mart spends much less per employee on health care benefits than other retailers. In 2002, 
the company spent $3,500 per covered employee, compared to an average o f $5,646 for all U.S, 
employers, and $4,834 for all U.S. wholesale/retail industry employers. Costco, one of Wal- 
Mart’s chief rivals, spent an average o f $5,735 per employee in 2004.141 A study using 2005 data
138 Arindrajit Dube, Barry Eidlin, and Bill Lester, "Impact o f Wal-Mart Growth on Earnings.Throughout the Retail 
Sector in Urban and Rural Counties," (Berkeley, California: University o f  California, Berkeley Institute o f  Industrial 
Relations, 2005).
139 Bernhardt, Chaddha, and McGrath, "What Do We Know About Wal-Mart? An Overview o f  Facts and Studies for 
New Yorkers." Dube and Jacobs, "Hidden Cost o f  Wal-Mart Jobs: Use o f Safety Net Programs by Wal-Mart 
Workers in California.", Miller, "Everyday Low Wages: The Hidden Price We All Pay for Wal-Mart."
140 Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Walmartfacts,Com Fact Sheets.
141 Bernhardt, Chaddha, and McGrath, "What Do We Know About Wal-Mart? An Overview o f Facts and Studies for 
New Yorkers.", Bernard Wysocki and Ann Zimmerman, "Bargain Hunter: Wal-Mart Cost-Cutting Finds a Big 
Target in Health Benefits; Restrictions and Tough Stance on Basic Claims Keep Its Outlays Below Average; Setting 
Industry ’Benchmark?'" Wall Street Journal, September 30 2003.
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showed that retailers with 1,000 or more workers paid 16% more .in wage and health benefits per 
hour compared to Wal-Mart.142
Wal-Mart employees pay approximately one third o f their health plan premium costs,143 which is 
slightly above the national average for the retail industry o f 23% for individual coverage and 
32% percent for family coverage. It is much higher than the national average for large employers 
of 17% for individual coverage and 23% for family coverage, as well as the national average for 
unionized employers o f 15% for individual coverage and 21% for family coverage.144 
Employees at rival Costco pay less than 8% of their premium costs.145
According to an internal memo on its benefits policies, 48% of U.S, Wal-Mart employees are 
enrolled in the company’s health insurance plans.146 This leaves more than 720,000 Wal-Mart 
employees without company-provided health insurance. This coverage rate is significantly lower 
than the national average for large firms (200+ employees) of 67%. However, it is roughly 
equivalent to the 46% average for all retail industry firms.147
Wal-Mart medical plan premiums have ranged from $133 to $264 per month for family 
coverage, and from $33 to $72 per month for individual coverage.148 This compares with a 
national average for all large enroloyer plans o f $207 a month for family coverage, and $53 a 
month for individual coverage. 9 In October 2005, responding to public pressure, Wal-Mart 
announced plans for a new “Value Plan” with lower premium rates, starting at $11 per month for 
individuals and $65 per month for families,150
Even though Wal-Mart’s plan premiums fall within the range for all U.S. employer health plans 
in terms o f absolute dollar amounts, Wal-Mart’s low wages mean that the cost o f health care 
premiums represent a larger proportion o f employee earnings. For example, for a Wal-Mart 
worker making the stated company average hourly wage o f $9.63 and working 34 hours a week 
(considered full-time for a Wal-Mart employee), the annual cost o f the lowest-premium family 
health coverage ($133/month) represents fully 1.1 months o f pre-tax earnings. The new lower 
family premium represents more than half o f one month’s pre-tax earnings. Additionally, for 
employees hired after 1998, Wal-Mart imposes a surcharge o f $100 per month for family
142 Arindrajit Dube and Steve Wertheim, "Wal-Mart and Job Quality: What Do We Know, and Should We Care?" 
(Berkeley, California: Institute o f Industrial Relations, 2005).
143 Reed Abelson, "States Are Battling against Wal-Mart over Health Care," New York Times, November 1 2004, 
Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Walmartfacts. Com Fact Sheets.
144 Kaiser Family Foundation, "Employer Health Benefits 2005 Annual Survey," (Menlo Park, California: Henry J. 
Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research & Educational Trust, 2005).
145 Abelson, "States Are Battling against Wal-Mart over Health Care."
146 Susan Chambers, "Reviewing and Revising Wal-Mart's Benefits Strategy," (Bentonville, Arkansas: Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 2005).
147 Kaiser Family Foundation, "Employer Health Benefits 2005 Annual Survey."
148 Bernhardt, Chaddha, and McGrath, "What Do We Know About Wal-Mart? An Overview o f Facts and Studies for 
New Yorkers.”
149 Kaiser Family Foundation, "Employer Health Benefits 2005 Annual Survey."
150 Michael Barbaro, "Wal-Mart to Expand Health Plan for Workers," New York Times, October 24 2005. The
$11/month premium will only be available in “a handful o f  areas,” according to a Wal-Mart spokesperson. Average 
individual premiums under the newly-proposed “Value Plan” will be closer to $25.
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coverage if  the employee’s spouse could get coverage through another employer, regardless of 
whether or not the spouse is even eligible to participate in the other employer’s plan.151
Furthermore, the lower the plan premium, the higher the deductible is. Wal-Mart plan 
deductibles range from $350 to $1,000 per year.152 By comparison, the $1,000 deductible is three 
times the national average, and fully 90 percent o f retailers and U.S, employers overall have 
annual deductibles o f $310 or less.153 After deductibles and premiums, employees are then 
responsible for paying 20 percent of medical costs, up to a maximum of $1,750. Wal-Mart does 
not have any lifetime cap on benefits.154
Even though Wal-Mart employees may participate in their health plan at rates equivalent to other 
retailers, their participation provides them with significantly poorer coverage. New full-time 
employees must wait six months before becoming eligible to enroll in Wal-Mart’s plan. For part- 
time employees, the wait is two years, and they can never qualify for family coverage.155 By 
comparison, the average waiting period for new employees is 1.7 months,156 and only 6 percent 
of private sector employees face a waiting period of six months or more.157
Wal-Mart’s health plan has a limited scope o f coverage. The company plan generally excludes 
most forms of preventive care, such as regular check-ups, flu shots, child vaccinations, eye 
exams, chiropractic services, and alcohol and smoking cessation programs. Women’s 
preventative exams, such as mammograms, are not covered in the first year, and contraceptive 
drugs are excluded,158 Mental health and substance abuse services are not covered in the first 
year and limited thereafter. Wal-Mart generally does not cover treatment o f pre-existing 
conditions in the first year, and prescription drug benefits are limited.159 *13456789
151 Bernhardt, Chaddha, and McGrath, "What Do We Know About Wal-Mart? An Overview o f Facts and Studies for 
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According to Wal-Mart’s internal communications, 24% of its workforce and 46% of dependent 
children are either uninsured or enrolled in a public health program,160 This compares with a rate 
of 22,5% for workers at large retail establishments overall, and 29.1% o f their dependent 
children.161
Perhaps the most macabre o f Wal-Mart’s “benefit” policies is its long-time practice of so-called 
“dead peasant” life insurance. The company routinely took out insurance policies on its 
employees and named itself as the beneficiary, often without the knowledge or consent of the 
employees. In Texas, where the practice was illegal, the company received $30,7 million from 
the death of 380 employees between 1994 and 2000. When families o f the dead employees found 
out, they sued and Wal-Mart paid them $10.4 million in a settlement. Meanwhile, in 1999, the 
Texas legislature reversed the ban on dead peasant insurance, as long as employees consent in 
writing. The company is fighting an additional suit over dead peasant life insurance in 
Oklahoma, and plaintiffs have requested the addition o f eleven states to the litigation.162
3.3.6 Personnel and Disciplinary Policies
While Wal-Mart’s overall corporate structure is highly centralized, store managers have 
considerable leeway to determine policies and procedures for scheduling, evaluating, promoting, 
and compensating their employees.163 However, corporate headquarters keeps close tabs on each 
store through daily reports via the online “Manager’s Workbench” and frequent store visits by 
district management,164 and it enforces a cap that restricts payroll at each store to a certain 
percentage o f sales.165
The company has a four-step progressive disciplinaiy procedure, known as its “Coaching for 
Improvement Policy,” Step one is a verbal coaching, step two is a written coaching, step three is 
a “decision making day” during which the associate is given a day off with pay to decide if  he or 
she will make the required improvement in his or her job performance, and step four is 
termination. The policy establishes an investigatory procedure for determining if  discipline is 
warranted, and the procedure includes obtaining from the associate who has engaged in the 
alleged misconduct “his/her side o f the story and any additional facts.”166
3.3.7 Compliance with Employment Laws
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Mounting evidence shows that Wal-Mart repeatedly violates federal and state workplace laws. 
Such violations include requiring employees to work without pay, discriminating in hiring and 
promotion based on gender, racial and disability bias, exploiting undocumented and child 
workers, disregarding health and safety and worker compensation laws, and undermining 
workers’ right to free association.
Several studies and legal proceedings suggest that Wal-Mart further lowers its wage bill by not 
paying employees for all hours worked. According to its own annual report, the company is 
currently facing 44 class action lawsuits alleging so-called “off-the-clock” work.167 This is in 
addition to off-the-clock work lawsuits involving 69,000 workers in New Mexico and Colorado, 
where the company settled out of court, and a 2002 case in Oregon where a jury found in favor 
of 400 Wal-Mart employees seeking compensation for unpaid work.168 In the latest 
development, on December 22, 2005, a jury in Oakland, California, ordered Wal-Mart to pay 
$172 million in compensatory and punitive damages to about 116,000 current and former 
employees denied lunch breaks.169 In 2002, statisticians estimated Wal-Mart shortchanged its 
Texas workers $150 million over four years by regularly not paying them for working through 
their 15-minute breaks. The case is currently under appeal.
Wal-Mart has been the subject o f numerous lawsuits and regulatory proceedings related to its 
discriminatory hiring and promotion practices. Most notable among these is Dukes vs. Wal-Mart, 
a class action lawsuit brought on behalf of more than 1.6 million present and former female Wal- 
Mart and Sam’s Club employees. The suit alleges systematic gender bias at Wal-Mart in its 
promotion, pay, training, and job assignment policies.170
Also potentially significant is the Armstrong vs, Wal-Mart case, which alleges discrimination in 
the hiring of African-American over-the-road truck drivers. The suit notes that although African- 
Americans constitute 15% of over-the-road truck drivers nationwide, Wal-Mart only employs 
2% to 3%.171
Wal-Mart has been cited repeatedly for violations o f the Americans with Disabilities Act. It has 
had to enter into a consent decree with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
and has had to pay out more than $20 million in fines in the past five years for its 
infringements.172
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Examining data for cases closed between 2000 and 2003, Wal-Mart had 655 violations o f the 
Occupational Safety & Health Act (OSHA) in that period,173
On October 23,2003, federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents executed a 
series o f pre-dawn raids on 61 Wal-Mart stores in 21 states, arresting 250 undocumented workers 
who had been employed by Wal-Mart subcontractors to clean the stores. The raids capped a 
multi-year investigation into undocumented employment among Wal-Mart subcontractors,174 
Wal-Mart claimed that it did not know that its subcontractors were using undocumented workers, 
but federal agents produced recordings and affidavits indicating that company executives had 
knowledge o f the arrangement.175
On March 18, 2005, Wal-Mart announced an $11 million settlement with federal officials for the 
incident, as well as for a similar 2001 incident in Pennsylvania.176 The company still faces a 
class-action racketeering suit in New Jersey by the undocumented workers from the raids, 
seeking back pay for overtime worked.177
An audit of time records for 128 stores in one week in July 2000 released in 2004 showed 1,371 
instances in which minors apparently worked too late at night, worked during school hours, or 
worked too many hours in a day.178 Additionally, on January 6,2005, Wal-Mart settled a series 
of child labor law violations in Arkansas, Connecticut, and New Hampshire by paying a fine of 
$135,540. Subsequently, Connecticut discovered further violations at Wal-Mart stores in that 
state.179 Prior to that settlement, Maine had fined the company $205,650 in March 2000 for child 
labor law abuses.180
Wal-Mart is a major violator o f federal labor laws. Between 1998 and 2002, the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) filed more than forty unfair labor practice charges against the 
company.181 Charges ranged from illegal termination and harassment for suspected union 
activity, to surveillance, to making threats and intimidating actual and potential whistle­
blowers.182
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3,3.8 Unions
Wal-Mart is well known for its anti-union animus. In a training manual for managers at its 
Greencastle, Indiana, distribution center on how to remain “union free,” Wal-Mart states that:
Staying union free is a full-time commitment. Unless union prevention is a goal equal to 
other objectives within an organization, the goal will usually not be attained. The 
commitment to stay union free must exist at all levels o f management -  from the 
Chairperson o f the “Board” down to the front-line manager. Therefore, no one in 
management is immune from carrying his or her “own weight” in the union prevention 
effort. The entire management staff should fully comprehend and appreciate exactly what 
is expected of their individual efforts to meet the union free objective. The union 
organizer is a “potential opponent” for our center.
The commitment to remain union free also has a price. Unless each member of 
management is willing to spend the necessary time, effort, energy, and money, it will not 
be accomplished. The time involved is a day-in/day-out (365 days per year) application 
of the union free standards and the obligations and responsibilities imposed upon the 
management team. Effort, energy and money must also be infused into the union free- 
system with equal attention and fervor.183
Wal-Mart backs up its commitment to remaining “union free” in its practice. At the first sign of 
union activity, facility managers must call the company’s “Union Hotline,” 479-273-8300, at 
corporate headquarters in Bentonville.184 From there, Wal-Mart dispatches a group from its 
“Labor Relations Team” to investigate the situation immediately,18 While Wal-Mart’s former 
“People Division” head, Coleman Peterson, states that Labor Relations Team members were sent 
in as part of a company "effort to educate local managers about labor laws,”186 there is strong 
evidence suggesting that Team members’ duties are far more extensive. In its confidential 
communications with store managers, Wal-Mart assures them that the Labor Relations Team 
“has developed action plans for all types of union activity,” and that “the Team will work with 
you [the manager] to develop strategies to combat these and all other types of union activities 
[followed by a list o f activities].”187 For their part, labor union activists and Wal-Mart workers
183 Orson Mason, "Labor Relations and You at the Wal-Mart Distribution Center #6022," (Greencastle, Indiana: 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1991).
184 Mason, Wal-Mart Stores Inc., "A Manager’s Toolbox to Remaining Union Free," (Bentonville, Arkansas: Wal- 
Mart Stores, Inc., 1997).
185 Aaron Bernstein, "Labor Finally Puts a Target on Wal-Mart," BusinessWeek Online, December 6 2000, 
Featherstone, Head, "Inside the Leviathan,;" Steven Pearlstein, "Wal-Mart's Hidden Costs," Washington Post, 
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44
have alleged that the Labor Relations Team visits are part of the company’s all-out effort to 
threaten and intimidate workers who attempt to unionize.188
Regardless o f which story is closer to the truth, the end result is that there is not a single 
unionized Wal-Mart store or distribution center in the U.S., despite numerous attempts. In a well- 
known February 2000 incident, ten meatcutters at a Jacksonville, Texas, Wal-Mart store beat the 
odds and voted 7-3 in favor o f unionizing with the United Food and Commercial Workers 
(UFCW), the only workers ever to do so in the U.S. However, one week after the vote, Wal-Mart 
announced that it was eliminating all meatcutting positions in its stores and switching to "case- 
ready” (pre-packaged) meat, putting the Jacksonville meatcutters out of work.189 Although the 
National Labor Relations Board ruled that Wal-Mart was required to bargain with the 
meatcutters in 2003, the issue was moot by then, and the message was clear: Wal-Mart would not 
tolerate unions in its U.S. operations.
Unions have had somewhat better luck in Canada, but only marginally so. In September 2004, a 
provincial labor board certified a unit o f approximately 190 workers at a Wal-Mart store in 
Jonquiere, Quebec, roughly 300 miles northeast of Montreal, However, before the workers could 
negotiate a first contract, Wal-Mart abruptly closed the store in April 2005, citing poor 
profitability at that location. However, a Quebec court ruled in September 2005 that the store 
was in fact closed to avoid bargaining with the union, and ordered unspecified compensation for 
the laid-off workers.190 Notwithstanding the threat posed by the Jonquiere example, unions have 
begun to get a toehold in Canada. In January 2005, the Quebec labor board certified another unit 
at a Wal-Mart store in Saint Hyacinthe, on the outskirts o f Montreal, Despite Wal-Mart’s 
appeals, the board upheld its decision in March 2005.191
Unions at two tire and lube stations have been certified in Gatineau, Quebec, across the river 
from the Canadian capital o f Ottawa,192 Most recently, a group o f Wal-Mart Tire and Lube 
Express workers in Cranbrook, British Columbia, voted to join the UFCW. The B.C. Labor 
Board certified the results of that vote on September 15,2005.193 Although these victories 
represent a breakthrough in terms o f  establishing a union presence against overwhelming 
corporate opposition, they remain but a small fraction o f Wal-Mart Canada’s 262 stores and 
more than 70,000 workers. Furthermore, even though the UFCW won certification in a handful
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o f cases, it also lost several representation elections in Quebec, Ontario, and British Columbia.194 
Wal-Mart remains a serious challenge for the Canadian labor movement.
Elsewhere in the world, Wal-Mart generally has to operate in a unionized environment of some 
kind. The table lists the unions in each country that are involved with Wal-Mart workers, either 
in organizing drives or as collective bargaining agents. In the case of Argentina, Brazil,
Germany, Great Britain, and Japan, unionization has been the result o f Wal-Mart purchasing an 
already-unionized domestic retailer, thus inheriting the company’s bargaining units.195 Countries 
such as Germany and Great Britain have national labor laws that require a degree of worker 
representation or adherence to sectoral collective bargaining agreements.196 Additionally, after 
initially claiming they were exempt from national regulations, Wal-Mart announced in 2004 that 
it would allow unions at its stores in China,197 Wal-Mart stores in Mexico also come under 
collective bargaining agreements.198 And at their August 2005 convention in Chicago, UNI 
Commerce, the global labor federation for retail workers, announced a major campaign to 
organize Wal-Mart workers in South Korea.199 20
Unions at W al-Mart Outside the United States260
Argentina Federation Argentina de Empleados de Comercio y Servicios (FAECYS)
Brazil Sindicato dos Comerciarios de Sao Paulo (SECSP)
Canada United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW)
China All-China Federation o f Trade Unions (ACFTU)
Germany Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft (ver.di)
Great Britain GMB: Britain’s General Union
Japan Federation o f Seiyu Workers Union (SWU)
Korea (South) Korean Federation o f Private Service Workers (KPSU)
Although unions have a nominally substantial presence in Wal-Mart’s international operations, it 
is important to note that the organization, scope, and effectiveness of union representation vary 
from country to country. Unions in some countries, such as GMB in Great Britain and 
particularly ver.di in Germany, have shown considerable resolve in standing up to Wal-Mart, and
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have engaged in various types o f job actions and legal fights.201 -At ASDA, the unions have shop 
stewards, but no collective bargaining agreements. In Brazil, Wal-Mart reached agreement with 
unions on some workers’ rights issues.202 At the other end of the spectrum, unions in China are 
known more for their role in enforcing government policy than in representing workers, and 
Mexican unions are notorious for being little more than protection rackets, offering “sweetheart 
contracts” with few representation rights for workers in exchange for employer payoffs.203 
Nevertheless, the presence o f unions and collective bargaining arrangements in these countries 
would seem to provide possible leverage for efforts to unionize Wal-Mart’s North American 
operations.
3.4 Suppliers
As the world’s largest retailer, Wal-Mart has literally thousands of suppliers spread all over the 
globe. The company says it has more than 61,000 goods and services suppliers in the United 
States, but it does not provide numbers on those outside the U.S., and it does not identify more 
than a few its suppliers, wherever they are located,204 Some are obvious, such as the world’s 
large suppliers o f personal care products, apparel, packaged groceries, toiletries, sundries, 
household goods, cleaning products, and entertainment. Procter & Gamble received 16% of its 
revenue, or $9.1 billion, from Wal-Mart in its fiscal year ending June 30,2005.205 Gillette, which 
P&G recently bought, received 13% of its revenue from Wal-Mart in 2004,206 Kraft received 
14% of its revenue from Wal-Mart in 2004.207 Wal-Mart accounted for 13% o f Kimberly-Clark 
revenue in 2004, or $2.1 billion.208 Rayovac (now Spectrum Brands) received 18% of its revenue 
from sales through Wal-Mart in the twelve months ending September 3 0 ,2005.209 Video game 
maker Electronic Arts received 14% of its revenue from Wal-Mart in fiscal 2005, up from 12% 
in fiscal 2003.210 Cosmetics marker Revlon received a whopping 21% o f its revenue from Wal- 
Mart in fiscal 2004.211
Wal-Mart’s relationships with its suppliers vary considerably, so generalization is difficult. 
Contradictory tendencies exist within Wal-Mart’s supplier relationships. Wal-Mart can be a 
gravy train, but it can also be a harsh taskmaster, or both at the same time. On the one hand, Wal- 
Mart can impose such harsh conditions that manufacturers become less profitable, and, in 
extreme cases, go out o f business. On the other hand, Wal-Mart sales can lead manufacturers to
201 Iritani, "Unions Go Abroad in Wal-Mart Fight.’’, Rowell, "Welcome to Wal-World: Wal-Mart's Inexhaustible 
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greater market share and higher profitability. One study concluded that Wal-Mart suppliers are 
less profitable than manufacturers in the same industry who do not supply Wal-Mart. It also 
noted that Wal-Mart suppliers who have significant market share enjoy outsized profits 
compared to similarly placed competitors without a Wal-Mart relationship. In other words, Wal- 
Mart squeezes most suppliers, but helps market-leading suppliers achieve dominance.212
Many suppliers respect Wal-Mart for being straightforward and up-front in their bargaining. 
Unlike other retailers who impose numerous add-on charges on suppliers, Wal-Mart boils 
everything down to one single price, with no surprises. As a Rubbermaid executive said, “All the 
funny money -  1% for this, 2% for that, ‘I need a rebate... I need a special fund for our annual 
golf event’ -  it isn’t there. They’ll negotiate hard to get the extra penny, but they’ll pass it along 
to the customer.”213 That no-nonsense attitude has garnered Wal-Mart recognition among 
suppliers as the “best company with which to do business” for the past seven years in a survey 
run by Cannondale Associates.214
Wal-Mart has an automated process for approving new suppliers, which includes filling in an 
online questionnaire and ordering a Dun and Bradstreet Supplier Evaluation Report. Approval 
occurs within 24 hours, via email. According to the company’s website, the “authorized buyer at 
the home office makes buying decisions for all programs,” further evidence of Wal-Mart’s 
centralization. New suppliers must sign a supplier agreement, which has stipulations relating to 
allowances, new store discounts, merchandise warranties, defective/retum merchandise 
allowances, warehouse allowances, soft goods allowances, late shipment penalties and 
markdown dollars or discounts. In other words, Wal-Mart will not pay for a series o f possible 
mistakes in the supply chain. Suppliers must also install Electronic Data Interchange, get their 
products tested by Consumers’ Testing Lab, adhere to lead-time requirements, and follow a list 
of rules for interacting with and providing information to Wal-Mart.215
New suppliers get access to and do much of their business with Wal-Mart through Retail Link, 
Wal-Mart’s multi-tasking online database. Retail Link connects Wal-Mart and its suppliers, 
provides computerized decision support for the company’s buyers, tracks merchandise through 
the supply chain, and offers sales and inventory information and purchase orders to suppliers. 
Through Retail Link, suppliers learn how well their products are selling at Wal-Mart and when 
they must restock the company’s shelves. They can also learn how to change their products to 
increase sales. In one case, the maker of roach spray changed its packaging because Wal-Mart 
found by looking at its Retail Link data that the old package’s picture o f a roach alienated buyers
212 Paul N. Bloom and Vanessa G. Perry, “Retailer Power and Supplier Welfare: The Case o f Wal-Mart,” Journal of 
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in Minnesota. Retail Link is so complicated and so important that businesses have sprung up to 
teach suppliers how to use it.216
Despite Retail Link’s electronic interface, hundreds o f suppliers have set up shop in northwest 
Arkansas to be close to Wal-Mart. Procter & Gamble, the world’s largest packaged goods 
company, has 200 people stationed near Bentonville, working solely on getting the company’s 
products into Wal-Mart. They, like their competitors, trudge regularly to Wal-Mart’s ‘‘Vendor 
Alley,” a grouping o f cubicles where Wal-Mart’s buyers hear pitches. Like Procter & Gamble, 
many large packaged and household goods makers, including Unilever, Newell Rubbermaid, S, 
C. Johnson & Sons, Kimberly-Clark, Colgate-Palmolive, and Kraft, will not introduce a new 
product until Wal-Mart agrees to put the product on its shelves. The process o f winning that 
agreement can be onerous, including Wal-Mart’s involvement in the supplier’s product 
development process, its inspection o f internal supplier production schedules, and its assessment 
of supplier margins. Wal-Mart is so involved in its suppliers that it is a manufacturer in all but 
name. 17
Wal-Mart exerts tremendous pressure on suppliers, who are desperate for access to its huge 
customer base. While the pressure takes many forms, the most important is that Wal-Mart 
expects suppliers to lower their prices each year. Unlike many retailers, the company usually 
negotiates a single product price, without a vast array o f fees, allowances, charges, and penalties. 
The single price makes life easier and harder for suppliers. Negotiations are simpler, but meeting 
the low price is difficult. Suppliers who resist a low price on one product can find all of their 
products excluded. But suppliers who meet Wal-Mart’s terms can become partners who work 
with Wal-Mart on developing products, marketing, merchandising, and everything else along the 
supply chain from raw materials to the checkout counter. For many suppliers, Wal-Mart might be 
a pain, but it is a profitable pain,218
Chinese factories are the source o f a significant percentage o f the goods Wal-Mart sells.219 
Despite many years o f a “Buy American” campaign, the company set up a global procurement
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operation in Shenzhen, China, that scours the country looking for low-cost suppliers. Usually, it 
does not have to go far, since Shenzhen is at the heart of an enormous industrial belt that 
encompasses much o f the Pearl River delta in Guangdong Province, Hong Kong and Macau are 
nearby. Every major purveyor o f toys, sporting goods, apparel, and electronics has facilities or 
suppliers with facilities in the province. Now, Wal-Mart has more than 5,000 suppliers in China. 
The $18 billion worth of goods the company and its suppliers sourced from China in 2004 makes 
Wal-Mart the country’s eighth largest trading partner, behind the European Union, the United 
States, Japan, Hong Kong, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, South Korea, and 
Taiwan,
Wal-Mart takes advantage of conditions in the Pearl River Delta. Wages are low, about $100 per 
month, meaning most workers cannot afford to shop at the Wal-Mart stores opening near them. 
Workers are mostly migrants from the countryside, with official residence permits. Their 
presence is subject to the whim of employers, and they receive no social benefits, because these 
originate in the location of their official residence. To employ this terrorized workforce, the 
Chinese government has made massive investments in infrastructure, such as roads and ports, 
and it has encouraged local entrepreneurs and foreign investors to build enormous factories in 
Shenzhen, some with as many as 40,000 workers. Simultaneously, the government has ignored 
social, environmental, workplace, and urban planning regulations. As a result, Wal-Mart and its 
suppliers have access to state-of-the art factories operating at peak efficiency with rock-bottom 
labor costs and little regulation.20 21
Wal-Mart does not force its suppliers to move to China, but its insistence on the lowest price 
compels them. Take toy making as an example. It is a labor-intensive industry, Wal-Mart is the 
largest seller o f toys in the world. The two largest toy “makers” in the world, Mattel and Hasbro, 
contract to make all their toys in China, The two companies received 43% and 21% of their 2004 
revenue from Wal-Mart. The company’s buyers probably never told Mattel to move production 
from California, but it did not need to. Interestingly, Lego, the number three toy brand in the 
world, does not have a factory in China, but Wal-Mart carries its products,222
Fans are another example, Lakewood Engineering cut the price of its desk fans made in Chicago 
by 50% over the course o f a decade, but Wal-Mart wanted more. Lakewood automated, cutting 
the number o f people needed to make a product to seven from 22. That still was not enough, so 
the company opened a factory in Shenzhen, where workers earn 25 cents an hour, compared with 
$13 in Chicago. Along with their competitors, Lakewood sales representatives travel to 
Bentonville several times a year to pitch their products in one o f sixty glass-sided cubicles. “You
220 Nelson Lichtenstein, “Supply Chains, Workers’ Chains and the New World o f Retail Supremacy,” New Labor 
Forum (forthcoming 2006).
221 Pallavi Gogoi, “Wal-Mart’s China Card,” BusinessWeek, July 26, 2005; Jiang Jingjing, "Wal-Mart’s China 
inventory to hit $18b this year,” China Daily, November 29,2004, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doe/2004- 
11/29/content 395728.htm. accessed January 7, 2006; Vanessa Hua, “Wal-Mart’s China operation a study in 
contrasts; Workers at many o f the factories that supply goods to the stores can’t afford to shop there,” San Francisco 
Chronicle, December 29,2004; Joshua Holland, “Wal-Mart’s ‘China Price,”’ AlterNet, 
http://www.altemet.org/walmart/27829. posted November 7 ,2005 , accessed January 6, 2006.
222 Hasbro, Form 10-K (2004), March 9 ,2005, p. 6; Mattel, Form 10-K (2004), March 8, 2005, p. 87; Charles 
Fishman, “The Wal-Mart You Don’t Know,” Fast Company, Iss, 77, December 2003, p. 68.
50
give them your price ,” Lakewood owner Carl Krauss said. “If they don't like it, they give you 
theirs.” Lakewood’s reps know their competitors are sitting in the next cubicle. "Your price is 
going to be whittled down like you never thought possible,” Krauss said. All the retailers he 
supplies -  including Home Depot and Target -  drive a hard bargain, but none is as tough as Wal- 
Mart, Krauss said.
China is important to Wal-Mart because not only is it a source of cheap goods and a potentially 
enormous market, but because it sends a message to other suppliers. During Wal-Mart’s Buy 
American campaign in the 1980s and early 1990s, the company pledged to buy more o f its goods 
in the U.S., but only if  American manufacturers lowered their prices and resisted unions. In a 
letter to American suppliers in 1988, Sam Walton made this clear: “Our American suppliers must 
commit to improving their facilities and machinery, remain financially conservative and work to 
fill our requirements, and most importantly, strive to improve employee productivity.” The same 
logic applies today.23 24
Wal-Mart boasts of its Standards for Suppliers, which all suppliers must read, sign, and meet. 
These standards include fair compensation, reasonable hours, and freedom of association and 
collective bargaining for workers, no forced labor or child labor, no discrimination, compliance 
with immigration laws, factory health and safety, personal security, and concern for the 
environment. The company touts its annual “Report on Standards for Suppliers,” which details 
how Wal-Mart enforces its standards. The company claimed that it performed 12,500 audits at 
7,600 factories in 2004. Wal-Mart stopped doing business with 1,500 factories during the year, 
but permanently banned only 108 o f these, primarily for child labor violations.225
Despite Wal-Mart’s claims, many o f its suppliers violate its standards. Indeed, its low-price 
policies encourage them to do so. In 1996, four years after Wal-Mart established its Standards 
for Suppliers, the National Labor Committee demonstrated that Central American and U.S. 
suppliers o f the Wal-Mart Kathy Lee Gifford line o f clothing operated sweatshops, imposed 
forced overtime, and used illegal child labor. Despite pledges by Gifford and Wal-Mart, the NLC 
found similar violations three years later.226
In September 2005, The International Labor Rights Fund filed a class action suit in California 
Superior Court in Los Angeles on behalf o f workers at Wal-Mart suppliers in California, China, 
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nicaragua, and Swaziland. The suit presents evidence that Wal-Mart
223 Abigail Goldman and Nancy Cleeland, "An Empire Built on Bargains Remakes the Working World,” Los 
Angeles Times, November 23,2003.
224 Nelson Lichtenstein, "Supply Chains, Workers’ Chains and the New World o f  Retail Supremacy,” New Labor 
Forum (forthcoming2006). Walton quote from Michael Barrier, "Walton’s Mountain,” Nation's Business, Vol, 76, 
Iss. 4 (April 1988), p. 18, cited in Lichtenstein.
225 Wal-Mart, “Standards for Suppliers,” http://walmartstores.com/Files/SupplierStandards.pdf: Wal-Mart, "Wal- 
Mart Stores, Inc. Report on Standards for Suppliers January 1 -  December 31 ,2004 ,” 2005, p, 2, 
http://www.walmartfacts.com/docs/2004SupplierStandardsReport.pdf.
226 Steven Greenhouse, "A Crusader Makes Celebrities Tremble,” New York Times, June 18,1996; United Food and 
Commercial Workers, “Wal-Mart and Sweatshops,”
http://www.ufcw.org/issues and actions/walmart workers campaign info/facts and figures/walmartsweatshops.cf 
m, accessed January 8,2006.
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suppliers outside the U.S. denied workers their basic minimum wage, forced them to work 
overtime, and in certain cases denied their right to organize. It also alleges that Wal-Mart’s 
unfair labor practices, including false representations regarding compliance with its code of 
conduct, have hurt workers at California suppliers. The plaintiffs claim that Wal-Mart’ s failure to 
enforce its code o f conduct and its unfair business practices violate California’s Unfair Business 
Practices A c t227
These are just a few o f the many examples that suggest Wal-Mart does not adequately enforce its 
Standards for Suppliers,228 Perhaps the best evidence o f Wal-Mart’s lax approach is that it 
refuses to allow independent, unannounced inspections of its suppliers’ facilities. Additionally, 
only 8% of its own audits were unannounced in 2004, though that was supposed to rise to 20% in 
2005. Finally, in its 48-page Report on Standards for Suppliers, Wal-Mart does not mention a 
single instance in which it took remedial or compensatory action after discovering violations at a 
supplier. In reality, despite its rhetoric, Wal-Mart accepts no responsibility for the actions o f its 
suppliers.
3.5 Procurement and Distribution
This section describes Wal-Mart’s Global Procurement organization, which is internal to the 
company, and some o f the “outside” aspects o f its distribution system, primarily the truckers, 
shipping lines, and railways that handle its goods.
3.5.1 Global Procurement
In addition to dealing with suppliers from headquarters in Bentonville, Wal-Mart has moved in 
recent years to source its own products through its Global Procurement division (GP).
Established in 2002, the division currently employs approximately 1,400 employees working out 
of 28 offices in 24 countries. They coordinate merchandise sourcing from more than 5,000 
factories in 65 countries. The division took over, integrated, and expanded work previously done 
by Hong Kong-based Pacific Resources Export on a ten-year contract, and what was known as
227 International Labor Rights Fund, “Sweatshop Workers on Four Continents Sue Wal-Mart in California Court,” 
Press Release, September 13,2005; ILRF, “Class Action Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages,” Superior 
Court o f the State o f  California for the County o f Los Angeles, Central District, Filed September 13,2005, available 
at http.7/www.laborrights.ors/proiects/corporate/walmart/WalMartComplaint091305.pdf: Peter S. Goodman and 
Philip P. Pan, “Chinese Workers Pay for Wal-Mart’s Low Prices,” Washington Post, February 8 ,2004, p. A l.
228 For additional examples, see National Labor Committee, “Victory! Mary-Kate and Ashley Take a Stand Against 
Sweatshops,” December 21, 2004,
http://www.nlcnet.org/news/blog comment.asp?bi=34&m=l&v=2006&d=&s:=category, accessed January 7, 2006; 
Dexter Roberts and Aaron Bernstein, “Inside a Chinese Sweatshop: ‘A Life o f Fines and Beating,’” BusinessWeek, 
October 2, 2000; Steven Greenhouse, “Beatings and Other Abuses Cited at Samoan Apparel Plant That Supplied 
U.S. Retailers,” New York Times, February 6,2001; “Investigation Claims Wal-Mart Suppliers Use Child Labor,” 
Portage Daily Graphic (Manitoba), December 1,2005; Nelson Lichtenstein, “Supply Chains, Workers’ Chains and 
the New World o f Retail Supremacy,” New Labor Forum (forthcoming 2006).
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an internal “global sourcing group” Wal-Mart hired many of Pacific Resources Export 
employees.229
Andrew Tsuei, vice president and managing director o f global procurement, runs the division out 
of its headquarters in Shenzhen, China. His boss in Bentonville is Kenneth Eaton, senior vice 
president for global procurement. Four operations executives oversee the GP staff and report to 
Tsuei. Each has responsibilities for a region: the Americas, Europe/Middle East/Africa, northern 
Asia, and Indian subcontinent/Southeast Asia. The division also includes a U.S. Export Office, 
based in Bentonville, which assists U.S. manufacturers in connecting with Wal-Mart 
International segment buyers and with facilitating the export process.230
The GP division sees itself as an “internal service organization” for Wal-Mart, offering company 
buyers a “compelling choice” as they search relentlessly for the best-priced merchandise. 
Essentially, GP competes against the gaggle o f suppliers that line up everyday at Bentonville 
headquarters to press their wares. GP tries to get a better price for a given product by cutting out 
the middleman and sourcing it directly from factories overseas. In the event that GP can beat 
other suppliers’ prices, the products it sources end up on Wal-Mart store shelves as private label 
merchandise.
Sourcing directly allows Wal-Mart both to cut prices and raise its profit margins on the items it 
sells. Preliminary results show that the company reduced costs relative to comparable 
merchandise by 10% to 20%. Currently, GP-sourced merchandise is limited to seasonal, low- 
volume, high design complexity items, such as Halloween costumes. However, the division is 
now moving aggressively to provide more entry price point “replenishable” items, i.e. basic, 
high-volume merchandise, and to expand its range o f items more generally. Tsuei has pointed to 
examples such as bed sheets, where, thanks to direct sourcing, Wal-Mart increased thread count, 
dropped price, and boosted profit margins; or a recordable CD player it sells in its Brazilian 
stores, where it cut the price and increased margins by 30%,231
The GP division works closely with Wal-Mart’s Product Development Division in order to 
figure out exactly what design specifications are required for the product in question, as well as 
which manufacturers are best equipped to handle the production.232
While GP currently only accounts for around 10% of total Wal-Mart purchases, the company 
expects this to grow substantially in years to come. Some analysts estimate that the company
229 Mike Troy, "In-Sourcing the Role o f  the Middleman," DNS Retailing Today 43, no. 23 (2004), Bruce Upbin, 
"Wal-Mart Rolls Back the Middleman," Forbes, April 2 2004, Wal-Mart Stores Inc., "2005 Analysts’ Meeting Day 
2."
230 Troy, "In-Sourcing the Role o f  the Middleman;" Wal-Mart Stores Inc,, "2005 Analysts' Meeting Day 2."
231 Brent Feigner, "Wal-Mart Goes Deeper for Savings," Home Textiles Today, June 20 2005, Gregory Melich et al,, 
"Wal-Mart: Yes, They Can, If  Allowed," (New York: Morgan Stanley, 2004), Troy, "In-Sourcing the Role o f the 
Middleman;" Upbin, "Wal-Mart Rolls Back the Middleman;" Wal-Mart Stores Inc., "2005 Analysts' Meeting Day 
2."
232 Feigner, "Wal-Mart Goes Deeper for Savings."
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plans to have GP constitute more than 30% o f purchases by 2010. As with their U.S. operations, 
GP is particularly looking to food imports for major growth.233
3.5.2 Trucking, Shipping, and Railroad
To move its goods, Wal-Mart relies on a network o f common carriers, including trucking 
companies, railways, and shipping lines, and the intermodal intersections between them, such as 
ports. For shipments from foreign factories, mostly in Asia, containerization has become 
essential, because it speeds intermodal freight transportation. At the factory, employees pack 
goods into containers the size of a standard truck trailer. Trucks or trains take the containers to a 
port, where huge cranes stack them on enormous ocean vessels, often carrying thousands at a 
time. At a U.S. port, cranes remove the containers and put them on trucks. Trucks can deliver the 
containers to a railway hub or directly to a Wal-Mart distribution center, at which point 
employees open the container and distribute its contents to warehouse floor or to trucks bound 
for Wal-Mart stores. With containerization, huge amounts o f goods move across the globe 
rapidly under a single bill o f lading.
Key ports for Wal-Mart include Los Angeles/Long Beach, which handles 58% of all trade 
through West Coast ports.234 Other key ports include Charleston, South Carolina; Norfolk, 
Virginia; Savannah, Georgia; Seattle, Washington; New York, New York; and Houston, Texas. 
With its massive distribution centers along the Eastern Seaboard, 40% percent o f Wal-Mart’s 
goods flow through Norfolk, Virginia, and Savannah, Georgia.235
Deregulation in the trucking, railroad, and shipping industries has made it possible for a single 
company to handle intermodal transportation from door to door. Offering all three modes, 
especially railroad and trucking gives shippers a choice, Numerous studies o f transportation 
economics have found that double-stack rail is economical at distances as short as 500 miles. 
However, in some cases trucking may still be competitive at even 1,000 miles. Deregulation has 
also spurred technological development, such as web-based truck appointment systems, 
inventory tracking, and sophisticated logistics management software, all o f which make cargo 
handling faster and cheaper.236 *
The five top steamship companies in terms o f tonnage that operate out o f West Coast ports are 
the following: American President Lines (APL), controlled by the Singapore government; China 
Ocean Shipping Co. (COSCO), controlled by the Chinese government; Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, 
Ltd. (“K”-Line); Maersk Sealand; and Mitsui O.S.K. Lines. It is difficult to gauge the percentage 
of Wal-Mart products each shipping company carries. At present, any importer may request
233 Melich et al., "Wal-Mart: Yes, They Can, If Allowed;" Upbin, "Wal-Mart Rolls Back the Middleman;" Deborah 
Weinswig and Charmaine Tang, "Wmt: Roic Driving Decisions — Details from Meetings with Management," (New 
York: Citigroup, 2005).
234 Edna Bonachich with Khaleelah Hardie, ‘‘Wal-Mart and the Logistics Revolution,” in Wal-Mart: The Face of  
Twenty-First-Century Capitalism, edited by Nelson Lichtenstein. New York, N ew York: The New Press, 2006.169
235 Fairplay International Shipping Weekly, March 11, 2004.
236 Arin Dube, Rhonda Evans, Peter Hall, Peter Olney, Van Swearingen, Amy Willis, and Goetz Wolff, “On The
Waterfront And Beyond: Technology And The Changing Nature O f Cargo-Related Employment On The West
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confidential treatment o f its name and address on all manifests, including identifying marks and 
numbers, and they need not provide a reason for their request for confidentiality.237
Six o f the top importers into West Coast ports do not appear in container bill o f lading (BOL) 
information, and Wal-Mart in particular is conspicuous in its absence. From other sources there 
is some information about Wal-Mart’s distribution behavior. The company is the nation’s 
number one shipper, importing more than 292,000 Twenty-foot Equivalent Units (TEUs) 
annually. Wal-Mart maintains a giant distribution center complex in the Inland Empire of 
California, but it is diversifying its distribution centers to reduce its reliance on the West Coast 
ports. Maersk-Sealand is the company’s biggest steamship provider, and J. B. Hunt is one of its 
regular trucking companies. Wal-Mart itself maintains a fleet o f more than 7,000 trucks 
nationwide that operates out of forty transportation centers. Wal-Mart uses Burlington Northern 
Santa Fe (BNSF) as its West Coast railroad.238
Mostly due to West Coast port congestion, and in no small measure due to the lockout of the 
International Longshore Workers Union at the Los Angeles and Long Beach ports in 2002, Wal- 
Mart has embarked on an ambitious direct import strategy, symbolized by the building of a new 
inbound 4 million square feet distribution center outside Houston in Baytown. It is the largest 
distribution center in the country. “The day that strike happened in California, my phone started 
ringing off the hook,” said Charles Iupe, president and majority owner o f Cedar Crossing 
Industrial Park, the Wal-Mart complex’s new home. And according to Satish Jundel, president of 
the SJ Consulting Group, a Pittsburgh-based transport consultancy, “they’re [Wal-Mart] letting 
the people in [the ports of] L.A. and Long Beach know, ‘You don’t control how we bring 
shipments into this county.’” 239
Under its direct import plan, Wal-Mart spreads cargo to defined gateways, including Charleston, 
South Carolina, Los Angeles-Long Beach, and Houston. It stages the goods briefly at these hubs 
before moving them to regional warehouses closer to final transport to stores. Wal-Mart awarded 
its logistics contract for the Texas site to UTi Worldwide.240
To win traffic, East Coast ports have teamed up with the Panama Canal Authority in a series of 
alliances that call for joint marketing, data sharing, and information/teehnology exchange, all 
with a view to coordinating any future expansion of the canal with parallel developments along 
the East Coast. 241
At the ports, truckers often take goods from ships to distributions centers to railroads. Decades 
ago, port drivers were employees of trucking firms, entitled to steady wages, pensions, health 
care, and the right to join unions. But as retailers and steamship lines moved to cut costs on the 
docks, trucking companies outsourced work to owner-operators. Current law considers the 
drivers independent contractors, which prevents them from collective action. Nonetheless, 300 of
237 Ibid.
238 Ibid.
239 William Hoffman, “Redrawing the Logistics Map,” Traffic World, August 15,2005.
240 Ibid.
241 “Eyeing China, The East Coast builds Alliances,” Fairplay International Shipping Weekly.
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the 11,000 drivers in the Los Angeles/Long Beach port complex are members o f the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters.242
Ninety-three percent o f the port drivers are Hispanic (sometimes called troqueros), compared to 
10% nationally. They work on average 11.2 hours a day, 33% percent more than the typical full- 
time worker in the U.S. does. They receive $50~$200 per cargo container they haul, depending 
on distance. After fuel, insurance, registration, and maintenance costs, earnings average $8-$9 
per hour according to Teamster estimates. Virtually all o f them work without pension and health 
plans,243
3.6 Customers
Wal-Mart says it serves 138 million shoppers worldwide each week. It says that more than 70% 
of its customers are women.244 Beyond that, it does not say much. In some of its literature, 
especially when justifying low prices, the company explains that its customers have limited 
incomes. For example, on the www.walmartfacts.com website, the answer to the question “Why 
does Wal-Mart import so many items from abroad?” begins with, “Many of our customers live 
paycheck to paycheck. They trust Wal-Mart to provide their families with quality merchandise at 
every day low prices, raising the standard of living for millions o f U.S. families. We owe it to 
them to provide the right products at the right prices.”245 Arguing for a higher minimum wage 
before Congress in October 2005, CEO H. Lee Scott said, “We have seen an increase in 
spending on the 1st and 15th of each month and less spending at the end of the month, letting us 
know that our customers simply don’t have the money to buy basic necessities between 
paychecks.”246 In public at least, Wal-Mart portrays its customers as America’s poor.
There is undoubtedly a grain of truth in this portrayal. For its first three decades, Wal-Mart 
located its stores in relatively small, Southern rural towns in states with some o f the lowest per 
capita incomes in the United States.247 Even when Wal-Mart moved into states with higher per 
capita incomes in the 1990s, it headed first for rural towns and exurbs, where incomes were 
lower. As a result, Wal-Mart probably did have a relatively poor clientele for most of its 
existence.
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56
Expansion in recent years complicates the picture. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the 
company started moving into middle-class suburbs in California', Connecticut, Illinois, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York, where incomes are nearer or above the national 
median. Without access to company data, we cannot know just how much the profile o f its 
customers has changed.
Wal-Mart’s focus on low-income consumers imposes some limitations on its growth. Since the 
turn o f  the 21st century, income growth has redounded almost entirely to the wealthiest segments 
of the economy. Wages at the bottom end o f the income hierarchy have stagnated. As a result, 
richer consumers have maintained their levels o f consumption, to the benefit o f high-end 
merchandisers, such as Neiman-Marcus. Stores such as Target and Costco have also benefited, 
because they, not Wal-Mart, are where middle- and upper-income consumers go when they want 
to save money. Meanwhile, Wal-Mart’s typical customers have suffered through a jobless 
recovery, falling real wages, and rising gasoline prices. This partly explains why same-store sales 
growth has been faster at Target than Wal-Mart since the second half o f2003,
The irony, o f course, is that Wal-Mart’s own low-price strategy is a major reason for falling real 
wages. Sam Walton relentlessly cut costs, resisted unions, skirted minimum wages laws, and 
demanded his suppliers to do the same. Implicitly, today the company repeats the very same 
message when it demands suppliers lower their prices every year.
Besides Scott’s meager testimony in favor o f a higher minimum wage, Wal-Mart’s solution to 
the economic problems o f its customers is not to help them by raising its workers’ wages or 
easing off suppliers. Instead, it is trying to abandon them. Increasingly, the company is 
introducing higher-margin, higher quality, and higher-cost products in an effort to attract 
wealthier customers (see Section 3.6 Marketing). A new fashion line, Metro 7, is one example, as 
is higher quality electronics. So far, however, the company has found only limited success, in 
part because the strategy conflicts with what it does best. Quality electronics selling requires 
experienced customer support, a direct contradiction to Wal-Mart’s tradition o f limited service. 
Similarly, fashion marketing requires an impeccable fashion sense, good luck matching ever- 
changing fashion trends, and sophisticated sourcing and pricing/markdown strategies, Wal-Mart 
has no experience in fashion, its every day low price mantra rules out markdowns, and its 
sourcing strategies emphasize price, not quality. Thus, in going after wealthier customers, Wal- 
Mart is challenging its own corporate DNA and, possibly, alienating its core customers -  who 
live paycheck to paycheck -  in the process.
3,7 Marketing
Consumers know Wal-Mart has the lowest prices on everything. That is the slogan: Always low 
prices. Always, “Lower prices” is the company’s Holy Grail, its mantra, its raison d’etre, and the 
source for all that is good about the company, “Low prices” save consumers, most o f them rural 248
248 Emme P, Kozloff, Ian J. Gordon, Robert Higginbotham, “WMT: Management Offers 'Mea Culpa' but Proposed 
Solution Faces Implementation & Timing Hurdles,” Bernstein Research Call, June 6,2005.
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The truth is Wal-Mart has never had the lowest prices on everything. It just implies that it does. 
The key here is something called the “opening price point item.” It is the television or mop or 
bathing suit with an unbeatable and incredibly attractive low price. Every type of product at Wal- 
Mart has an opening price point item. Its low price catches “the consumer’s eye and creates the 
perception o f value across the higher price points further up the aisle.”249 50 In other words, one 
incredibly low-priced bathing suit makes it appear as if  all the other bathing suits for sale are also 
low-priced, whether they are or not. Ray Bracy, Wal-Mart vice president for international affairs 
told Frontline, the PBS documentary team, “The opening price point is clearly a foundation of 
who we are and how we interact with our customers.”251
Wal-Mart circulars, advertisements, and promotions feature opening price point items. They get 
customers into the stores. Then by placing displays for the opening price point items in strategic 
locations within the store, Wal-Mart encourages customers to walk down aisles displaying 
similar, more expensive items on which it receives a higher margin. Often, they buy the higher- 
priced items. The strategy is similar to fraudulent “bait-and-switeh” advertisements and operates 
using identical psychology. It is legal, however, because the opening price point item really is in 
stock and for sale. Says one former Wal-Mart store manager, “Once you walk past that opening 
price point, they got you because you’ve already formed the perception that everything in that 
department is the lowest price in town.”252
An extreme twist on the “opening price point item” is the “loss leader.” Wal-Mart will sell 
certain products, such as drugs and health and beauty aids, below its costs to entice customers 
into its stores, hoping they buy enough profitable goods to make up for the loss leaders. 
Sometimes, “loss leaders” just happen to be popular items found at competing stores. In 1993, 
Wal-Mart tried to drive several drug stores in Conway, Arkansas, out o f business, using what the 
stores and a local judge called “predatory pricing” on prescription drugs. In court, the stores 
demonstrated that customers switched to Wal-Mart when it lowered its prices below cost. They 
also showed that Wal-Mart would lift its prices as competition disappeared. Nearer to Little 
Rock, where there were plenty of pharmacies, Wal-Mart’s drug prices were lower; in more 
remote towns, like Conway, they were higher. Ironically, one o f the drug stores regularly bought 
much o f its non-drug stock from Wal-Mart, because its retail prices were lower than the small 
drug store could get wholesale. Fifteen months after the local court found against Wal-Mart, the 
Arkansas Supreme Court overturned the case, arguing that the “loss leader” strategy was legal, 
Wal-Mart has not faced a serious predatory pricing suit ever since, and the loss leader strategy
and poor, $100 billion a year, by one estimate. What more could the world want from a
retailer?249
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The level o f Wal-Mart’s marketing deception used to be even greater. Until 1993, the company’s 
slogan was Always the low price. Always. Note the crucial definite article “the,” To demonstrate 
the truth o f this slogan, Wal-Mart store shelves regularly carried head-to-head price comparisons 
to demonstrate that its prices were lowest. Only the comparisons were often phony, because they 
compared different-sized items or listed old prices. At least one competitor, Target, tried and 
failed to persuade Wal-Mart to change its practices and slogan. So it joined with several others, 
including Meijer, Pace Membership Warehouse, and Vision World, to bring a complaint to the 
National Advertising Division (NAD) o f the Council o f  Better Business Bureaus, The NAD 
allowed the slogan, but told Wal-Mart to modify its price comparison practices. Not satisfied, the 
competitors appealed to the National Advertising Review Board, an organization o f advertising 
and public interest groups, which ruled that Wal-Mart’s slogan was deceptive. In the spring of 
1994, Wal-Mart relented and changed its slogan to the current Always Low Prices. Always,253 54
On top of low prices, Wal-Mart has used many other methods to entice customers to its stores 
and, once there, induce them to spend money. Wal-Mart Discount Stores are generally very 
crowded compared to competitors. In this way, Wal-Mart can offer more items for sale. It is one 
reason Wal-Mart has a high rate of sales per square foot, a key measure o f retail productivity.
For fiscal year 2003, Wal-Mart recorded sales per square foot of $440, compared to $249 for 
Target and $221 for Kmart,255 Interestingly, archrival Costco outperforms Wal-Mart in this 
respect, pulling in $795 in sales per square foot for fiscal year 2004, compared to $516 for direct 
competitor Sam’s Club,256
“Retailtainment” is another marketing method at Wal-Mart, Every store has Wal-Mart 
Television, which carries news, advertisements, and entertainment. Store events range from 
celebrity appearances to bubble-gum blowing contests to book readings to eating contests to 
fashion shows to cooking demonstrations. Suppliers sponsor many o f these events. For example, 
NASCAR, Kodak, Coca-Cola, Energizer, Kraft, and Wrangler sponsored NASCAR Days, the 
centeipiece o f which was the opportunity to take a photo with cardboard cutouts o f racecar
remains prominent -  on the day after Thanksgiving 2005, the company sold Toshiba laptop
computers for $199 and Hewlett-Packard Pavillion laptop computers for $398.253
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The truth is Wal-Mart has never had the lowest prices on everything. It just implies that it does. 
The key here is something called the “opening price point item.” It is the television or mop or 
bathing suit with an unbeatable and incredibly attractive low price. Every type of product at Wal- 
Mart has an opening price point item. Its low price catches “the consumer’s eye and creates the 
perception o f value across the higher price points further up the aisle.”249 50 In other words, one 
incredibly low-priced bathing suit makes it appear as if  all the other bathing suits for sale are also 
low-priced, whether they are or not. Ray Bracy, Wal-Mart vice president for international affairs 
told Frontline, the PBS documentary team, “The opening price point is clearly a foundation of 
who we are and how we interact with our customers.”251
Wal-Mart circulars, advertisements, and promotions feature opening price point items. They get 
customers into the stores. Then by placing displays for the opening price point items in strategic 
locations within the store, Wal-Mart encourages customers to walk down aisles displaying 
similar, more expensive items on which it receives a higher margin. Often, they buy the higher- 
priced items. The strategy is similar to fraudulent “bait-and-switeh” advertisements and operates 
using identical psychology. It is legal, however, because the opening price point item really is in 
stock and for sale. Says one former Wal-Mart store manager, “Once you walk past that opening 
price point, they got you because you’ve already formed the perception that everything in that 
department is the lowest price in town.”252
An extreme twist on the “opening price point item” is the “loss leader.” Wal-Mart will sell 
certain products, such as drugs and health and beauty aids, below its costs to entice customers 
into its stores, hoping they buy enough profitable goods to make up for the loss leaders. 
Sometimes, “loss leaders” just happen to be popular items found at competing stores. In 1993, 
Wal-Mart tried to drive several drug stores in Conway, Arkansas, out o f business, using what the 
stores and a local judge called “predatory pricing” on prescription drugs. In court, the stores 
demonstrated that customers switched to Wal-Mart when it lowered its prices below cost. They 
also showed that Wal-Mart would lift its prices as competition disappeared. Nearer to Little 
Rock, where there were plenty of pharmacies, Wal-Mart’s drug prices were lower; in more 
remote towns, like Conway, they were higher. Ironically, one o f the drug stores regularly bought 
much o f its non-drug stock from Wal-Mart, because its retail prices were lower than the small 
drug store could get wholesale. Fifteen months after the local court found against Wal-Mart, the 
Arkansas Supreme Court overturned the case, arguing that the “loss leader” strategy was legal. 
Wal-Mart has not faced a serious predatory pricing suit ever since, and the loss leader strategy
and poor, $100 billion a year, by one estimate. What more could the world want from a
retailer?249
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The level of Wal-Mart’s marketing deception used to be even greater. Until 1993, the company’s 
slogan was Always the low price. Always. Note the crucial definite article “the.” To demonstrate 
the truth of this slogan, Wal-Mart store shelves regularly carried head-to-head price comparisons 
to demonstrate that its prices were lowest. Only the comparisons were often phony, because they 
compared different-sized items or listed old prices. At least one competitor, Target, tried and 
failed to persuade Wal-Mart to change its practices and slogan. So it joined with several others, 
including Meijer, Pace Membership Warehouse, and Vision World, to bring a complaint to the 
National Advertising Division (NAD) o f the Council o f Better Business Bureaus. The NAD 
allowed the slogan, but told Wal-Mart to modify its price comparison practices. Not satisfied, the 
competitors appealed to the National Advertising Review Board, an organization o f advertising 
and public interest groups, which ruled that Wal-Mart’s slogan was deceptive. In the spring of 
1994, Wal-Mart relented and changed its slogan to the current Always Low Prices, Always.253 54
On top of low prices, Wal-Mart has used many other methods to entice customers to its stores 
and, once there, induce them to spend money, Wal-Mart Discount Stores are generally very 
crowded compared to competitors. In this way, Wal-Mart can offer more items for sale. It is one 
reason Wal-Mart has a high rate o f sales per square foot, a key measure o f retail productivity.
For fiscal year 2003, Wal-Mart recorded sales per square foot of $440, compared to $249 for 
Target and $221 for Kmart.255 Interestingly, archrival Costco outperforms Wal-Mart in this 
respect, pulling in $795 in sales per square foot for fiscal year 2004, compared to $516 for direct 
competitor Sam’s Club.256
“Retailtainment” is another marketing method at Wal-Mart. Every store has Wal-Mart 
Television, which carries news, advertisements, and entertainment. Store events range from 
celebrity appearances to bubble-gum blowing contests to book readings to eating contests to 
fashion shows to cooking demonstrations. Suppliers sponsor many o f these events. For example, 
NASCAR, Kodak, Coca-Cola, Energizer, Kraft, and Wrangler sponsored NASCAR Days, the 
centerpiece o f which was the opportunity to take a photo with cardboard cutouts o f racecar
remains prominent -  on the day after Thanksgiving 2005, the company sold Toshiba laptop
computers for $199 and Hewlett-Packard Pavillion laptop computers for $398.253
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drivers.257 Another tactic, ‘‘Store of the Community,” is a concession to the fact that Wal-Mart 
increasingly operates in communities with diverse populations. It allows store managers to bend 
the packaging, product assortment, and shelving rules laid down in Bentonville in order to, say, 
offer a 20-pound bag of pinto beans in a Latino area, large packages of rice in Asian 
neighborhoods, more Mountain Dew in a college town, or Eagles jerseys in Philadelphia.258
Today, Wal-Mart could be running up against the limits o f its religious adherence to low prices. 
In June 2005, CEO H. Lee Scott said the company would focus on three types of customers: (1) 
core customers who shop at Wal-Mart for its “opening price point items”; (2) customers who 
shop at Wal-Mart for its food and consumables; and (3) customers who do not shop at Wal-Mart. 
Nothing will change for the first category. For the second category, Wal-Mart will try to get 
them to move from just food and consumables to general merchandise. And for the third 
category, Wal-Mart will try to get them into the store.259
In essence, Wal-Mart is trying to go up-market. It is introducing a number o f marketing and 
merchandising tactics designed to attract customers who are looking and willing to pay for more 
expensive, higher margin items, such as 400-thread count sheets, George apparel (number one in 
Britain), and high-end electronics. To implement the strategy, management is insisting on 
cleaner stores, "more friendly associate service,” and keeping key items in stock. Stores will 
offer ethnic food selections and bilingual signage in applicable markets, entertainment sections 
for kids, and fancier and more expensive in-store displays. One store in Hudson, New 
Hampshire, added mock wood floors in the clothing department to make the merchandise stand 
out, lowered the racks in the women’s clothing section, reduced the amount o f apparel on 
display, and added mirrors around the area. “The presentation is a lot better. The customers are a 
lot happier. We’re just carrying a lot o f what you see in your higher end stores,” said women’s 
apparel department manager Kathy Boucher.”260 *
Advertising is different, too. Campaigns now focus on lifestyle rather than pricing. The company 
advertises in Vogue, held a catwalk show in Times Square during Fashion Week, and its 
Christmas campaigns, unlike in past years, featured celebrities, including Garth Brooks and 
Martina McBride, the country and western singers; Destiny’s Child, the R&B group; and Queen 
Latifah, the rapper. Wal-Mart bases much o f its new marketing activity on market research -
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customer focus groups, interviews, surveys -  something the company eschewed in the past.261 In 
2000, Wal-Mart’s advertising-to-sales ratio was 0.3%, as compared to 2.2% at Target and 1.2% 
at Kmart, but this is misleading because Wal-Mart has such higher sales and additional spending 
may not reach more people.262
The new marketing thrust includes a public relations offensive designed to convince higher-end 
consumers that Wal-Mart is a good corporate and community citizen. CEO H. Lee Scott did a 
blizzard o f interviews through late 2004 and 2005, and the company took out advertisements in 
hundreds o f newspapers to defend its record. It hired public relations firm Edelman to staff “war 
rooms” in Bentonville, Arkansas, and Washington, D.C., to respond to any and every attack. The 
new team’s first public relations effort highlighted Wal-Mart’s hurricane relief activities after 
Katrina hit the Gulf Coast. Then, at its annual shareholder’s meeting in June 2005, the company 
pledged, according to one analyst, “to be a responsible citizen by sourcing ethically, helping the 
environment (building attractive stores, testing solar power, etc.), and engaging in charity and 
volunteer work.” Next, Scott went before Congress to ask for a higher minimum wage. A few 
months later, he announced a program to decrease Wal-Mart’s solid waste by 25% in the next 
three years, reduce packaging, increase the use o f post-consumer material, and replace polyvinyl 
chloride packaging for its private brands with more recyclable alternatives within the next two 
years. The company will improve the fuel efficiency o f its trucks and reduce energy usage at it 
stores.
Curious about the motivation for this blizzard of announcements, BusinessWeek correspondent 
Robert Berner asked Lee, “Would a Wal-Mart that’s more environmentally sensitive and more 
concerned with sweatshop issues resonate better with upper-income shoppers?” Lee responded, 
“Yeah, I think so. In many cases the people on the upper end o f that spectrum are more socially 
active because they’re not living day-to-day and figuring out how they are going to get their kids 
through the next three years. They do think about [social issues] differently. If we go out and do 
the right thing, we remove those kinds of barriers or those kinds of alerts that cause a person to 
have some concern. As you do that and you give people the freedom to feel good about you, then 
they are more willing to take a look.263
4. Industry and Competitors
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22,2005; “Wal-Mart’s Scott: W e’re Not “Anti-Union;” In Part 2 o f  this Q&A, the CEO defends Wal-Mart’s 
position on unions and explains why it’s going after more affluent customers,” Business Week Online, September 
23,2005
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4,1 Industry Overview
At the highest level o f analysis, Wal-Mart is a retailer. Retailing includes every business that 
sells goods to individual consumers, including hardware stores, clothiers, grocers, department 
stores, furniture stores, auto supply shops, florists, pet stores, toy stores, ice cream parlors, 
sporting goods, bookstores, shoe stores, gas stations, and drug stores. With its wide variety of 
merchandise, Wal-Mart competes with all of these businesses, and many others. This is one 
reason the store has such a profound economic impact when it comes to town; it competes with 
almost every existing retailer.
Total United States Retail Trade264
2002 2003 2004
2003-
2004
10-
year
growth
rate
Retail trade 3,141,468 3,275,407 3,521,709 7.5% 5.3%
GAFO, total* 915,606 949,631 1,010,230 6.4% 5.2%
Automotive group 821,664 845,772 882,040 4.3% 5.1%
Furniture & appliance group 180,118 185,760 198,326 6.8% 5.9%
Building materials, garden equipment & suppliers 248,746 264,911 303,071 14.4% 6.9%
Food group 466,176 477,294 498,151 4.4% 2.6%
Liquor stores 30,167 30,563 31,950 4.5% 3.7%
Health & personal care stores 182,138 193,976 205,404 5.9% 7.8%
Gasoline service stations 250,958 274,095 320,604 17.0% 6.5%
Apparel group 172,678 178,642 189,997 6.4% 3.9%
Men's clothing stores 8,140 8,519 9,457 11.0% -0.6%
Women's clothing stores 31,500 32,884 35,242 7.2% 1.4%
Family clothing stores 64,060 65,858 70,632 7.2% 6.4%
Shoe stores 23,329 23,337 23,715 1.6% 1.8%
Sporting goods, hobby, book, music stores 76,889 77,280 80,062 3.6% 3.4%
General merchandise group 446,666 468,876 502,845 7.2% 5.8%
Department stores 221,272 215,027 215,999 0.5% 0.8%
Other general merchandise stores 225,394 253,849 286,846 13.0% 12.8%
Miscellaneous retail 104,634 103,558 107,928 4.2% 4.4%
Nonstore retailers 190,801 205,243 233,281 13.7% 9.4%
♦Consists o f  General Merchandise, Apparel, Furniture & Appliance, Sporting & Hobby, and Misc. Retail
In 2004, the retail industry in the United States grew 7.5% to $3.5 trillion, or about 30% of the 
country’s gross domestic product. That year, the country had more than 1,4 million retail 
establishments, which employed 23 million people, nearly one o f every five U.S. workers. 
Within retailing, Wal-Mart participates in virtually every category except automotive (it does not 
sell cars, yet) and gas stations (it is just getting into the business by selling gas at Sam’s Club). 
These retail businesses totaled $1.1 trillion in 2004, leaving $2.4 trillion as Wal-Mart’s 
addressable market. Wal-Mart has said its $229 billon in domestic annual revenue in fiscal year
264 The data come from the U.S. Department o f Commerce. Jason Asaea, “Retailing: General,” Standard & Poor ’s 
Industry Surveys, November 17, 2005, p, 7.
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2005 represents market share o f only 10%, In other words, Wal-Mart sees itself in competition 
with all other retailers o f any stripe, and it wants their sales.265
Productivity in retailing accelerated rapidly after 1995. In the five previous years, annual 
productivity growth averaged 2.3%. In the next seven years, productivity growth jumped to 
7.4%, By contrast, the productivity of retailing in Europe averaged 1,5% prior to 1995 and 1,6% 
since. Technology and organizational restructuring produced the increase in the United States, 
Technology improvements included barcodes, electronic data interchange (EDI), scanners, 
computers, and communications, which streamlined inventory management, transportation and 
logistics, distribution, and merchandising. Organizational restructuring included the vertical 
integration that eliminated separate wholesalers.266 We would add consolidation, deregulation, 
and de-unionization as some o f the structural changes that increased productivity.
Key indicators o f overall retail industry health include real GDP growth, disposable personal 
income, consumer confidence, interest rates, and the consumer price index,
4.1,1 Mass Merchandisers
Stepping the analysis down one level, Wal-Mart’s variety o f merchandise makes it a mass 
merchandiser or multi-line retailer, as opposed to specialty retailers like Gap or the local shoe 
store, which concentrate on a limited set o f related products, Mass merchandisers sell hard goods 
and soft goods. Hard goods include electronics, hardware, small appliances, office supplies, 
health and beauty aids, medicines, cosmetics, candy, paper goods, pet supplies, toys, sporting 
goods, lawn and garden equipment, and automotive supplies. Soft goods include apparel, shoes, 
accessories, sheets, towels, and other linens.
Getting more specific, multi-line retailers fall into four basic formats:267
(1) Department stores have a relatively limited selection of goods, with soft goods and 
cosmetics predominating. They also have checkout counters in most departments. They tend 
to have the highest level of service among multi-line retailers. Within the category, specialty 
department stores shrink the number o f items and increase the level o f service.
(2) Discount stores sell a wide variety of hard goods and soft goods and usually have a single 
checkout area. They provide less service and offer lower prices than department stores. 
Discount stores (and their hypermarket cousins) are taking market share from other retail 
formats, especially department stores and specialty retailers.
265 Ibid., p. 6.
266 Robert H. McGuckin, Matthew Spiegelman, and Bart van Ark, “The Retail Revolution: Can Europe Match U.S. 
Productivity Performance?” Perspectives on a Global Economy, The Conference Board, Research Report R-1358- 
05-RR, March 2005.
267 Jason Asaea, “Retailing: General,” Standard & Poor ’s Industry Surveys, November 17,2005; “Hypermarket,” 
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hvpermarket. accessed January 22,2006,
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(3) Hypermarkets combined discount stores with grocery stores. Carrefour, the French 
retailer, opened the first hypermarket in 1962, near Paris. Meijer opened one that same year in 
Grand Rapids, Michigan. Only recently, however, have these stores proliferated. Unlike other 
multi-line formats, they compete with grocery stores, long considered a separate category.
(4) Membership warehouse stores require an annual fee and carry bulk goods and groceries. 
They usually have lower prices, given the membership fees.
4.1.2 Survival Strategies and Industry Trends
Retailing is intensely competitive, meaning merchants have a hard time raising prices. Consumer 
spending is growing, but slowly due to wage stagnation and rising prices (especially gas). It does 
not help retailers that “[although Americans have not lost their acquisitiveness, they generally 
are less interested in shopping than they were a decade ago.” They have also become more 
discerning consumers; “value has become their hallmark.” As a result, retailing “is a zero-sum 
game with low profit margins.” This leaves retailers with only two related strategies for survival: 
cut costs and improve economies o f scale. Those who do take market share from those who do
Cost cutting strategies include technological innovation, closing unprofitable units, consolidating 
back-office functions, cutting staff, reducing shrinkage, decreasing inventory, and negotiating 
better terms with suppliers. Strategies to increase economies o f scale and market share include 
acquisitions, new store openings, and merging businesses. Wal-Mart is the only major U.S.- 
based discounter to move abroad in any significant way. As Wal-Mart demonstrates, successful 
market share growth leads to market power when it comes to suppliers.269
Many mass merchandisers (and grocers) have discovered the pleasures o f private-label goods, 
which carry the retailer’s own brand names. These cut out middlemen, give retailers complete 
control over product development, and cut the time to market for product changes. The drawback 
is higher costs associated with marketing the new brands. Still, unless the brand flops, the 
increased margins o f private label goods are very attractive. The new Wal-Mart apparel brands, 
George and Metro 7, are examples of this, though George has been a disappointment so far.270
Retailers o f all types use data mining and market research to support so-called relationship 
marketing. This involves collecting data on customers’ preferences and directing more specific 
marketing at them. Loyalty programs, event marketing, personal service, and proprietary credit 
cards are some o f the tools for this type o f marketing. 71
Shoppers have changed their habits. They patronize stores across the economic spectrum, 
shopping, for example, at both Target, the discounter, and Nordstrom, the specialty retailer. They 
do not cruise malls as they did in years past. Instead, they are “precision” shoppers who do not
268
269
270
271
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browse but search for just what they want. They wear more casual clothes. Men have a sense of 
style and they will pay for it.272
A bulge o f teenagers, so-called echo boomers (Generation Y) bom between 1977 and 1994, is 
boosting retail sales. This is the most brand-aware generation in history. It is also adept at using 
the Internet to find product advice and buy goods.
4.2 Major Competitors
To determine Wal-Mart’s most serious competitors, we looked at publicly-traded companies in 
six retailing categories: apparel, multi-line, home improvement, specialty, grocery, and drug. 
Then we selected the top 25 in terms o f annual revenue from the entire group. Several 
observations pop out:
• Twelve grocery chains and eight multi-line retailers dominate the list, which is not 
entirely surprising. They sell the least discretionary goods, such as food and toiletries.
• Not a single apparel retailer makes the list. Gap is the largest apparel-only retailer, with 
about $16 billion in annual revenue, two thirds o f number 25 Woolworths, the Australian 
grocery chain,
• Only one specialty retailer is on the list: Best Buy at number 22.
•  Just two home improvement retailers make the list: Home Depot at number 4 and 
Loewe’s at number 13. Both are American, a result the country’s massive housing boom, 
Britain’s Kingfisher is the only other home improvement retailer in the top 50.
• Two drug retailers make the list: Walgreen at number 10 and CVS at number 17.
• Sears is not on the list, but should be since its March 2005 merger with Kmart gives it 
annual revenue in the neighborhood o f $55 billion.
W al-M art Competition273
Wal-Mart Competition (mil $)
Operating
Rev,/Turnover
Total
Assets
Shareholders
Funds
Net
Income
Market
Cap.
WAL MART STORES US 288,189 120,223 49,396 10,267 231,178
CARREFOUR FR 99,399 53,090 9,379 2,264 34,180
METRO DE 78,864 38,264 6,455 1,122 17,877
HOME DEPOT US 73,094 38,907 24,158 5,001 93,875
KONINKLIJKE AHOLD NL 70,829 28,202 6,266 -654 12,061
TESCO GB 65,302 39,230 17,311 2,626 45,339
KROGER US 56,434 20,491 3,540 -100 14,074
COSTCO WHOLESALE US 52,935 16,514 8,881 1,063 19,066
272
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TARGET US 46,839 32,293 13,029 3,198 45,835
WALGREEN US 42,202 14,609 8,890 1,560 46,211
AEON COMPANY JP 40,229 26,386 7,991 595 11,622
ALBERTSON’S US 39,897 18,311 5,421 444 9,266
LOWE’S COMPANIES US 36,464 21,209 11,535 2,176 43,882
SAFEWAY US 35,823 15,377 4,307 560 9,996
PPR FR 32,980 31,261 10,479 1,281 12,282
FINATIS FR 32,591 25,637 238 65 1,059
RALLYE FR 32,466 25,308 1,280 75 1,941
CVS US 30,594 14,547 6,987 905 17,217
CASINO FR 29,141 24,467 5,135 727 7,487
J SAINSBURY ' GB 29,009 21,872 8,234 115 9,339
COLES MYER AU 27,777 7,102 2,834 453 8,914
BEST BUY US 27,433 10,294 4,449 984 17,152
DELHAIZE GROUP BE 24,876 12,807 4,574 288 7,138
GEORGE WESTON CA 24,749 14,870 3,638 333 12,840
WOOLWORTHS LIMITED AU 24,630 6,828 1,649 603 13,156
Wal-Mart Competition (%) Gross Margin EBIT Margin
Number of 
employees
WAL MART STORES US 25.23 5.93 1,700,000
CARREFOUR FR 22.50 4.63 430,695
METRO DE 26.26 3.18 261,438
HOME DEPOT US 35.23 10.84 325,000
KONINKLIJKE AHOLD NL 23.01 0.87 231,003
TESCO GB 10.11 6.28 335,750
KROGER US 25.33 1.50 289,000
COSTCO WHOLESALE US 13.35 2.79 118,000
TARGET US 31.29 7.69 328,000
WALGREEN US 29.07 5.74 179,000
AEON COMPANY JP 35.86 2.91 51,147
ALBERTSON'S US 30.70 3.08 241,000
LOWE’S COMPANIES US 33.73 10.18 125,000
SAFEWAY US 32.07 3.27 191,000
PPR FR 38.95 7.78 82,150
FINATIS FR 18.05 4.32 124,233
RALLYE FR 16.90 4.53 124,223
CVS US 26.25 4.75 78,500
CASINO FR 19.79 5.57 n.a.
J SAINSBURY GB 9.38 0.69 105,100
COLES MYER AU 26.86 2.55 93,766
BEST BUY US 25,35 5.26 109,000
DELHAIZE GROUP BE 93.29 3.82 138,048
GEORGE WESTON CA 8.52 6.44 n.a.
WOOLWORTHS LIMITED AU 26.69 3.96 79,311
4,2,1 Carrefour
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Carrefour, headquartered in Paris, France, is the largest retailer in Europe, Most o f its sales come 
from food. At July 1,200$, the company had 11,406 stores in approximately 32 countries, Of 
these, the company had majority ownership of 6,659; the rest were franchisees or joint ventures. 
The core o f the company’s business is in France, Spain, Italy, and Belgium, France accounted for 
47,4% o f revenue in the first half o f 2005, Europe, excluding France, generated 39% of the 
company’s revenue, leaving 6.3% for South America and 7% for Asia,274 Thus, it is a heavily 
European firm. Nonetheless, it is one o f the most geographically diversified retailers,275 The 
company had 431,000 employees at the end o f 2004.
Carrefour has the largest market share in France (25%), Spain (26%), and Belgium (26%). It is 
number three in Italy (16%), Protective regulatory environments in each country -  Raffarin law 
in France, Ley del Commercio in Spain, Bersani law in Italy, and Cadenas law in Belgium -  
restrict new store openings, thereby protecting existing players like Carrefour. France, Spain, and 
Italy prohibit loss leaders, a key strategy for discounters in the United States, though France 
could be on the way to ending this prohibition.276
The company has three basic formats,277
• Hypermarkets combine discount stores and grocery stores, like Wal-Mart Supercenters. 
They range in size from 60,000 to 215,000 square feet and carry about 80,000 items.
They often have travel agencies, insurance, and other services. They accounted for 57,8% 
of Carrefour revenue for the first half o f 2005 and employed 267,000 people,
• Supermarkets are grocery stores, like Wal-Mart Neighborhood Markets, but bigger. They 
range in size from 10,000 to 20,000 square feet and carry 10,000 items. They accounted 
for 25% of Carrefour revenue in the first half o f 2005 and employed 87,000 people.
• Hard Discount stores are small food stores. They accounted for 9% of sales in the first 
half o f 2005 and employed 37,000 people.
The rest o f Carrefour sales come from convenience stores, cash and carry stores for small 
businesses, and catering outlets.
In France, Carrefour has struggled to grow, like the European economy as a whole. Sales in the 
first half o f 2005 rose 2.6%, and it was the first time since 2000 that Carrefour gained market 
share. Net income fell 6,9%. In reaction to the hard times, the company changed management
274 Carrefour, '‘Presentation to Analysts,” September 1,2005,
http://www,carrefour.com/doos/presentation 2005 h i results en.pdf. accessed January 30,2006.
275 Nicolas Baudouin, “Carrefour S.A.,” Standard & Poor's Ratings Direct, July28, 2005.
276 Ibid.
277 Carrefour, Annual Report 2004, http://www.carrefour.com/ra2004uk/pdf/rak20Q4uk.pdf. accessed January 30, 
2006.
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and made significant price cuts to re-establish itself as the price leader in the hypermarket arena. 
It is also trying to get costs under control, while adding more non-food products.278
Carrefour is trying to become less dependent on France for its profitability. Success in Spain has 
helped, and the company is pushing to grow in Italy, where the supermarket and hypermarket 
industries are immature. The Carrefour’s GS supermarket is doing well in Italy. Belgium is now 
profitable, with old GB hypermarkets (but not supermarkets) now carrying the Carrefour name. 
Carrefour is number two in Brazil, and recently bought more stores. It is number one in 
Argentina and Taiwan, and it is a leading player in China and South Korea. Plans call for heavy 
investment in China, where the company already has hypermarkets in eighteen o f China’s largest 
cities.279
4.2.2 Metro AG
Metro AG is a diversified European retailer headquartered in Düsseldorf, Germany. At the end of 
2004, it had 2,300 locations in approximately 30 countries and employed 250,000 people. For the 
first nine months o f 2005, German stores accounted for 48.6% of Metro’s revenue, Western 
Europe excluding Germany 30.3%, Eastern Europe 18.9%, and Asia/Africa 2.1%. Metro is even 
more heavily European than Carrefour.280
The company’s four segments and their percentage o f revenue are: cash & carry (48,2%), food 
retail (17,4%), non-food specialty (27.2%), and department stores (5.9%),281 Within the four 
segments, the company has six brands.282
• Metro Cash & Carry (Metro marko in Germany) is a self-service wholesale store, similar 
to Sam’s Club or Costco, Like them, it aims at small businesses and consumers buying in 
bulk. Metro C&C has a leading market share in most o f the countries where it operates. A 
typical store carries up to 20,000 food items and 30,000 non-food items. The company 
claims a specialty in fresh food. There were 504 Metro Cash & Caiy stores, 114 in 
Germany and 390 in additional countries, including 23 in China and 14 in Russia, at the 
end of 2004. Metro says 80% to 90% of Metro Cash & Carry merchandise comes from 
local producers and suppliers, even outside Germany. Metro Cash & Carry has three 
formats. Classic stores operate mainly in Germany and offer the largest selection of
278 Carrefour, “Presentation to Analysts,” September 1,2005,
http://www.carrefour.com/does/presentation 2005 hi results en.ndf. accessed January 30,2006; Nicolas 
Baudouin, “Carrefour S.A.,” Standard dc Poor’s Ratings Direct, July28, 2005.
279 Carrefour, “Presentation to Analysts,” September 1,2005,
http://www.carrefour.com/docs/oresentation 2005 hi results en.ndf. accessed January 30,2006; Nicolas 
Baudouin, “Carrefour S.A.,” Standard & Poor’s Ratings Direct, July28,2005.
280 Metro AG, Quarterly Report 9M/3Q 2005, http://www.metrogroup.de/servlet/PB/show/1038620/Q3-2005-en.pdf, 
accessed January 30, 2006; Metro AG, Annual Report,
http.7/www.metrogroup.de/multimedia/lGB/2004/PDF/GB2004-en.pdf. accessed January 30,2006.
281 Metro AG, Quarterly Report 9M/3Q 2005, http://www.metrogroup.de/servlet/PB/show/1038620/Q3-2005-en.pdf. 
accessed January 30, 2006.
282 The following descriptions come from the company’s annual report: Metro AG, Quarterly Report 9M/3Q 2005, 
http://www.metro group.de/servlet/PB/show/1038620/03-2005-en.pdf, accessed January 30,2006. See also Olaf 
Toelk and Christian Wenk, “Metro AG,” Standard & Poor’s Ratings Direct, June 6,2005.
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merchandise in both the food and nonfood categories. They have 110,000 to 172,000 
square fee of selling space. Next are the Junior stores, with 75,000 to 97,000 square feet. 
Eco stores have 27,000 to 43,000 square feet and concentrate on food. Within this 
assortment, fresh food is the focus. Most Eco stores are in France. For the first nine 
months of 2005, sales grew 6.1% and operating earnings increased 9.2%.
• Real is a hypermarket chain. It has 306 stores, with 272 Germany, 17 in Poland, and 
seven in Turkey. It carries 80,000 items in an average space of 75,000 square feet. Food 
accounts for about 75% of sales. The company’s Payback customer loyalty program 
includes 28 million members, who spend 65% more per year on shopping at Real than 
customers without Payback cards. The company has been adding self-checkout counters 
quite quickly, since they have been popular. Its next country of expansion will be Russia,
• Extra is a food supermarket chain in the midst o f restructuring. Sixteen o f the chain’s 
larger stores switched to Real in 2004. Extra sold five stores to franchisees and closed 
eleven. The network was down to 308 stores, compared to 466 at the end of 2003. The 
company is focusing its activity in northern and western Germany. The combined Real 
and Extra saw nine-month sales decline (7.3%) and operating earnings fall (58,6%). They 
have a 10% share o f the German market, which ranks them fourth. They take advantage 
of the purchasing power of Metro C&C.
• Media Markt and Saturn are two European electronics retailers with 504 outlets in eleven 
countries. Media Markt operates in 11 European countries, Saturn in six. Media Markt 
had 197 outlets in Germany at the end o f 2004, while Saturn had 105. The two chains sell 
about 45,000 products, including consumer electronics, household appliances, new 
media, telecommunications, computers, and photographic equipment. Saturn also carries 
music. Store managers at both chains are co-owners, with substantial authority for 
choosing product mix and pricing. The two chains added 69 stores in 2004,33 in 
Germany. Combined, the two chains constitute the largest electronics retailer in Europe, 
with strong positions in Italy, Spain, Austria, Switzerland, Poland, and the Netherlands. 
Sales grew 10.5% and operating earnings rose 11.4%.
• Praktiker is a home improvement chain. It has 339 stores, including 278 in Germany. 
Average selling space is 62,000 square feet. Average number o f items is 70,000. 
Specialties include building, workshop, decorating, and gardening. The company will 
beat any competitor’s price by 20%. The chain is not growing and it closed eight stores in 
2004. It has managed to increase the number of major customers, who spend more than 
€1,500 per year, and it offers discounts based on the level of customers’ purchases. Most 
of the company’s foreign stores are in Eastern Europe, Sales grew 2.4% and operating 
earnings increased 26,3%. The chain is number two in home improvement with a 12% 
share.
• Kaufhof Warenhaus is a 125-year-old department store chain. It has 115 stores across 
Germany, These are similar to Nordstrom or Bloomingdales in the U.S., because they 
target more affluent consumers. The division has struggled with the slow Germany 
economy. To improve earnings, it has closed stores, weeded out poor performing
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employees, increased employee training, pared brands, installed new inventory 
management software, and more rapidly changed product mix to meet demand. The 
Galeria format o f the chain, which updates the layout, is the most successful. Sales fell 
(5,4%) and operating earnings dropped (71.9%).
Metro as a whole grew sales by 4.2% for the first nine months o f 2005. Operating earnings grew 
1.5%. The dynamic parts of the company are in Eastern Europe and the Metro Cash & Carry, 
Media Markt and Saturn, and Praktiker segments divisions.283 485 The weaknesses o f the company 
include its significant exposure to the competitive and slow-growing German economy and its 
seasonality; it earns 60% o f its operating profit in the last quarter of the year,284
4.2.3 Home Depot
Home Depot, headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, is a home improvement store that has benefited 
from the spectacular housing boom over the last decade in the United States. For the ten years 
through 2004, on average the company grew sales 19,3% annually and grew net earnings 23,5% 
annually. It claims to be the fastest retailer to reach $30 billion, $40 billion, $50 billion, $60 
billion, and $70 billion in sales. Store literature says it serves 22 million people a week, 
compared to 138 million worldwide for Wal-Mart.285
Home Depot has about 2,000 stores in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. Each offers about 40,000 
different products. Store departments include Building Materials, Millwork, Plumbing, Kitchen 
& Bath, Paint, Floor & Wall, Tools, Hardware, Electrical, and Lawn & Garden. Selection varies 
with market and regional differences, as well as differences in local building codes. The 
company also operates 34 EXPO Design Centers, eleven Home Depot Landscape Supply stores, 
two Home Depot Floor Stores, five Home Depot Supply stores, and seven Contractors’ 
Warehouse stores.286
Home Depot guarantees low prices. If customers find a lower price from “a legitimate, local 
competitor on an identical item we stock, even if  it’s an ‘advertised special,’ the store will beat 
the price by 10%.”
The company has global sourcing offices in Shanghai and Shenzhen, China, and one in 
Monterey, Mexico. It imports products from more than forty countries and stores them in twelve
283 Metro AG, Quarterly Report 9M/3Q 2005, http://www.metrogroup.de/servlet/PB/show/1038620/Q3-2005-en.pdf. 
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January 30,2006.
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import distribution centers around the United States ranging between 750,000 and 1.4 million 
square feet.287
The company’s 2010 targets include annual sales growth o f 9% to 12%, earnings per share 
growth o f 10% to 14% percent, and 400 to 500 new stores. The company also wants to grow 
Home Depot Supply, a chain devoted to professional contractors in residential and commercial 
construction and facility maintenance. As abusiness-to-business enterprise, it has outside 
salespeople, credit services, specialized distribution centers, and more skilled customer service. 
And it wants to grow internationally. Right now, international sales are about 5% of the business. 
The company believes its addressable market around the world is $1 trillion.288
Through the first nine months o f 2005, Home Depot grew sales 10.2%, gross profit 11%, 
operating income 16.9%, and net earnings 15%. For the full year, the company should rake in 
about $81 billion in revenue.
4.2.4 Tesco
Tesco is a British supermarket chain that has discovered the hypermarket. It has headquarters in 
Cheshunt, Hertfordshire, England. At the end o f April 2005, it had 2,365 stores around the 
world, with plans to add 318 over the next twelve months. Most of its stores are in the United 
Kingdom. The company has grown sales and earnings each o f the last five fiscal years. In fiscal 
2005, which ended in April, sales grew 10.4% and profit grew 18.8%.289
Tesco’s core U.K, business generates 80% of the company’s revenue. It has 1,780 stores and 
employs more than 250,000 people, making it the biggest private sector employer in the United 
Kingdom. In the U.K., Tesco has four formats.290
• Tesco Extra hypermarkets offer the widest range of food and non-food lines, including 
electrical, house wares, clothing, health and beauty, and seasonal items, such as garden 
furniture. There were 100 Extra stores at the end of April 2005, with an average size of 
66,000 square feet,
• Tesco is refurbishing its 446 Tesco Superstores, making them larger and adding new non­
food items, such as DVDs and books. The average store is 31,000 square feet. Tesco is 
converting and expanding many Superstores to Extra stores.
287 Home Depot, "Our Suppliers,”
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289 Tesco, “Tesco at a glance,”
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• The 160 Metro convenience stores sit mostly in town and city centers. They average 
12,000 square feet.
• The 546 Tesco Express stores average 2,000 square feet and offer 7,000 items, including 
fresh produce, wines and spirits, and an in-store bakery. Tesco hopes to revitalize local 
areas with them by attracting so-called “top-up” shoppers, those picking up extra items. 
The company is in the process o f converting many o f its 527 One Stop convenience 
stores into Tesco Express stores.
Tesco offers several retail services. Tesco Personal Finance is a joint venture with the Royal 
Bank of Scotland that offers banking, car insurance, and other services. The company claims 
more than 1.4 million Koreans use TPF. Tesco telecom offers mobile phone service through a 
joint venture with 02 , regular home phone service, and home dial-up Internet access.291 93
As part of its marketing, Tesco has a loyalty program with 11 million members, and the company 
uses data mining to send them customized offers. Another marketing/merchandising strategy is 
its three private-label brands, each for a different price level: Value, Tesco, and Finest. Value 
brand jeans sell for £3, which translates to less than $6. To handle non-food items and 
hypermarkets, the company has added dedicated department managers, new non-food 
distribution centers, and a team of 100 people sourcing more than £1 billion o f non-food 
products globally.292
Outside the U.K., Tesco has 585 stores in twelve countries in Europe and Asia, and they employ 
more than 100,000 workers. More than half the group’s space is in these countries, but it 
generates much less revenue and profits: £7.6 billion and £370 million, respectively. The 
countries include China, Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Poland, 
Slovakia, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. Tesco is taking its time abroad, experimenting with 
multiple formats, developing brands, and tailoring its offerings to local conditions. For example, 
in Japan it has small stores to meet customer demand for extremely fresh food every day.293 
Tesco international sales rose 13% in fiscal year 2005, while earnings rose 21%.294
4,2.5 Costco Wholesale
Costco is the dominant membership-only wholesale company in the United States.
Headquartered in Issaquah, Washington, it had $53 billion in sales for the fiscal year ending 
August 28,2005, compared to number two Sam’s Club which had $37 billion in sales in 2004.295 
Net income topped $1 billion for the first time.
291 Tesco, “Retail Services.” http://www.tescocorporate.com/publiclibs/tesco/retailingservices.pdf. accessed January 
30, 2006.
292 Tesco, “Non-Food,” http://www.tescocorporate.com/publiclibs/tesco/Nonfood.pdf. accessed January 30,2006.
293 Tesco, “International,” http://www.tescocorPorate.com/publiclibs/tesco/Intemational.pdf. accessed January 30, 
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294 Tesco, “Annual General Meeting 2005,” Presentation, June 24, 2005, 
http://www.tescocorporate.com/images/AGM 24 June 2005 O.pdf. accessed January 30, 2006.
295 Mary Lou Burde, “Costco Wholesale Corp.,” Standard and Poor’s Ratings Direct, December 7,2005.
72
The company operates more than 450 stores under the Costco Wholesale Club name in the 
United States (338), Canada (65), United Kingdom (16), South Korea (5), Taiwan (4), and Japan 
(5), plus 25 joint venture warehouses in Mexico, which are not consolidated in Costco’s 
earnings, Costco’s typical warehouse format averages approximately 139,000 square feet,296
The company began operations in 1983 in Seattle, Washington. In October 1993, it merged with 
The Price Company, which had pioneered the membership warehouse concept in 1976. The 
founder o f The Price Company was Sol Price, a New Deal Democrat who had very clear and 
very progressive ideas about personnel policies. Even after becoming a millionaire, he favored 
high taxes on incomes, enhanced social welfare spending, and a confiscatory tax on wealth. He 
paid high wages and offered good benefits, which kept employee turnover low. Costco 
executives “have taken a comparatively hands-off attitude toward Teamster efforts to organize 
their employees,”297 Costco has 118,000 employees, 45% part-time, with 13,500 in California, 
Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and one warehouse in Virginia in the Teamsters union.298
Costco offer three types o f membership: Business, $45; Gold Star (individual), $45; and 
Executive, $100. Executive members get additional savings o f business and consumer services, 
such as credit card processing, loans, home insurance, check printing, and mortgage services, all 
of which third parties usually provide. Executives also get a 2% reward, worth up to $500 per 
year, Costco had 5,0 million Business and 16.2 million Gold Star members, and 4,2 million of  
these have upgraded to the Executive Membership.299
The goods Costco sells fall into five categories. Food includes dry and fresh foods and 
institutionally packaged foods (31% of revenue). Sundries are candy, snack foods, health and 
beauty aids, tobacco, alcoholic beverages, soft drinks and cleaning and institutional supplies 
(29%). Hardlines include major appliances, electronics, hardware, office supplies, garden and 
patio, sporting goods, furniture, cameras, and automotive supplies (16%). Softlines axe apparel, 
domestics, jewelry, housewares, media, home furnishings, and small appliances (12%). Other 
includes gas stations, pharmacy, food court, optical, one-hour photo, hearing aid, and print shop 
(12%).
Warehouse retailing is a low-margin, high-volume business with high barriers to entry, because 
it takes a substantial investment to build and stock large-format stores.300 With high sales volume 
and rapid inventory turnover, Costco often receives cash from the sale o f its inventory before it is 
required to pay its vendors, meaning its vendors, not working capital, finance its inventory,301
296 Costco, Form 10-K (2005), November 10,2005, p. 3,
297 Nelson Lichtenstein, “Wal-Mart: A Template for Twenty-First-Century Capitalism,” in Wal-Mart: The Face of 
Twenty-First-Century Capitalism, edited by Nelson Lichtenstein (New York: N ew  Press, 2006), p. 16
298 Costco, Form 10-K (2005), November 10,2005, p, 5-6.
299 Costco, Form 10-K (2005), November 10,2005, p, 5.
300 Mary Lou Burde, “Costco Wholesale Corp.,” Standard and Poor's Ratings Direct, December 7,2005.
301 Costco, Form 10-K (2005), November 10,2005, p, 3,
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Costco has the highest sales volume per warehouse, nearly double those of the nearest 
competitor. In 2005, the company generated $120 million in revenue per building and had 
twenty-five warehouses with sales exceeding $200 million.302
Costco plans to add 28 to 30 new stores in 2006 in the United States and Canada, and five to six 
internationally. That is up from the sixteen added in 2005.303 It will probably raise its 
membership fees, but it should, according to Morgan Stanley: “Our updated membership 
spending analysis suggests Costco members do get more out o f their membership than other 
warehouse customers.”304
Consumer electronics is a growth area for Costco, some 20% annually. It now sources 90% of its 
televisions directly. One concern about Costco (and other warehouse stores) is that there are 
close to 1,000 warehouse clubs now open in the United States and 25% o f American families 
belong to at least one. Some analysts worry whether fewer people will be willing to pay to 
shop. 5
4.2,6 Target
Target is an upscale discounter, which means it provides “high-quality, on-trend merchandise at 
attractive prices in clean, spacious and guest-friendly stores.”306 Its “brand promise” is “Expect 
More. Pay Less.” Its has convinced a certain group of shoppers that it carries better quality goods 
than most discounters and lower prices than most department stores. According to Standard & 
Poor’s, Target customers have a medium household income of $57,000 and 44% have a college 
degree, Wal-Mart and Kmart shoppers, by comparison, have a medium household income of 
$35,000.307
Headquartered in Minneapolis, Minnesota, Target had 1,308 stores at the end of January 2005, 
Like its competitors, it has discovered the hypermarket, and 136 o f its stores are SuperTargets, 
with plans to have 400 by 2010.308 Target stores are big, averaging 123,000 square feet. 
SuperTargets are 175,000 square feet. Target operates 23 regional distribution centers and three 
import warehouses.309 Target is strongest in the Midwest and West, and it has room to expand 
into the Northeast and South.
302 Costco, Annual Report 2005, p. 2.
303 Mary Lou Burde, “Costco Wholesale Corp.,” Standard and Poor's Ratings Direct, December 7,2005.
304 Gregory Melich and Elmer Huh, “Costco Wholesale Corp.: Correction: Turn It, the Faster the Better,” Morgan 
Stanley Equity Research North America, January 12,2006.
305 Gregory Melich and Elmer Huh, “Costco Wholesale Corp.: Correction: Turn It, the Faster the Better,” Morgan 
Stanley Equity Research North America, January 12, 2006.
306 Target, “Company Overview.” http://investors.target.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=65828&p=;irol-homeProfile. accessed 
January 30,2006.
307 Jason Asaea, “Retailing: General,” Standard & Poor’s Industry Surveys, November 17, 2005, p. 15.
308 Mary Lou Burde, “Target Corp.,” Standard & Poor ’s Ratings Direct, March 11, 2005.
309 Target, “Corporate Overview,” http://investors.target.com/phoenix.zhtmr? c=65828&p=irol-homeProfile. 
accessed January 30,2006.
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Target achieves its hip reputation through marketing and merchandising. It is obsessed with the 
design o f its stores and its products, even its credit cards. It carries discount version o f designer- 
branded products, including clothes from Isaac Mizrahi and Mossimo, and home, office, kitchen, 
and bath good from Michael Graves. More than other discounters, it partners with brands, 
instead of developing its own, though it does that, too. Other merchandising tactics include 
regularly remodeling stores, keeping shelves stocked, and providing a relatively high level of 
service. For example, stores have guest call buttons to summon customer service, and employees 
try to respond within 60 seconds, a goal reached 90% of the time in fiscal 2005. Another 
example is event marketing like Deliver the Shiver, in which Target sold air conditioners on the 
spot from trucks as they cruised New York City streets during three sweltering days.310
Target has its own Visa credit card, which offers benefits to shoppers who use it, including 
exclusive offers and savings certificates. Like Wal-Mart, Target has a global procurement 
operation (a subsidiary), but only a small portion of its goods represent direct imports. Also like 
Wal-Mart, Target continually applies technology to improve its supply chain efficiency, 
including a vendor website.
Target has grown same-store sales faster than other discounters have over the last two years. In 
2005, it added 98 stores and closed 15, and it expects similar store growth in 2006. The company 
grew sales by 12.6% and earnings from continuing operations by 36.7% in the nine months 
ending October 29,2005,
5. Financial Analysis
Financially speaking, Wal-Mart is a healthy company. Particularly remarkable is the fact that the 
company has grown revenue, profit, assets, shareholder’s equity, and dividends every single year 
for at least 21 years.311 This is an astounding accomplishment; no other major company even 
comes close. Wal-Mart’s dogged pursuit o f lower costs is a major reason for this incomparable 
record.
While it is it the biggest in terms o f revenue and employees, Wal-Mart is not the world’s most 
profitable company. Exxon Mobil claimed that title in 2004, with 2.5 times Wal-Mart’s net 
income. In fact, several oil companies, including BP, Royal Dutch/Shell, Total, and 
ChevronTexaco made more money. So did several banks, including Citigroup, HSBC, and Bank 
of America. Drug company Pfizer, manufacturer General Electric, and carmaker Toyota also 
generated more net income than Wal-Mart. This is no knock on the company. Wal-Mart is in a 
low-margin business. The fact that a retail company is one of the twenty most profitable
3,0 Target Corp., Annual Report 2005, p. 8 ,13 .
311 This report uses the Osiris database from Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing, which includes data since 
1984. According to one analyst, Wal-Mart has grown profit every single year since it incorporated in 1969. See 
Brady Willet and Todd Always, “Wal-Mart Stores, Inc,,” Fallstreet.com Company Watch, April 28,2003, p. 1, 
http://www.fallstreet.comAVMTCW.pdf accessed January 18,2006. Wal-Mart has not grown earnings per share, 
every year; EPS in fiscal 1996 were below those in fiscal 1995. Robert Slater, The Wal-Mart Decade: How a New 
Generation o f  Leaders Turned Sam Walton ’s Legacy into the World’s  #J Company (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 
2003), p. 167-168.
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Companies in the world is incredible. It is testament to the company’s size, its business model, 
and its ruthless operational efficiency.
Wal-Mart’s financial model, which one consultant calls “Buy -  Sell -  Pay,” is a retail analyst’s 
dream come true.312 To put it simply, Wal-Mart has its suppliers and customers finance its 
business. How? It buys goods, and then it sells them before it pays for them. Wal-Mart was not 
the first nor is it the only company to do this -  computer giant Dell does it -  but it is one of the 
best. By moving goods rapidly through its supply chain and off the store shelves, Wal-Mart can 
get the money for those goods before it pays its suppliers for them. One advantage is that Wal- 
Mart need not advance its own cash or borrow money to get the goods that stock its shelves. That 
lowers debt and the company’s average cost o f capital. Another advantage is that it can make 
smaller investments in inventory, which lowers its working capital requirements and thus 
increases its return on investment. Finally, lower working capital requirements increase cash 
flow from operations, perhaps the best measure o f a company’s health.
Wal-Mart has pushed the envelope with the Buy -  Sell -  Pay model in recent years.313 At the 
extreme, the model can mean operating with negative working capital, having more current 
liabilities than current assets. For most companies, this would be a nightmare. Not for Wal-Mart. 
It is confident that its customers will buy its goods before it needs to pay its suppliers. In essence, 
Wal-Mart’s suppliers continually loan it money; they provide the “working capital” it needs to 
operate. Wal-Mart first finished a year with negative working capital in fiscal year 2000, and it 
has done so in five o f the last six years.
Wal-Mart uses four key metrics to measure its performance: comparative store sales, operating 
income growth, inventory growth, and return on assets. Comparative store sales, also called 
same-store stales, are sales at stores that were open as o f February 1 o f the prior fiscal year. It is 
a measure o f existing store performance, and it excludes the impact from opening new stores, 
Wal-Mart’s goal each year is to grow operating income faster than net sales. By definition, this 
means cutting costs. For inventory, Wal-Mart’s goal is growth at half the rate o f net sales. This 
means getting more efficient in the supply chain. Wal-Mart is happy with its return on assets, so 
its goal is to maintain its level as assets grow.314
In fiscal 2005, Wal-Mart had mixed results on these measures. Comparative store sales growth in 
the United States was 3%, compared to 4% in 2004 and 5% in 2003, a negative result. Operating 
income growth was 13.8%, compared to net sales growth o f 11.3%, a positive result. Inventory 
growth was 10.7%, much more than half of net sales growth, a negative result. And return on 
assets was 9.3%, compared to 9.2% in 2004 and 9.2% in 2003, a positive result.315
3,2 Rick Sidorowicz, “The Evils o f  Working Capital,” The CEO Refresher, no date, 
http://www.refresher.com/levils.html. accessed January 17,2006.
353 Brady Willet and Todd Always, “Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,” Fallstreet.com Company Watch, April 28,2003, p. 1, 
http://www.fallstreet.com/WMTCW.pdf. accessed January 18,2006.
3]4 Wal-Mart, 2005 Annual Report, p. 25.
3,5 Wal-Mart, 2005 Annual Report, p. 25. Note that Wal-Mart calculates return on assets as income from continuing 
operations before minority interest divided by average assets. This paragraph refers to this measurement. Elsewhere, 
this report defines return on assets as net income divided by average total assets.
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5.1 Income Statement -  Fiscal Year 2005
On the income statement for the fiscal year ended January 31,2005, net sales increased 11,3% 
year-over-year to $285.2 billion, after increasing 11.6% to $256.3 in 2004. Sales increased 
12.6% in 2003, and 6.6% in 2002. Other income, which consists mostly of membership fees, 
rose 26.2% to $3,0 billion, after rising 19.9% to $2.4 billion in 2004. Membership fees rose 8.2% 
in 2003 and 1.4% in 2002. Total revenue increased 11.4% to $288.2 billion, after rising 11.7% to 
$258.7 in 2004. Total revenue increased 12,5% in 2003 and 6.6% in 2002.
As noted, comparative store sales in the United States increased 3% in 2005, after rising 4% in
2004. Wal-Mart blamed slower comparative store sales growth on the opening o f new stores, 
which cannibalize sales from existing stores. Despite the cannibalization, Wal-Mart will continue 
to open new stores near old ones, with the belief that growth at the new store will more than 
make up for the slowdown at the old store.
Gross profit rose 13.8% to $69,7 billion, after rising 12.4% to $61.3 billion in 2004. Gross profit 
rose 14.5% in 2003 and 8.4% in 2001. The Gross Profit Margin (GPM) increased 54 basis points 
to 24.45%, after increasing 17 basis points to 23.91% in 2004, The GPM increased 40 basis 
points 2003 and 37 basis points in 2002, Wal-Mart has improved the GPM eveiy year since 
1997, which is impressive and evidence o f its ability to get more for less from suppliers.
Selling, general, and administrative expenses rose 13,8% to $51,1 billion, after rising 12,3% to 
$44,9 billion in 2004. SG&A was 17.9% of sales, up from 17,5% in 2004 and 17.4% in 2003. 
This ratio has risen in each o f the last five years, and it is rising faster than sales, not a good sign. 
For 2005, Wal-Mart blamed higher worker pay for the SG&A increase.316
Operating income rose 13.8% to $17.1 billion, after rising 13% to $15,0 billion in 2004. The 
operating profit margin (OPM) increased 13 basis points to 5,99%, after increasing seven basis 
points to 5.86% in 2004. The OPM has been steady for the last five years, but it is significantly 
below where it was in the 1980s.
Net interest expense increased 18% to $986 million, after falling 10% in 2004.
Wal-Mart had an effective tax rate o f 34.70%, down from 36,1% in 2004 and 35,2 in 2003,
Net income increased 13,4% to $10.3 billion, after increasing 13.8% to $9.1 billion in 2004, The 
net profit margin increased six basis points to 3,56%, after increasing six basis points to 3,50% in 
2004. The NPM was 3.44% in 2003 and 3,20% in 2002, On a per share basis, net income was 
$2.41, compared to $2,07 in 2004 and $1,79 in 2003. Wal-Mart has been buying back shares, 
thus reducing share count and boosting earnings per share.
Dividends increased 41.1% to $2.2 billion, after rising 18,1% to $1,6 billion in 2004, Wal-Mart 
has increased dividends every year.
316 Wal-Mart, 2005 Annual Report, p. 25.
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For the nine months ending October 31, 2005, net sales increased 9.9% to $223.2 billion. 
Membership fees increased 6.5% to $2.4 billion. Total revenue increased 9.9% to $225.5 billion.
Wal-Mart did not release comparative store sales for the nine-month period. However, for the 
three months ending October 31,2005, United States comparative stores sales increased 3.8%.
Gross profit rose 10.4% to $51.8 billion, from $46.9 billion in 2004. The Gross Profit Margin 
increased 10 basis points to 23.2%, from 23.1% a year earlier.
Selling, general, and administrative expenses rose 11.1% to $41.5 billion. SG&A was 18.6% of 
sales, up from 18,4% a year earlier. Wal-Mart blamed the increase on higher utility, 
maintenance, and repair costs, but noted that these were offset by a decrease in payroll costs (in 
contrast to 2005).317
Operating income rose 6,4% to $11.8 billion, The operating profit margin decreased 20 basis 
points to 5.3%, from 5.5% a year earlier.
Net interest expense increased 24% to $851 million.
Net income increased 7.1% to $7.6 billion. The net profit margin fell six basis points to 3.38%, 
from 3.46% a year earlier. On a per share basis, net income was $1.82, compared to $1.66 a year 
earlier. Dividends were $0.60 per share, compared to $0.52 per share a year earlier.
5.2 Balance Sheet -  Fiscal Year 2005
On the balance sheet on January 31, 2005, cash and marketable securities increased 5.6% to $5.5 
billion, or $1.24 per share, after rising 90.0% to $5,2 billion in 2004 and 26.6% to $2.7 billion in
2003. Cash represented 2,4% o f the share price.
Accounts receivable (A/R) increased 36.8% to $1.7 billion, after dropping 20.1% to $$1.3 billion 
million in 2004. A/R was a tiny fraction of sales, so it is not a worry. A/R turnover was a 
whopping 192 times for the year, for Days Sales Outstanding (DSO) of 2 days, compared to 2 
days in 2004 and 3 days in 2003. Wal-Mart customers pay immediately for their goods, so 
receivables should never be a problem.
Inventories increased 10.7% to $29.4 billion, after increasing 9.1% to $26.6 billion in 2004. The 
Inventory Turnover Ratio was 7.7 times during 2005, or once every 47 days, unchanged from
2004. As we noted, Wal-Mart’s inventory growth was more rapid than the company prefers. It 
blamed the rise on weaker sales and increased levels of imported merchandise, which carries 
longer lead times.318
5.1.1 Income Statement -  First Nine Months of Fiscal Year 2006
317 Wal-Mart, Form 10-Q (October 31, 2005), p. 11.
318 Wal-Mart, 2005 Annual Report, p. 25.
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Current assets increased 11.8% to $38.5 billion, after rising 12% to $34.4 billion in 2004 and 
increasing 10.2% to $30.7 billion in 2003. The current ratio was 0.90-to-l, down slightly from 
0.91-to-l in 2004 and 0.94-to-l in 2003. The liquidity ratio, which eliminates inventories, was 
0.21-to-l, unchanged from 2004, but up from 0.19 in 2003. These ratios are well below ideal, but 
they reflect Wal-Mart’s financial aggressiveness and its willingness to have suppliers finance its 
operations.
At January 31,2005, Wal-Mart had negative working capital (current assets minus current 
liabilities) for the fifth time in six years. Again, the company is willing to carry high short-term 
obligations without corresponding liquid assets, because it believes it can sell its goods fast 
enough to generate the cash needed to pay its obligations.
Intangible assets increased 9.3% to $10.8 billion, after increasing 5.3% to $9.9 billion in 2004. 
These assets axe goodwill, which reflects the premium over book value Wal-Mart paid for 
acquisitions, virtually all o f which took place in the company’s International segment. In 2005, 
the company bought Bompre90 S.A. Supermercados do Nordeste, which increased goodwill. 
Essentially, goodwill is worthless, and it weighs on the balance sheet.
The asset turnover ratio for 2005 was 2.53, down slightly 2.56 in 2004 and 2.58 in 2003. This 
ratio is a measure o f how well the company uses its assets, and since it is well above 1.0 it 
indicates that Wal-Mart uses its assets very well.
At January 31,2005, Wal-Mart had $70.8 billion in total liabilities, or 143% of shareholder’s 
equity. This is essentially unchanged since 2000, when the debt/equity ratio was 172%. The 
major components o f the company’s $42.9 billion in short-term liabilities were accounts payable 
of $21.8 billion, bank debt o f $4.0 billion, and accrued liabilities o f $12.2 billion. Wal-Mart does 
not disclose much about the accrued liabilities, which include deferred revenue from Sam’s Club 
membership (a minor amount) and hedging instruments with unfavorable fair value (also 
negligible). These could include provisions for unfavorable litigation outcomes.
Wal-Mart grew accounts payable faster than inventories in 2005, which means it got more goods 
than it paid for, a boon to cash flow and a reason for carrying a high level o f accounts payable 
(assuming suppliers do not get angry). Major components o f the company’s $27.9 billion in 
long-term liabilities included $20,1 billion in long-term bank debt, $3,6 billion in capital leases, 
and $2.9 billion in deferred taxes.
Wal-Mart's Contractual O bligations319
Payments due during fiscal years ending January 31 (mil $)
Total 2006 2007-2008 2009-2010 Thereafter
Recorded Contractual Obligations
Long-term debt 23,846 3,759 4,972 5,811 9,304
Commercial paper 3,812 3,812 — — —
Capital lease obligations 5,720 521 1,019 958 3,222
Unrecorded Contractual Obligations
319 Wal-Mart, 2005 Annual Report, p. 29. Purchase obligations do not include purchase orders.
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Non-cancelable operating leases 9,072 730 1,326 1,108 5,908
Interest on long-term debt 10,701 U 0 7 1,912 1,653 6,029
Undrawn lines o f  credit 4,696 1,946 — 2,750 —
Trade letters o f credit 2,613 2,613 — — —
Standby letters o f  credit 2,026 2,002 24 — —
Purchase obligations 28,472 12,461 13,717 2,280 14
Total commercial commitments 90,958 28,951 22,970 14,560 24,477
The Interest Coverage ratio was 14, compared to 15, 13, and 9 for fiscal 2004,2003, and 2002, 
respectively. The strength o f this ratio is one reason why Wal-Mart can operate with negative 
working capital.
At January 31,2005, Wal-Mart had a tangible book value o f $38,6 billion, up 14,5% from $33,7 
billion a year earlier. Tangible book value was $30.1 billion at the end o f 2003 and $26.5 billion 
at the end of 2002. Tangible book value per share was $8.75, up from $7.65 a year earlier and 
$6.67 at the end o f 2003.
Return on equity (ROE) was 22.1% and return on assets (ROA) was 9.1%, up from ROE of 
21.8% and ROA o f 9.0% in 2004. In 2003, ROE was 21.3% and ROA was 8,9%. Wal-Mart has 
increased these ratios while increasing shareholders’ equity and total assets, a sign of improving 
management performance.
5.2.1 Balance Sheet -  October 31,2005
On the balance sheet for October 31,2005, Wal-Mart had $4.5 billion in cash, down 2% from the 
same period a year earlier. Cash was $1.08 per share, or 2% o f the share price.
Accounts receivable (A/R) increased 30,2% to $1.8 billion, from $1.4 billion a year ago. A/R 
was less than 1% of sales, which is extraordinarily healthy. A/R turnover was 187 times, for 
Days Sales Outstanding (DSO) of 2 days. Again, Wal-Mart customers pay for their goods 
immediately, so receivables are not a problem.
Inventories increased 8.6% to $36.6 billion, from $33.7 billion a year earlier. The Inventory 
Turnover Ratio was 6.6 times during 2005, or once every 55 days.
Current assets increased 8.7% to $44,9 billion, up from $41.3 billion a year earlier. The current 
ratio was 0,89-to-l, up from 0,86-to-l in October 2004. The liquidity ratio was 0.17-to-l, up 
from 0,16-to-l a year earlier. Such low ratios, along with continued negative working capital, 
reflect Wal-Mart’s continued aggressive financing o f its operations.
At the end of October 2005, Wal-Mart had $10.5 billion o f goodwill, up from $10.2 billion a 
year earlier. This is a worthless asset.
The asset turnover ratio for the twelve months ending September 30,2005, was 2.43. Again, 
Wal-Mart’s massive sales and operational efficiency demonstrate that the company knows how 
to use its assets.
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At October 31,2005, Wal-Mart had $81,9 billion in liabilities and $49,9 billion in shareholders’ 
equity, for a debt/equity ratio o f 164%, This is unchanged from a year earlier. Accounts payable 
increased 8,7% to $25,1 billion. Again, Wal-Mart purchased inventory faster than it paid for it.
Wal-Mart had a tangible book value of $39.5 billion at October 31, 2005, compared to $34,9 
billion a year earlier. Tangible book value was $9.26 per share, compared to $8,11 a year ago.
Return on equity (ROE) for the twelve months ending October 31,2005, was 22.7% and return 
on assets (ROA) was 8.6%.
5.3 Cash Flow Statement -  2005
On the cash flow statement for the fiscal year ending January 31,2005, cash from operating 
activities was $15.0 billion, down from $16.0 billion in 2004, but up from $13.0 billion in 2003 
and $10.5 billion in 2002. Wal-Mart blamed the decline in cash flow on differences in the timing 
of payroll, income and other taxes, supplier payments, and the timing o f the collection of 
receivables. The bulk of cash flow came from net income, which is very healthy.
Cash used in investing activities was ($12.4) billion, compared to ($8,3) billion in 2004, ($9.8) 
billion in 2003, and ($7,2) billion in 2002, Capital expenditures for 2005,2004,2003, and 2002 
were $12.9 billion, $10,3 billion, $9.2 billion, and $8.3 billion. Wal-Mart continues to invest in 
new stores as it grows.
Cash used in financing activities was ($2,6) billion, versus ($5.6) billion in 2004, ($2,4) billion 
2003, and ($3,0) billion in 2002, Wal-Mart spent $4.5 billion to repurchase shares of its common 
stock, received $5.8 billion from the issuance of long-term debt, and repaid $2.1 billion of long­
term debt.
In 2005, cash at Wal-Mart increased $289 million, compared to increases o f $2.4 billion in 2004, 
$597 million in 2003, and $107 million in 2002.
5.3.1 Cash Flow Statement -  First Nine Months o f Fiscal Year 2006
For the nine months ending October 31,2005, Wal-Mart had cash from operating activities of 
$8.1 billion, compared to $7.4 billion a year earlier. The increase was due primarily to an 
increase in net income, supplemented by differences in the timing o f supplier, payroll, and tax 
payments.
Cash used in investing was ($10.1) billion, compared to ($8,9) billion a year earlier. Capital 
expenditure was $10.4 billion, compared to $9.3 billion in the same period a year ago.
Cash from financing activities was $1.1 billion, versus $885 million for the first nine months of 
fiscal 2005.
For the nine months ended October 31, 2005, total cash at Wal-Mart decreased ($953) million, 
compared to ($560) for the same period in a year earlier.
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5.4 Segment Analysis
Wal-Mart has three operating segments: Wal-Mart Stores, Sam’s Club, and International. Wal- 
Mart Stores includes all Supercenters, Discount Stores, and Neighborhood Markets in the United 
States. The Sam’s Club segment includes all Sam’s Club membership warehouse stores in the 
United States. The International segment includes all stores of all formats outside U.S.
The following table presents sales and operating profit data for the segments. Additional segment 
data appears in the appendix.
W al-Mart Segment Data320
W al-Mart Stores Segment
2005 2004 2003 2002
Sales 1 9 1 ,8 2 6  1 7 4 ,2 2 0  1 5 7 ,1 2 0  139 ,131
Sales Growth 10.1% 10.9% 12.9% 14.1%
Operating Profit 14 ,163  12 ,9 1 6  11 ,8 4 0 10,189
Operating Profit Growth 9.7% 9.1% 16.2% 6.2%
Operating Margin 7.4% 7.4% 7.5% 7.3%
Sam’s Club Segment
2005 2004 2003 2002
Sales 3 7 ,1 1 9  3 4 ,5 3 7  3 1 ,7 0 2  2 9 ,3 9 5
Sales Growth 7.5% 8.9% 7.8% 9.7%
Operating Profit 1 ,280  1 ,126  1,023 1,023
Operating Profit Growth 13.7% 10.1% 0.0% 8.9%
Operating Margin 3.4% 3.3% 3.2% 3.5%
International Segment
2005 2004 2003 2002
Sales 5 6 ,2 7 7  4 7 ,5 7 2  4 0 ,7 9 4  3 5 ,4 8 5
Sales Growth 18.3% 16.6% 15.0% 10.5%
Operating Profit 2 ,9 8 8  2 ,3 7 0  1 ,998 1,271
Operating Profit Growth 26.1% 18.6% 57.2% 37.7%
Operating Margin 5.3% 5.0% 4.9% 3.6%
5.4,1 Wal-Mart Stores Segment
The Wal-Mart Stores segment accounts for about 67% of total company sales. Growth o f sales 
and operating income has slowed recently for the segment, but margins have remained stable. It 
has higher operating margins than the other two segments, because it has been around the longest 
and the company has improved efficiency over the years. 320
320 Calculated from tables in Wal-Mart, 2005 Annual Report, p. 26-27. Segment operating profit is income from 
continuing operations before net interest expense, income taxes and minority interest, and it excludes unallocated 
corporate overhead.
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For fiscal 2005, comparative store sales increased 2,9%, after increasing 3,9% in 2004. Wal-Mart 
blamed the slow growth on “the impact o f higher fuel and utility costs on our customers,”321
Wal-Mart’s expansion plans for the segment include opening new stores o f all formats, 
converting Discount Stores to Supercenters, relocating stores to larger buildings, and expanding 
existing stores. During fiscal year 2005, Wal-Mart opened 36 Discount Stores and closed two, 
versus opening 41 and closing one in 2004. The company opened 21 Neighborhood Markets, 
versus 15 in 2004. It opened 242 Supercenters, including the conversion o f 159 existing Discount 
Stores, compared to 213, with 130 conversions, in 2004. Total square footage grew 8.6% to 
approximately 36 million, after growing 8,8% to approximately 34 million in 2004.
Segment gross margin grew 40 basis points in 2004, which Wal-Mart attributed to its global 
sourcing efforts, fewer markdowns, and less theft,322 The improved gross margins did fall to 
operating income because expenses rose just as fast, Wal-Mart blamed the increase on “expense 
pressures from associate wages and accident costs,” Apparently, the company’s new job 
classification and pay structure, launched in the summer o f 2004, increased its costs. The Wal- 
Mart Stores segment did not meet the company’s goal o f growing operating income faster than 
sales.
5.4.2 Sam’s Club Segment
The Sam’s Club segment accounts for about 13% of total company sales. Revenue includes sales 
and membership fees, though membership fees are recognized on a pro-rated basis over the 
twelve-month term of the membership.
Comparative club sales increased 5.8%, after increasing 5.3% in 2004, Wal-Mart claimed its 
focus on winning business customers, along with improved sales in fresh and specialty 
categories, including fuel, explain the more rapid growth,
Wal-Mart opened 13 new clubs in both fiscal 2005 and fiscal 2004, adding approximately 3 
million square feet, or 3.7%, in 2005, and approximately 2 million square feet, or 3.6%, in 2004.
The gross profit margin improved at Sam’s Club in 2005, though the company did not disclose 
by how much. The improvement resulted largely from sales o f higher-margin goods, something 
Wal-Mart has made a priority. Segment operating profit margin increased only slightly, and 
again Wal-Mart blamed higher wage costs. Nonetheless, the segment handily beat the goal o f  
growing operating profit faster than net sales,
5.4.3 International Segment
The International segment accounts for about 20% o f total company sales. The international 
segment has the most rapid sales and operating profit growth o f the three segments. Rapid sales
321 Wal-Mart, 2005 Annual Report, p. 26.
322 Wal-Mart did not provide cost o f sales or gross margin data for its operating segments.
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growth results largely from acquisitions and the opening of new stores. Operating profit growth 
comes from efficiency improvements as the stores come under Wal-Mart management.
For fiscal 2005, the International segment opened 232 units, net o f relocations and closings. This 
amounted to 18 million square feet, or 15.6%, of additional space. The expansion included the 
acquisition o f Bompre90 S.A. Supermercados do Nordeste in Brazil, which added 118 stores and
7.5 million square feet in February 2004. For fiscal 2004, the International segment opened 83 
units, net o f relocations and closings, adding 9 million square feet, or 8.5%, of additional space.
Favorable foreign currency rates boosted segment sales by $3.2 billion and $2 billion in fiscal 
2005 and fiscal 2004, respectively.
ASDA, a supermarket chain in the United Kingdom, accounted for 46,2% of International 
segment net sales in fiscal 2005. Revenues for ASDA were $26.0 billion, $21.7 billion, and 
$18.1 billion, fiscal 2005,2004, and 2003 respectively.
The International segment experienced a 0.3% improvement in gross profit margin during fiscal
2005. A shift in the product mix away from groceries and more toward general merchandise 
accounted for the growth. The result boosted operating profit, which grew substantially faster 
than revenue, meeting a key corporate goal.
5.5 Competitive Financial Assessment
We compared Wal-Mart to a geographically diverse selection of large general merchandise and 
warehouse companies, including U.S. companies Costco Warehouse and Target; Japanese 
company Aeon; French company PPR; and German company Metro. The appendix contains a 
comparative table of some key ratios and Section 4.2 Major Competitors describes the 
companies.
With $288 billion in revenue, Wal-Mart has more than three times the revenue o f its next-largest 
competitor, Metro, which had $79 billion. Costco and Target come next, with $48 billion and 
$47 billion, respectively. Wal-Mart is also more profitable, with three times the profits of Target 
and more than five times the profits o f PPR.
As one would expect, Wal-Mart does not have the highest gross margin. But it does not have the 
lowest, either, Costco does, at almost half that o f Wal-Mart. PPR has the highest gross margin, 
more than 50% higher than that o f Wal-Mart. These differences reflect the nature o f the 
businesses, Costco is a warehouse store, with the lowest margins by definition. PPR is a 
department store, where prices, and thus margins, are higher.
Operating profit (EBIT) margin does not follow gross margin, because operating efficiencies 
differ. Reflecting its efficient ways, Wal-Mart moves past Metro and Aeon, Still, operating 
efficiencies cannot overcome the large differences in gross margins; PPR and Target have higher 
operating margins than Wal-Mart.
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Target has the highest profit margin, followed by PPR, Wal-Mart, Aeon, Costco, and Metro. One 
reason Costco performs “poorly” could be that it pays its workers better than Target or Wal- 
Mart. Its thin gross margin probably has something to do with it, too.
Costco, on the other hand, gets much more out o f its employees. Its revenue per employee was 
more than four times that o f Wal-Mart and Target. Aeon was even better. Metro and PPR fell in 
the middle. Again, this reflects, in part, the nature o f the stores. Costco is a bare-bones operation 
selling bulk items. It has one quarter the employees as Target, but more total revenue. Wal- 
Mart’s use o f employees is less efficient in part because it contracts for very few o f its 
operations. For example, it has a trucking fleet, something the others do not have.
Although Target had the highest return on equity and return on assets in the latest year, Wal- 
Mart consistently beat its competition by a considerable margin over the previous four years.
This reflects the company’s operational excellence and its aggressive financing. It is all the more 
impressive because the company continually boosts assets and equity by reinvesting in new 
stores and acquisitions.
When it comes to the balance sheet, Wal-Mart runs leaner than its competitors do. It is dead last 
in liquidity ratio and next-to-last in current ratio. This reflects the fact that it can rely so heavily 
on its suppliers and customers to finance its operations. Actually, all the companies run lean, 
with their current assets barely covering their current liabilities, or not, as is the case for Wal- 
Mart and Metro, For Wal-Mart, Costco, and Aeon, this is not really a problem, because they 
have very high interest coverage ratios. Target is just getting its debt under control, while PPR 
and Metro remain highly leveraged.
5.6 Stock Analysis
Long-term shareholders o f Wal-Mart, particularly the Walton family, have benefited mightily 
from the stock’s performance. Adjusted for splits and dividends, the share price has increased 
almost 10,000 times since it went public in 1972, Much o f this growth took place in the 1980s, 
particularly the early 1980s when the share price increased by a factor o f 10 in less than three 
years. Since peaking in late 1999, share price performance has disappointed, down nearly a third.
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Wal-Mart Stock Performance
Note: adjusted for splits and dividends, logarithmic scale, plotted monthly.
Source: http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=WMT&a=07&b=25&c=1972&d=00&e=22&f=2006&g=m,
After so much appreciation, Wal-Mart shares were wildly overvalued at the turn o f the century, 
trading at 15 times book value and 50 times trailing earnings, and carrying an enterprise value to 
EBITDA ratio (EV/EBITDA) o f nearly 20. Since then, a combination o f share price stagnation, 
stock repurchases, and earnings growth has moderated the company’s valuation. As of October 
31, 2005, the company traded at 6 times tangible book value and 18 times expected earnings, the 
lowest P/E ratio in ten years. The price to earnings growth ratio was less than 2 for the first time 
in years, and the EV/EBITDA ratio was down to 10.5. The dividend yield topped 1% for the first 
time in at least a decade. Analysts are mildly bullish about Wal-Mart, rating it outperform.
6. Command and Control
6.1 Management
The management pyramid at Wal-Mart is tall and wide. It is tall because there are many layers: 
store, district, region, division, and segment. It is wide because o f the sheer size of the company, 
more than 5,000 stores, and because there are many functions—human resources, compliance, 
corporate affairs, real estate, loss prevention, merchandising, operations, and accounting—that 
must be managed for each store, district, and region. Wal-Mart continually adjusts its 
management structure, but the following table offers a typical career path within the main store 
operations area o f the company.
W al-Mart Career Path323
Division Vice President 
Regional Vice President
323 http://walmartstores.com/GlobalWMSforesWeb/navigate.do?catg=303. accessed January 25,2006.
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Operations Coordinator
District Manager_________
Store Manager___________
Co-Manager_____________
Assistant Manager_______
Assistant Manager Trainee 
Department Manager/CSM 
Associate/Cashier_______
This will change slightly with Wal-Mart’s current store operations realignment, The restructuring 
aims to put decision making closer to the customers by giving more power to regional and 
district managers. Wal-Mart will have nine regional general managers, defined geographically. 
They have responsibility for the store operations in their region. Below them will be market 
managers, formerly district managers. They operate like regional managers, but with a smaller 
number o f stores. Wal-Mart wants to free regional and market managers to spend time improving 
store operations, from streamlining backroom inventory control to sprucing up the front-end’s 
product mix, merchandising appearance, and employee morale, To achieve this freedom, 
functional managers will report to each market and regional manager. These managers include 
human resources, compliance, corporate affairs, real estate, loss prevention, merchandising, and 
accounting. The idea, for example, is to have corporate affairs officers spend time in smoothing 
relations in the community or have real estate officers search for property, so store, district, and 
regional managers can concentrate on store operations,324
As noted in Section 3.2 Organization o f Production and Services, Wal-Mart has three key areas 
of operation: stores, distribution, and procurement. Beyond the corporation’s top officers, the key 
management positions at Wal-Mart are those with responsibility for each o f these areas.
6.1,1 H. Lee Scott, Jr., Chief Executive Officer
H. Lee Scott, Jr, joined Wal-Mart in 1979, at age 30, as assistant director o f Wal-Mart’s truck 
fleet. Until 1995, he worked in logistics and transportation, serving as director o f transportation, 
vice president o f distribution, and senior vice president o f logistics. As part o f a small 
management shake-up in 1995, CEO David Glass moved Scott to executive vice president of 
merchandise and sales for the Wal-Mart stores division, side-by-side with Tom Coughlin, the 
new executive vice president and COO o f the division. Scott brought his logistics skills to the 
merchandise area and reduced inventory and increased the rollback (price-cutting) program. In 
1998, he became president and CEO of the division. The next year, he became vice chairman and 
COO of Wal-Mart, and Coughlin took his spot as president and CEO o f the stores division. A 
year later, Glass stepped aside and Scott, after twenty years with the company, became CEO of 
Wal-Mart.325
324 Edward Weller, “Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,” ThinkEquity Fanners, November 15,2005; Bernard Sosnick, “Wal-
Mart Stores; Bold Changes, Big Potential, Oppenheimer Equity Research, November 15,2005; and Deborah 
Weinswig and Charmaine Tang, “WMT: Details o f  the 2005 Wal-Mart Analyst Meeting,” Citigroup Global 
Markets, October 30,2005.
325 Robert Slater, The Wal-Mart Decade: How a New Generation o f Leaders Turned Sam Walton’s Legacy into the 
World’s  #1 Company (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2003), p. 165-172.
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Scott’s history is a stereotypical small-town-boy-makes-good story. The second of three sons, he 
grew up in Baxter Springs, a small town in southeastern Kansas, not too far from the 
northwestern Arkansas home of Wal-Mart. His father ran a gas station and his mother taught 
music at the elementary school. He played the clarinet in the school orchestra and loved sports. 
He married and became a father at 21, and worked for a tire-mold manufacturer to pay his way 
through Pittsburg State University in Kansas. For a while, his family lived in a trailer and he 
drove an old car without a heater. After graduating college in 1971, he failed to land a 
management training position at Yellow Freight (now YRC Worldwide), a Kansas-based 
trucking company, but he persisted and by 1977 he was a terminal manager.326
At Wal-Mart, Scott originally alienated the truck drivers he managed with harsh dictums and 
scolding memos. After the drivers called for his dismissal, Sam Walton made Scott listen to the 
drivers’ complaints and thank each one individually for using the company’s “open-door policy,” 
Scott called the experience humbling and a good introduction to the company’s culture.
By 1993, Scott led the company’s logistics division. Wal-Mart was the first discount retailer to 
have its own distribution centers, and he designed and implemented a hub-and-spoke distribution 
network with warehouses serving a number o f stores not more than a day’s drive away. The 
close integration allowed Wal-Mart to restock shelves quickly and inexpensively and keep less 
inventory at the stores.
In 1995, Wal-Mart announced its first quarterly profit decline in 25 years. To shake things up, 
CEO David Glass picked Scott to run merchandising. He cut $2 billion in excess inventory by 
reducing the number o f products Wal-Mart sold in each category, eliminating slow-moving 
merchandise, and convincing suppliers to ship smaller amounts. His success in both 
merchandising and logistics made him the best candidate to succeed Glass as CEO.327
Scott has a self-effacing personality. He rarely issues a direct order. Instead, he gets his wishes 
across by asking questions and making suggestions. His people skills are “what got him so far,” 
according to BusinessWeek. He has absorbed the almost-missionary Wal-Mart culture of servant 
leadership and done a good job preserving and extending it. When asked why Wal-Mart is 
successful, he said, “People who have a good income forget that the average working person 
can’t afford to pay 10% more for something,” He likes to golf, fly-fish, and read Patrick O’Brian 
naval adventures.328
326 Robert Slater, The Wal-Mart Decade: How a New Generation o f Leaders Turned Sam Walton ’s Legacy into the 
World’s #1 Company (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2003), p. 165-172; Wendy Zellner, “Someday, Lee, This May 
All Be Yours: Wal-Mart heir apparent Lee Scott faces challenges Sam Walton never dreamed of,” BusinessWeek, 
No. 3655, November 15,1999, p. 84; Ann Zimmerman, “Counterpunch -  Wal-Mart Boss’s Unlikely Role:
Corporate Defender-in-Chief- Lee Scott, a Longtime Insider, Now Grapples With Critics As Chain Sheds Insularity 
-  Seeking Bill Clinton’s Advice,” Wall Street Journal, July 26,2005.
327 Ann Zimmerman, “Counterpunch -  Wal-Mart Boss’s Unlikely Role: Corporate Defender-in-Chief -  Lee Scott, a 
Longtime Insider, Now Grapples With Critics As Chain Sheds Insularity -  Seeking Bill Clinton’s Advice,” Wall 
Street Journal, July 26, 2005.
328 Wendy Zellner, “Someday, Lee, This May All Be Yours: Wal-Mart heir apparent Lee Scott faces challenges Sam 
Walton never dreamed of,” BusinessWeek, No. 3655, November 15,1999, p. 84.
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He and his wife Linda have two grown sons, one of whom works for Wal-Mart as a buyer,
6.1.2 Thomas M. Schoewe, Chief Financial Officer
Thomas M. Schoewe joined Wal-Mart in January 2000. He takes care o f treasury, tax, 
accounting and control, business planning and analysis, internal auditing, insurance and benefits 
management, the information systems division, risk management and global security, aviation, 
Wal-Mart Financial Services, and several other key areas o f the company. In June 2005, the lead 
financial executive in each of the operating segments (Wal-Mart, Sam’s Club, and International) 
began reporting directly to him.
Before joining Wal-Mart, Schoewe worked at Black and Decker Corp, from 1986 to 1999. His 
positions at the toolmaker included vice president o f business planning and analysis, vice 
president of finance, and senior vice president and chief financial officer. Prior to Black and 
Decker, he was CFO and controller o f Beatrice Consumer Durables, a subsidiary of Beatrice 
Companies.
Schoewe graduated from Loyola University of Chicago with a bachelor’s of business 
administration degree in finance. He attended the executive M.B. A. program of the University of 
Chicago, and he is a member of the Financial Executive Institute.
6.1.3 John B. Menzer
John B. Menzer joined Wal-Mart in September 2005. Currently, he is vice chairman. He recently 
switched jobs with Michael Duke. His responsibilities include Wal-Mart Stores U.S. A. (Discount 
Stores, Supercenters, and Neighborhood Markets), global procurement, information systems, 
benefits, logistics, real estate, financial services, and strategic planning. From June 1999 through 
September 2005, Menzer was president and CEO o f Wal-Mart International, with full operating 
responsibilities for fifteen countries outside the United States, Prior to June 1999, John served as 
executive vice president and CFO for Wal-Mart, his position upon joining the company.
Prior to joining Wal-Mart, Mezer was president o f Ben Franklin Retail Stores and held various 
other positions during his ten years with the company.
At Wal-Mart, Menzer is a rising star and possible successor to H. Lee Scott. As a CFO, he 
implemented a planning process that proved central in the company’s turnaround from a growth 
slump in the mid-1990s. He also championed “market basket” microanalysis, which tells stores 
what items consumers buy together, so they can, say, display the right candy bars next to the 
Barbie dolls. This work led Sam’s Club to reduce the number of products it carried, saving 
billions. He also developed “collaborative forecasting and replenishment,” in which Wal-Mart 
combines forces with its suppliers to forecast sales and schedule shipments. That work earned
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him two cover stories in CFO. Along with his leadership in the acquisition of ASDA in 1999, it 
also won him a position at the head o f Wal-Mart International.329
At Wal-Mart International, Menzer reduced the staff at Bentonville devoted to international 
operations by 50%, and gave individual country leaders greater decision-making authority, 
especially in the areas o f operations and merchandising. He setup “bandwidths o f responsibility” 
that clarified which decisions local managers could make and which should involve Bentonville. 
He put additional management structures and systems into place, including a larger finance 
division in each country, supported by a finance team in Bentonville to assist, report, and 
consolidate results. More importantly, Menzer built the international division from 2% of Wal- 
Mart sales to nearly 20%, largely through acquisition. After landing the biggest acquisition to 
date in ADSA, he led the acquisition of 34% of Seiyu, Ltd. in 2002.
Now Wal-Mart has brought Menzer back to the United States to reinvigorate its home-country 
performance.
Menzer is a director Emerson Electric, Wal-Mart de Mexico, Seiyu, Ltd. (Japan). He is a Board 
Member of CIES -  The Food Business Forum; US-China Business Council; and the Guangdong 
Province Governor’s Economic Advisors in China. He is a member of the Financial Executives 
Institute and the American Institute o f Certified Public Accountants.
Menzer received both his B.A. in business administration and his M.B.A. from Loyola 
University, and the Graduate School o f Business named him 1997 Alumnus of the Year.
6.1.4 Michael T. Duke
Michael T. Duke joined Wal-Mart in 1995. Currently, he is vice chairman. His star could be on 
the wane, however. His switch with Menzer means that he has moved from the heart o f the 
company, its Wal-Mart Stores U.S.A. division, to Wal-Mart International. Probably, this reflects 
Menzer’s accomplishments abroad and the Wal-Mart’s lagging home-country performance under 
Duke.330 Nonetheless, with full responsibility for operations in fifteen countries, Duke has 
responsibility for one fifth of the company and the mandate to raise International’s share to one 
third.
Duke worked his way up to the head of Wal-Mart Stores U.S.A. from logistics. He was also CFO 
of Wal-Mart for a time. Prior to joining the company, Duke worked for 23 years in retailing with 
Federated Department Stores and May Department Stores.
Duke graduated from Georgia Tech with a bachelor’s degree in industrial engineering and 
currently serves on the school’s Advisory Board. He is a steering committee member at the
329 Stephen Barr, “John B. Menzer,” CFO, Vol. 15, Iss. 10, October 1999, p. 72; Ian Springsteel and Roy Harris, 
“Birth o f a Salesman,” CFO, Vol. 13, Iss. 6, June 1997, p. 28.
330 Katherine Bowers, “Wal-Mart CEO Scott, On The Hot Seat, Navigates New Course,” Women ’s Wear Daily, May 
24, 2005; Katherine Bowers, “Wal-Mart Shuffles Exec Pair,” Women ’s Wear Daily, October 3,2005.
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Council on Competitiveness, a director o f Arvest Bank o f Bentonville and the Retail Industry 
Leaders Association, and a trustee o f Morehouse College.
6.1.5 Eduardo Castro-Wright
Eduardo Castro-Wright is President and CEO of Wal-Mart Stores, U.S.A., a position to which he 
ascended in September 2005, as part o f Wal-Mart management shuffle. Prior to this, he was 
COO o f the same unit, a title held only since January 2005.331
Castro-Wright began his Wal-Mart career in Mexico, where he served first as president and 
COO, then president and CEO of Wal-Mart de Mexico, which he joined in 2001. His transition 
to Wal-Mart’s U.S. operations marked a significant milestone for the company, in that it was the 
first time that the company tapped a member of its International management team to fill a 
position on its domestic team. Wal-Mart’s usual pattem is the opposite, sending U.S. executives 
around the world to manage the company’s growing international empire.332
Before joining Wal-Mart, Castro-Wright served in a variety of management positions for the 
Nabisco and Honeywell corporations. He started with Nabisco in Latin America, working his 
way up to president and CEO of Nabisco Venezuela by 1991, then Nabisco Mexico by 1994, He 
became president o f Nabisco Asia Pacific in 1995, a position he held until 1998. Throughout that 
period he was also a member of Nabisco’s Executive Committee, representing Nabisco 
International. In 1998, he moved to Honeywell, serving as president and CEO o f Honeywell 
Asia/Pacific from 1998 to 2000, and president and CEO o f Honeywell Transportation and Power 
Systems from 2000 to 2001, He was also a corporate officer o f Honeywell International Inc., and 
served on its Leadership Council.333
Castro-Wright caught the attention o f top Wal-Mart management while working for Honeywell 
in Asia, and they spent two years recruiting him. Since taking charge at Wal-Mart de Mexico, he 
made the Mexican operation the largest retailer in Mexico and the star performer of Wal-Mart’s 
international holdings. Key to this has been his focus on diversifying the number o f retail formats 
the company operates, and appealing to a broader array of customers. While he is now operating 
on a much larger scale in his new job, the company hopes that he can use some o f the strategies 
that worked in Mexico to diversify and increase sales growth in the U.S,334
331 Mike Troy, "Wal-Mart U.S. Taps Mexico for New Coo," DSN Retailing Today, January 24 2005, Wal-Mart 
Stores Inc., Senior Officers: Eduardo Castro-Wright [Website] (Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., January 27 2006 [accessed 
January 27 2006]); available from
http://wahnartstores.com/GlobalWMStoresWeb/navigate.do?catg=540&contId=41; Wal-Mart Stores Inc., "Wal- 
Mart Announces Management Changes and Organization Realignment," (Bentonville, Arkansas: Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 2005).
332 Troy, "Wal-Mart U.S. Taps Mexico for New COO."
333 Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Senior Officers: Eduardo Castro-Wright.
334 DSN Retailing Today, "Wal-Mart Stores: New Leadership Looks to Sharpen Store Execution," DSN Retailing 
Today, June 27,2005, Jenny Mero and Matthew Boyle, "Rising Star: Eduardo Castro-Wright, Wal-Mart," Fortune, 
February 6,2006, Troy, "Wal-Mart U.S. Taps Mexico for New COO."
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Both Wal-Mart executives and outside analysts see Castro-Wright playing a critical role in the 
future o f the company. Fortune magazine recently named him one o f  twelve “rising stars” on the 
CEO fast track,335 In September 2005, an analyst for Fifth Third Asset Management said of 
Castro-Wright’s appointment, it “is the most significant announcement.”336 As a sign o f his 
growing stature, Castro-Wright became a director o f Dow Jones & Company on January 18, 
2006.337
Castro-Wright grew up in Ecuador, the grandson o f a grocery merchant who built his business 
into what he claims is today the largest grocery chain in that country, He came to the U.S, to 
attend Texas A&M University, and graduated with a degree in mechanical engineering. He is 
currently married with three children.338
6.1.6 Lawrence V. Jackson
Lawrence V, Jackson joined Wal-Mart in October 2004, He is executive vice president for its 
“People Division,” otherwise known as human resources. He also serves as a strategic advisor to 
Wal-Mart’s senior management team. He took over from Coleman Peterson, who had occupied 
the post since 1994,339
Unlike many Wal-Mart executives, Jackson was recruited from outside the company. He also 
had little direct experience with human resources prior to his appointment.340 After graduating 
with a B.A. in economics from Harvard in 1975, he spent two years at the Bank of Boston before 
returning to Harvard to earn his M.B.A., which he received in 1979, He then went to work for 
the McKinsey & Co. consulting firm, where he stayed for two years. In 1981, he joined the 
management team at PepsiCo, starting as a plant manager. In his seventeen years with that 
company, he worked his way up through the ranks, ultimately making it to senior vice president 
of worldwide operations for PepsiCo Food Systems, In 1997 he left to become Vice President in 
charge of supply operations for supermarket retailer Safeway, where he stayed until 2003. He 
served briefly as President and COO for Dollar General Stores before assuming his current 
position,341
335 Mero and Boyle, "Rising Star: Eduardo Castro-Wright, Wal-Mart."
336 Coleman-Lochner, "Wal-Mart Names Two Vice Chairs to Compete for Top Job,"
337 Dow Jones Sc Company, Wal-Mart’s Eduardo Castro-Wright Elected to Dow Jones Sc Company Board of 
Directors [website] (Dow Jones & Company, January 18 2006 [accessed January 27 2006]); available from 
http://www.dowjones.com/Pressroom/PressReleases/Other/US/2006/0118_US_DowJones_9965.htm.
338 Jorge Ferraez, "Eduardo Castro-Wright: Putting a Global Spin on Wal-Mart," Latino Leaders: The National 
Magazine o f  the Successful American Latino, April 1 2005, Mero and Boyle, "Rising Star:, Eduardo Castro-Wright, 
Wal-Mart.", Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Senior Officers: Eduardo Castro-Wright, Wal-Mart Stores Inc., "Wal-Mart 
Announces Management Changes and Organization Realignment."
339 Wal-Mart Stores Inc., "Wal-Mart Names Lawrence Jackson Executive Vice President o f the People Division," 
(Bentonville, Arkansas: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2004).
340 John Rossheim, Hr Leaders o f  Tomorrow Will Be Specialists with a Broader Reach [Website] (Veritude: 
Strategic Human Resources, January 26 2006 [accessed January 26 2006]); available from 
http://www.veritude.com/ResourceCenter/ResourceView.aspx?id== 1180,
341 Bernadette Casey, "Jackson's Role Crucial to Enhancing Wal-Mart’s Image," DSN Retailing Today, November 8 
2004, Eve Tahmincioglu, "Wal-Mart's Man with a Mission,” Workforce Management, March 2005.
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In discussing his background, Jackson emphasizes his modest beginnings in southeast . 
Washington, D .C , the son o f a postal/hotel worker father and a mother who worked for 35 years 
as an examiner at the Bureau o f Engraving and Printing, He told Newsweek in 1979, “I have been 
poor most o f my life.” After a rough and tumble childhood, his parents scraped together enough 
money to send him to St, John’s College High School, an exclusive, all-male, military academy 
in Chevy Chase, Maryland, an affluent D.C, suburb two hours from his home. There, he 
distinguished himself as a student leader, attaining the rank o f lieutenant colonel, the second- 
highest-ranked student in the school,342
As a leading figure in the African-American business community, Jackson was brought on board 
as part o f  a company effort to refurbish its tarnished public image, particularly around issues o f  
employment discrimination,343 Not coincidentally, Wal-Mart rolled out its “Unfiltered. Truth” 
image-boosting publicity campaign in January 2005, just months after Jackson assumed his new 
post. Company spokespeople confirm that Jackson played a critical role in developing the 
campaign. He is a champion of corporate diversity, having recruited and mentored many 
African-American executives in his time at PepsiCo, where he was initially hired as part o f an 
initiative to gain market share over rival Coca-Cola in the African-American community. He also 
came to the company with a reputation for driving revenues up, gamering credit while at 
Safeway for retooling its business model to compete with Wal-Mart as it revolutionized the 
grocery industry in the late 1990s. More importantly for his current job, he takes a tough stance 
on labor issues, as perhaps best demonstrated by the key role he played in coordinating union 
decertification drives at several west coast PepsiCo bottling plants.344
Fortune magazine named Jackson to its list o f “50 Most Powerful Black Executives” in 2002. In 
addition to his job at Wal-Mart, Jackson sits on the board o f  the Parsons Company, an 
engineering and construction firm. He was also 2005 Honorary Chair o f the Harvard Business 
School African American Alumni Association (HBSAAA), and is on the board o f Students in 
Free Enterprise (SIFE) and Girls Incorporated, His wife Kimberly is a Harvard graduate who 
worked as an investment banker prior to their marriage. They have three children,345
6,2 Board o f Directors
Wal-Mart’s board o f directors currently consists o f fourteen directors. Under the company’s By- 
Laws, the board may contain no less than three and no more than twenty directors. The board has
342 Tahmincioglu, "Wal-Mart's Man with a Mission."
343 Casey, "Jackson's Role Crucial to Enhancing Wal-Mart's Image,"
344 Tahmincioglu, "Wal-Mart's Man with a Mission."
345 Ibid, Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Senior Officers: Lawrence V. Jackson [Website] (Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., January 26 
2006 [accessed January 26 2006]); available from
http://walmartstores.com/GlobalWMStoresWeb/navigate.do?catg=540&contId=40. Parsons Company, Parsons 
Board o f Directors [Website] (Parsons Company, January 26 2006 [accessed January 26 2006]); available from 
http://www.parsons.com/about/board_of_directors.asp. HBSAAA, Hbsaaa 2005 Conference Agenda [Website] 
(HBSAAA, October 6 2005 [accessed January 26 2006]); available from
http://www.hbsaaa.org/conf2005/confAgenda.htm. Students In Free Enterprise, Sife’s Free Enterprise Dream Team 
(Board o f Directors) Now Numbers More Than 200 Strong! [Website] (Students In Free Enterprise, January 26 2006 
[accessed January 26 2006]); available from https://www.sife.org/home/dream_team2.asp.
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the authority to increase or, upon a vacancy, reduce the number o f directors, and to fill vacancies 
between shareholder meetings. Members serve one-year terms.
Ten o f the directors are classified as independent, four as insiders. As described below, four of 
the independent directors (Breyer, Hernandez, Shewmaker, and Williams) are “related,” 
suggesting they may not have as much independence as Wal-Mart claims. The board has one 
member designated as a financial expert (Bums) and another as lead director (Villarreal).
The board has five committees: Audit; Compensation, Nominating and Governance; Executive; 
Stock Option; and Strategic Planning and Financial.
W al-Mart Board o f Directors Committees
Independent Directors AC CNGC EC SOC SPFC Since
James W. Breyer 2001
M. Michele Bums # X 2003
Douglas N, Daft X 2005
Roland A. Hernandez C 1998
John D. Opie X 2003
J. Paul Reason X 2001
Jack C. Shewmaker X 1977
Jose H. Villarreal* c 1998
Christopher J. Williams X 2004
Linda S. W olf X 2005
Inside Directors
David D. Glass c X 1977
H. Lee Scott, Jr X c 1999
S. Robson Walton* X X 1978
Jim C. Walton X 2005
♦Chairperson o f  the Board; C =  Committee Chair; X  = Member
* Lead Director;# Financial Expert
AC: Audit Committee
CNGC: Compensation, Nominating and Governance Committee
EC: Audit Committee
SOC: Stock Option Committee
SPFC: Strategic Planning and Finance Committee
Wal-Mart has split the jobs o f CEO and Chairperson of the Board, but its chairman, S. Robson 
Walton, is a former executive of the company, a major shareholder, and son of the founder. He is 
not an independent chairman, as preferred by many corporate governance experts.346
Non-management directors receive an annual retainer of $60,000, paid quarterly, taken in cash, 
shares, deferred in stock units, or deferred in an interest bearing account. Each non-management 
director also receives a share grant, which was 2,032 Shares on June 4, 2004. The chair of the
346 Carolyn Said, “Splitsville in executive offices; Dell latest firm to separate CEO, chairman positions,” San 
Francisco Chronicle, March 5 ,2004, p. B l.
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audit committee receives an additional retainer o f $15,000 and the chairs o f the compensation, 
nominating, and governance committee and the strategic planning and finance committee receive 
an additional retainer o f $10,000. Wal-Mart does not pay directors for meeting attendance, but it 
does cover expenses. Directors are required to own $300,000 worth of Wal-Mart stock within 
five years of their first appointment to the board.
6.2.1 S. Robson Walton -  Chairman of the Board
S. Robson (Rob) Walton joined the Wal-Mart board o f directors in 1978. He is the eldest son of 
Sam and Helen Walton. After earning an accounting degree from the University o f Arkansas and 
a law degree from Columbia University, he practiced law at Conner and Winters in Tulsa, 
Oklahoma. One o f the firm’s most important clients was Wal-Mart, While at Conner and 
Winters, Walton did the research necessary for Wal-Mart to go public in 1970. The company 
was a maze o f partnership agreements at the time and strapped for cash, Walton worked out the 
details for consolidating the debt and the partnerships and selling a percentage of the company to 
the public.347
While still in Tulsa, Walton, who was married with three children, had an affair with his 
secretary and left his wife. He then remarried, and soon moved back to Bentonville.348
In 1978, Walton joined Wal-Mart full-time as senior vice president, director, secretary, and 
general counsel. He never had much interest in the details o f running the stores. Instead, he was 
interested in real estate, international expansion, and the overall big-picture of the company. 
During his fourteen years at Wal-Mart before he became chairman in 1992, Walton held various 
responsibilities, including a stint as head of the company’s real estate and construction division, 
and later vice chairman. Upon becoming chairman after the death o f his father from bone cancer, 
Walton admitted he lacked the flair o f his father, “I’m pretty quiet, frankly, and maybe boring,” 
Despite his low-key style, Walton is a fierce competitor and an active participant in setting the 
strategic direction o f the company. He enjoys competitive sports such as bicycle racing, 
handball, racquetball, and marathon running.349
Walton is number 10 on the 2005 Forbes list o f the “World’s Richest People,” with an estimated 
net worth of $18.3 billion, most o f it in Wal-Mart stock. His brother Jim, sister Alice, and mother 
Helen follow him on the list.350 Walton is a donor to Republican candidates and several 
conservative political action committees, including the Committee for the Preservation of 
Capitalism and the New Republican Majority Fund.351 *35
347 "The Walton Influence Carries On,” Discount Store News, October 1, 1999.
348 Ortega, In Sam We Trust, p, 76-77.
349 “Walton Son Is Link Between Family and Retail Empire,” Seattle Times, May 31,1992, p. C6,
350 Forbes.com, "Forbes World’s Richest People,”
http://www.forbes.com/static/bill20Q5/rank.html7riassListI d=10&passYear=2005&passListTvrie=Person&searchPar
ameterl=unset&searchParameter2=unset&resultsStart=l&resultsHowManv=25&resultsSortProperties=%252Bnum
berfieldl%252C%252Bstringfield2&resultsSortCategorvName=Rank&passKevword=&categorvl=categorv&categ
orv2=categorv&boxes=custom. accessed January 26,2006.
355 “S. Robson Walton’s Federal Campaign Contribution Report,” Newsmeat.com, 
http://www.newsmeat.com/billionaire_politicaUdonations/S_Robson_Walton.php.
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The Walton Family Foundation had $1.1 billion in assets at the end of 2004, making it the 44th 
largest in the United States.352 In 2002, the foundation donated $300 million to the University of 
Arkansas to establish and endow an undergraduate honors college and endow the graduate 
school.353
Walton is a Trustee of Wooster College, which he attended for a time. He is active in fundraising 
for the University o f Arkansas. He is divorced, remarried, and the father o f three children with 
his first wife.
6.2.2 James C. Walton
James C. Walton joined the Wal-Mart board o f directors in September 2005. He replaced his 
brother, John T. Walton, who died June 28, 2005, when the ultra-light aircraft he was piloting 
crashed shortly after take-off from the Jackson Hole Airport in Grand Teton National Park.
Jim Walton is the youngest son of Sam and Helen Walton. Like his older brothers, he went to 
Bentonville High, where, like them, he was an all-state football player. Then he attended the 
University o f Arkansas, and earned a marketing degree. Like his father and brothers, Walton 
learned to fly. He joined Wal-Mart in 1971, doing real estate transactions, but left in 1975, when 
he moved to head Walton Enterprises, the family business that now controls the family’s Wal- 
Mart stock, Arvest Bank Group, Community Publishers, and other businesses.354
Walton is chairman and CEO o f Arvest, which operates more than 200 branch banks in 91 
communities in the states of Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Missouri. The bank’s roots are in the 
Bank of Bentonville, which Sam Walton bought in 1961. Over the years, the Waltons bought 
more banks, and now Arvest has 4,500 employees, total assets o f $7,5 billion, and made $64 
million in net income in the first nine months o f 2005.355 Arvest has banks branches and ATMs 
in Wal-Mart stores, for which it paid Wal-Mart $658,928 in banking facility rent and related 
ATM surcharges in fiscal 2005. “The banking corporation and its affiliates made additional 3524*
352 Mark Minton, “Walton foundation’s assets rise to 44th nationally Climb from 53rd comes as $497 million was 
added, $101 million handed out in ‘04,” Arkansas Democrat Gazette, November 16,2004, p. 1.
353 “University o f  Arkansas Receives $300 Million Gift, Largest in History o f  U.S. Public Higher Education,” 
Ascribe News, April 11 2002.
354 Wal-Mart, “Jim Walton Appointed to the Board o f Directors o f  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,” Press Release, September 
30,2005.
333 Wal-Mart, “Jim Walton Appointed to the Board o f Directors o f Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,” Press Release, September 
30, 2005; Arvest Bank, “Community Center: Arvest Story,”
http.7/www.arvest.com/banking/?page=communitv/arvest story, accessed January 26, 2006; Arvest Bank, 
“Consolidated Report o f Income,”
http://www2.fdic.gov/Call TFR Rpts/09302005/41/41RI.asi)?pCert=8728&pDocket=10375&pcmbOtrEnd~09%2F 
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+-H-+++&pCitv=FAYETTEVILLE++-F-H f i l i i l l l l t )■ H + &pStalp=AR&pzip5=72701&plnstitution=Arvest+Ban 
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payments to Wal-Mart pursuant to similar arrangements awarded by Wal-Mart on a competitive- 
bid basis.”356
Walton is chairman of Bentonville-based Community Publishers, Inc. which operates two free- 
distribution shoppers, 19 weeklies, three twice-weekly, and three daily newspapers and one bi­
monthly publication in Arkansas, Missouri, and Oklahoma.357
Walton works long hours. He makes few public statements and rarely sits for interviews. 
According to Fortune, “Word around northwest Arkansas is that nobody who works for Jim 
would want his job, because the man works too hard,”358
Walton is a trustee of the Walton Family Foundation, He is a donor to Republican candidates and 
conservative political action committees, such as the Business Industry PAC and the Committee 
for the Preservation o f Capitalism.359 His bank’s PAC gave 65%, 92%, and 89% of its money to 
Republican candidates in the 2004,2002, and 2000 election cycles, respectively,360
Walton is a donor to Arkansans for Education Reform, which promotes merit pay and charter 
schools.361
Walton is the current chairman o f the Northwest Arkansas Council, a nonprofit organization of 
businesspeople that promotes economic and business development around Bentonville. The 
organization takes credit for such local developments as the Northwest Arkansas Regional 
Airport Authority, funding to widen U.S, 412 to four lanes, Interstate 540 between Fayetteville 
and Alma, and the opening o f the Benton-Washington Regional Public Water Authority, Four 
co-chairs o f the Council will serve successive one-year terms at the head of the group: John A. 
White, chancellor of the University of Arkansas; John Tyson, chairman and CEO of Tyson 
Foods Inc.; Kirk Thompson, president and CEO of J, B. Hunt Transport Services Inc.; and H,
Lee Scott, president and CEO of Wal-Mart Stores Inc,362
6.2.3 David D. Glass -  Chairman of the Executive Committee
David D. Glass succeeded founder Sam Walton at the head o f Wal-Mart in January 1988, As 
president and CEO until January 2000, he, more than anyone else, was responsible for the 
company’s phenomenal growth and international expansion during the 1990s, Upon stepping
356 Wal-Mart, Proxy 2005, p. 26.
357 Community Publishers, Inc., http://www.coxnmDub.com/Dublications.html. accessed January 26, 2006.
358 Andy Serwer, Kate Bonamici, and Doris Burke, “The Waltons: Inside America’s Richest Family,” Fortune, 
November 15,2004, p. 86.
359 Newsmeat, source: http://www.newsmeat.com/billionaire political donations/Jim Walton.php.
360 Open Secrets, “Arvest Bank Group,”
http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/lookup2.asp?strid=C00336768&cvcle=2004. accessed January 26,2006.
361 Cynthia Howell, “Businessmen’s money propels Next Step plan for education reform; Murphy, Stevens give 
nearly $400,000,” Arkansas Democratic Gazette, October 30, 2002; Michael Rowett, Arkansas Democrat Gazette, 
November 12,2003.
362 Robert Smith, “Advisory group losing 3 leaders who helped area Council to focus on roads, water,” Arkansas 
Democrat Gazette, June 11,2005.
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down as CEO, he beeame chair o f the executive committee, which carries out the board’s 
policies between meetings. He is also a member o f the stock option committee.
Glass is from southeastern Missouri, where his father owned a modestly profitable feed mill. 
After high school, he joined the army and met and married Ruth Roberts while stationed in New 
Mexico. After his discharge, he returned to Missouri, enrolled at Southwest Missouri State 
College, and worked full-time at night as a truck dispatcher. For several years he worked at J, W, 
Crank drugstore chain, then briefly in Austin, Texas, building a Howard Johnson’s motel, and 
finally with Consumers Markets, where he eventually became the chain’s general manager 
before joining Wal-Mart in 1976.363
Glass actually met Walton in the 1960s, but resisted the retailer’s overtures. When he finally 
took the plunge, he began near the top, as CFO and head of distribution. Glass was an early and 
consistent proponent of automated technology at Wal-Mart, and on several occasions he 
convinced Sam Walton o f the wisdom of investment in technology. He had a knack for logistics 
and distribution, and he was the leading voice behind the Supercenter concept, which combines 
groceries and general merchandise and therefore gets shoppers to come to Wal-Mart more often. 
As CEO, he at times emulated Walton’s “personal touch,” often mixing with workers at Wal- 
Mart stores and working as a greeter, but never with the same success as Walton. Instead, he 
developed his own style, which relied much more on massive investments in new stores, 
distribution centers, and technology.364 A Dateline television interview in 1992 exposed his 
weak public communications skills and marked one o f the first times the company had come 
under public attack for a number o f unethical practices, including the sale under “Made in the 
USA” signs of foreign apparel sewn by Bangladeshi children. Confronted with the horrific 
conditions o f the workers, locked in for hours until they finish their quota, Glass said on camera, 
“Yeah, there are tragic things that happen all over the world.”365 36
Glass is the principle owner, chairman, and CEO of the Kansas City Royals baseball team. His 
son, Dan Glass, is the president and a director. His wife, Ruth, and second son, Don, are 
directors. The team recently negotiated with Jackson County to put a proposal on an upcoming 
ballot that would impose a three-eighths-of-a-cent sales tax levy in Jackson County that would 
raise $425 million toward a $575 million renovation of Kaufman and Arrowhead Stadiums. The 
baseball team would kick in just $25 million and the football team $75 million toward the
• , . i  366project.
363 Bob Ortega, In Sam We Trust: The Untold Story o f Sam Walton and How Wal-Mart is Devouring America (New 
York: Times Business/Random House, 1998), p. 96-99.
364 “The 25 Top Executives o f the Year; David D. Glass: Second Wind for Wal-Mart,” BusinessWeek, January 11, 
1999, http://www.businessweek.com/! 999/02/b3611024.htm, accessed January 25, 2006; Robert Slater, The Wal- 
Mart Decade: How a New Generation o f Leaders Turned Sam Walton ’s Legacy into the World's #7 Company (New 
York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2003), p. 84-87.
365 Ortega, In Same We Trust, p. 223-229.
366 Deann Smith, “Tax vote in April to raise money for stadium overhaul; Royals, Chiefs, Jackson County sign new 
leases,” Kansas City Star, January 25, 2006; Mark Sheldon, “Royals, Chiefs agree to new leases; Ticket user fee 
OK'd as referendum heads to ballot,” MLB.com, January 24, 2006,
htto;//kansascitv.rovals.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/news/article.isp?vmd=20060124&content id=1299859&vkev=:!news 
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Glass is a director o f the Baseball Hall o f Fame. He has a bachelor’s degree (1959) from 
Southwest Missouri State College (now Missouri State University) in Springfield, Missouri, and 
is a member o f its alumni association. The university named the business school building after 
him.
6.2.4 James W. Breyer
James W. Breyer joined the Wal-Mart Board o f directors in 2001. He is the Managing Partner of 
Accel Partners, a venture capital firm located in Palo Alto, California. Prior to Accel, he was a 
management consultant at McKinsey & Company in New York, and worked in product 
marketing and management at Apple Computer and Hewlett Packard.
Breyer’s relationship with Wal-Mart goes back to at least January 2000, when Accel and Wal- 
Mart announced they would create Wal-Mart.com Inc. as an independent joint venture in the Bay 
Area. The idea was that Wal-Mart.com would hire the smartest talent, reward them with stock 
options, and then go public after the website came to dominate online selling the way its parent 
dominated rural retail. Breyer played an active role in hiring staff for Wal-Mart.com and finding 
it headquarters. Barely nineteenth months later, Wal-Mart bought out Accel for an undisclosed 
amount and returned Wal-Mart.com to the Wal-Mart corporate family. In the process, Breyer 
impressed Wal-Mart enough that the board invited him to join.367
Breyer beneficially owns more than 10% of the equity o f Groove Networks, Inc. During fiscal 
years 2005 and 2004, Wal-Mart paid Groove Networks, Inc. $278,003 and $1,462,378, 
respectively, for computer software and services. Such payments compromise a board member’s 
independence.368
Breyer is the former Chairman o f the National Venture Capital Association, a former President 
of the Western Association o f Venture Capitalists, and on the Board o f the Associates o f the 
Harvard Business School, Pacific Community Ventures, the Stanford Engineering Venture Fund, 
Stanford Technology Ventures Program, and Technet. He is Chairman o f the Harvard Business 
School California Research Center, and Chairman o f the Silicon Valley region committee for 
Stanford University’s Campaign for Undergraduate Education. He holds a B.S. from Stanford 
University and an M.B.A. from Harvard University.369
Breyer is a director o f RealNetworks, Inc., and several private companies in which he and Accel 
are investors.
6.2.5 M. Michele Bums
367 "Wal-Mart, venture capital firm form walmart.com,” Reuters News, January 6,2000; David Lazarus, “Wal-Mart 
Poised to Swoop /  Net firms fret as huge retailer hatches plan for online spin-off,” San Francisco Chronicle, January 
15,2000; Wal-Mart, “Wal-Mart Announces Buyout o f Accel Partners’ Minority Interest in Walmart.com,” Press 
Release, July 23,2001; Constance L. Hays, “Wal-Mart Assumes Complete Control o f  Its Online Store,” New York 
Times, July 24,2001.
368 Wal-Mart, Proxy 2005, April 15,2005, p. 26; Wal-Mart, Proxy 2004, April 15,2004, p, 21.
369 Accel Partners, “Our People,” http://www.acceI.com/people/index.php. accessed January 26,2006.
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M. Michele Bums joined the Wal-Mart hoard of directors in 20Ö3. She has become infamous for 
receiving enormous severance packages after leaving two troubled companies within the space of 
two years. Now, she will become CFO at insurance giant Marsh & McLennan, yet another 
troubled company, in March 2006.
Bums spent eighteen years at Arthur Andersen, from 1981 to 1999, She joined Delta Air Lines in 
January 1999 as vice president corporate tax and rose to executive vice president and CFO by 
August 2000. While CFO, she helped set up bankruptcy-proof pension tmsts that would pay 
Delta executives millions of dollars even if  the company went bankrupt, which seemed 
increasingly likely after September 11,2001. The company paid some $65 million into these 
trusts during the same period it laid off thousands o f workers, cut the pay and pensions of those 
who remained, and underfunded its employee-pension obligations by $4,9 billion. Bums had 
salary of $560,000 in 2002, plus a bonus of $846,000. The next year she, like other executives at 
the money-losing airline, received no bonus on top o f her $560,000 salary. In early 2004, after 
employees found out about the executive pension trusts, she deferred her $1,35 million retention 
bonus, taking it instead in three yearly installments in 2004,2005, and 2006. Supposedly, the 
pension tmsts and retention bonuses would keep “key” employees from leaving, but many top 
executives, including Bums, left and took their pensions with them. She left in April 2004 with a 
severance package, the deferred retention bonus, and $1 million pension. She also took lifetime 
free first-class travel on Delta for herself and her family. When Delta went bankrupt after her 
departure, it asked the bankruptcy judge to void all free-travel arrangements. Bums was the only 
former executive to file a challenge demanding to keep the perk, after reaping nearly $10 million 
from Delta and her next employer.370
Bums’s left Delta and joined Mirant as CFO. Her job was to guide the company through 
bankruptcy, which she did. After twenty months, when it became clear she would not become 
CEO, she left, pocketing $4.25 million in severance plus the $4,1 million she made in salary, 
bonus, and other payments during her short tenure. Now, she joins Marsh & McClennan, which 
paid restitution for its insurance company’s bid rigging and price fixing practices in 2005. Her 
salary is $750,000, with a bonus of at least $750,000 and possibly $1.5 million. Marsh & 
McLennan will cover Bums’s housing and travel expenses for eighteen months -  with up to 
$8,000 a month in housing costs and one weekly airfare between Atlanta and New York -plus a 
“gross-up” to cover income taxes because o f the perks.371
Bums is the Wal-Mart board’s designated financial expert and a member of the audit committee. 
She is a director at Cisco Systems and at the Ivan Allen Company in Georgia. She is director and
370 Russell Grantham, “Delta’s pension tab rises Execs’ perk likely to cost $65 million by ‘04,” Atlanta Journal- 
Constitution, June 8,2003; Evan Perez and Theo Francis, "Delta’s Retention Program Fails to Stop Some Executive 
Departures,” The Wall Street Journal, August 8 ,2003, p. A l; Russell Grantham, “Delta’s bonuses fail to stop execs’ 
flight,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, April 16,2004, p. A l; Coleman Cowen, “Imagine Flying First Class Forever,” 
BusinessWeek, Vol. 3964, December 19,2005, p. 9.
371 “Mirant executive takes job at New York insurance broker,” Associated Press Newswires, December 21,2005; 
Matt Kempner and Russell Grantham, “Insurer appoints Bums as its CFO Controversial exec joins troubled firm,” 
Atlanta Journal-Constitution, December 21,2005, p. C l; “Bums stands to make $2.25 million Former Delta, Mirant 
exec’s pay disclosed,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, December 23,2005, p. C4.
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treasurer o f the Elton John Aids Foundation.372 She holds a bachelor’s degree in business 
administration and a master’s degree in accountancy from the Üniversity o f Georgia.
6.2.6 Douglas N. Daft
Douglas N. Daft joined the Wal-Mart board of directors in January 2005. He is retired from 
Coca-Cola, where he worked in various capacities from 1969 to June 2004, lastly as Chairman 
and CEO after February 2000, On several occasions, the financial press criticized Daft for his 
ineffectual tenure at the top o f what used to be the largest beverage company in the world. Labor 
and human rights groups also condemned Coca-Cola under his watch.
Daft, bom in Australia, joined Coca-Cola’s as a planning officer in Sydney in 1969. He spent 
most o f his thirty years at the company in Asia, including a stint as president o f Coca-Cola 
Japan, one of the company’s biggest markets outside the U.S. At other times he served as 
president o f the Central Pacific Division, with responsibilities for China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand, He moved to Atlanta in 1991 to become president of 
the Pacific Group and then became president o f the Middle and Far East Group in 1995. He 
became CEO o f the company largely by default, after a series of board clashes eliminated other 
candidates. During his tenure Coke shares lost 5% of their value and Daft made a series of 
leadership blunders that earned him the title o f "accidental CEO.”373
In March 2004, Coke withdrew its Dasani brand bottled water from Europe. British consumers 
spumed the new drink when they realized they were buying purified local tap water, and after the 
company botched the purification process and had to recall 500,000 bottles containing illegal 
levels of the carcinogenic chemical bromate.374 Protestors in India charged Coca-Cola bottlers 
with extracting too much groundwater, which takes the water from local farmers, and with 
discharging toxic water into surrounding fields and rivers.375
Beginning in 2003, several activist and labor organizations began protesting Coca-Cola’s alleged 
complicity in the murders o f union leaders at Coca-Cola bottling plants in Colombia since 1989, 
These groups include the International Labor Rights Fund and the United Steelworkers, which 
filed a suit against Coca-Cola in the United States on behalf o f the workers’ union, 
SINALTRAINAL, Ray Rogers then launched the “Killer Coke” corporate campaign, which 
many student organizations have joined. They have succeeded in removing Coke from several
372 http://www.eiaf.ore/. accessed January 26,2006.
373 The American Assembly, “About Douglas Daft,”
http://www.americanassemblv.ore/about.dir/about display trustee.php?this ld=4. accessed January 26,2006; Betsy 
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the barber knows,” Fortune, May 31,2004, p. 84.
374 “Coca-Cola: Always Coca-Cola?” Marketing, October 20 ,2004, p. 28; Christina Cheddar Berk, “Coca-Cola’s 
Dasani UK Recall Latest In Series o f  Mishaps,” Dow Jones News Service, March 19,2004; Chad Terhune and Betsy 
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4,2004, A l,
375 India Resource Center, “Campaign to Hold Coca-Cola Accountable,” 
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university campuses in the U.S. as part o f a worldwide boycott. In response to the allegations of 
SINALTRAINAL, Douglas Daft in the fall o f 2003 originally allowed general counsel Deval 
Patrick to investigate the situation in Colombia, but Daft abruptly canceled the investigation in 
March 2004.376
In 2000, Daft settled a suit by African-American employees charging Coca-Cola with 
discrimination in pay and promotion. The company agreed to pay $192.5 million, including $113 
million in cash, $43.5 million to adjust the salaries employees during the next ten years, and $36 
million to implement diversity initiatives and oversight of the company’s employment 
practices.377
Under Daft, Coca-Cola had numerous dubious corporate governance practices, especially a 
plethora o f related-party arrangements that Fortune dubbed the “Coca-Cola” keiretsu, a reference 
to the interlocking boards common in Japan. These included financial relationships with two 
Berkshire Hathaway companies, Dairy Queen and food distributor McLane (bought from Wal- 
Mart), while Berkshire Hathaway chairman Warrant Buffet sat on the Coke board. Another was 
the $16.3 million paid to Allen & Co., while its head, Herbert Allen, was on the Coke board.378 
Executive compensation was also a problem, as Daft received $48 million in stock one year even 
when he failed to meet sales volume growth targets and laid off 6,000 workers. He then received 
$36 million in a severance package when he left in 2004.379
Daft serves on the board of the McGraw Hill Companies, Inc., a publishing firm. He received a 
bachelor’s degree in mathematics from the University of New England and a post-graduate 
degree in business administration from the University of New South Wales
Daft has served on the boards o f SunTrust Banks, the Boys & Girls Clubs o f America, Catalyst, 
the Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education -  Economics Institute in the Czech 
Republic, the Prince of Wales International Business Leaders Forum, the Grocery Manufacturers 
of America, the British-American Chamber o f Commerce, the G100, the Woodruff Arts Center 
and the Atlanta Commerce Club.
He has also served as a trustee of Emory University, the American Assembly, and the Center for 
Strategic & International Studies. He was a member o f The Trilateral Commission, The Business 
Council, The Business Roundtable, and the Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS. He served 
as the United States Chair for the Council for the United States and Italy and was co-Chair for
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the Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue, As o f January 2005, he remained advisory board member 
for SISTEMA, the Russian Telecom company; advisory board member o f Longreach, a Japan- 
based investment firm; overseer board member for the International Business School o f Brandeis 
University; board member o f the Lauder Institute for Management and International Studies at 
the University of Pennsylvania; and chairman o f the United States Advisory Board for the 
Churchill Archives Center, Churchill College, Cambridge,380
6.2,7 Roland A, Hernandez
Roland A. Hernandez joined the Wal-Mart board in 1998, He is founder and managing partner of 
Hernandez Media Ventures, a private company engaged in the acquisition and management of 
media assets.381 Prior to this recent company, Hernandez had a career in Spanish-language 
media,
Hernandez took over as CEO of Telemundo in March 1995, when the station’s share o f the 
Hispanic audience had dropped to 20% from 42% three years earlier. He was one of the 
company’s biggest shareholders and had been a board member since 1989.382 Over the next two 
years, ratings continued to fall, the company lost money, and Hernandez looked for a buyer. In 
late 1997, Sony and Liberty Media teamed up with Wall Street investor Leon Black to buy 
Telemundo for $539 million.383 Less than a year later, the company abandoned traditional tele­
novellas, changed management, and moved Hernandez to chairman.384 Hernandez retired in 
2000, and NBC bought Telemundo the next year for $2 billion.385
In July 1999, while at Telemundo and on the board o f Wal-Mart, Hernandez issued a formal 
apology to Drayton McLane Jr,, owner of the Houston Astros and a number o f other businesses, 
after a Houston Telemundo affiliate accused McLane o f racist remarks about Latino baseball 
players, McLane, then a large shareholder o f Wal-Mart, had sold his grocery distribution 
business to Wal-Mart in 1990 and he served as vice chairman o f Wal-Mart from 1990 to 1994. 
McLane denied that his remarks were racist and the local affiliate issued a statement to that 
effect. McLane nonetheless requested an official apology and Hernandez obliged.386
Prior to Telemundo, Hernandez was president of Interspan Communications which owned and 
operated o f Spanish-language television properties and provided marketing and management
380 Wal-Mart, “Douglas Daft Appointed To Wal-Mart Board O f Directors,” Press Release, January 6,2005.
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13, 1995,
383 Anne Moncrieff Arrate, "Media Giants Team Up to Buy Miami-Based Telemundo TV,” Miami Herald, 
November 25,1997,
384 Sony Pictures Entertainment, Liberty Media, Telemundo, “Telemundo Assembles New Executive Management 
Team,” Press Release, August 13, 1998; David Bauder, “Telemundo tries Spanish versions o f  American favorites,” 
Associated Press Newswires, June 16,1998.
385 Peter Lauria, “NBC buys Telemundo for $1.98B,” The Daily Deal, October 12,2001.
386 John Williams, “Telemundo chairman apologizes to McLane over racial controversy,” Houston Chronicle, July 
13,1999; Houston Histoiy, “Who’s Who: Drayton McClane Jr.,” 
http://www.houstonhistorv.com/whoswhoyhistorvl9hof.htm. accessed January 27,2006.
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consulting to companies targeting the United States Hispanic population.387
Hernandez beneficially owns more than 10% of Inter-Con Security Systems, Inc, which the Los 
Angeles Business Journal listed as the 15th largest privately-owned business in Los Angeles 
County in 2002, with $1 billion in sales. His brother, Enrique (Rick), is CEO. His father founded 
the company. During fiscal 2005, Wal-Mart paid Inter-Con Security Systems, Inc., through its 
wholly owned subsidiary operating in Mexico, $731,006 for security services.388 Such payments 
compromise Hernandez’s independence. Rick Hernandez is a board member at Wells Fargo, 
McDonald’s, Tribune Company, and Nordstrom.389
Roland Hernandez joined the board at Lehman Brothers in September 2005. He is also a director 
of MGM Mirage (MGM), where he chairs the audit committee, the Ryland Group Inc. (RYL), 
and Vail Resorts Inc. (MTN).390 He serves on the board of Harvard Law School, the advisory 
committee of the Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Harvard University, and the 
board of councilors of the Annenberg School of Communication at the University o f Southern 
California.
Hernandez received an A.B., cum laude, from Harvard College, and a J.D. from Harvard Law 
School, as did his brother.
6.2.8 John D, Opie
John D. Opie joined the Wal-Mart board in August 2003. He worked at General Electric from 
1961 to April 2000, and held jobs in sales, manufacturing, and marketing. He led five different 
operating units, including Lexan and Specialty Plastics Division, Distribution Equipment 
Business Division, and he served as president and CEO of GE Lighting from 1986 to 1995, when 
he became vice chairman o f the board and executive officer.391
He is a life trustee o f  Michigan Tech University, from which he earned a B.S. in metallurgical 
engineering. He is lead independent director of Delphi’s Board o f Directors and an ex officio 
member of its audit committee, compensation and executive development committee, and 
corporate governance and public issues committee. For his work on the Delphi board he received 
each year a $100,000 retainer and $200,000 worth of restricted stock.392
387 The HACR Symposium, “2005 FORTUNE Director Honorees,
http://www.hacr.Org/events/eventID.2.eventPageID.37/eventpage.asp. accessed January 27, 2006.
388 Wal-Mart, 2005 Proxy, April 15,2005, p. 26; Nicole Taylor, “ L.A,’s 100 largest private companies: ranked by 
2002 revenues,” Los Angeles Business Journal, October 27,2003, p. 23.
389 Outstanding Directors Institute, “‘Nine Who Made Their Mark:’ Outstanding Directors Institute Announces 2005 
Outstanding Directors Awards Nine Directors o f Public Companies Honored for their Courage, Integrity and 
Contributions in the Boardroom,” Press Release, October 18,2005.
390 “Roland Hernandez Joins Lehman Brothers Board,” Dow Jones News Service, Septebmber 14,2004.
391 Stanley Works, “The Stanley Works Adds John G. Breen and John D. Opie to Board o f  Directors,” Press 
Release, PR Newswire, July 12, 2000.
392 Michael Oneal, “Executive Pay: A Special Report; Expectations (and Pay) Climb for Directors,” New York 
Times, April 6,2003; Delphi, 2005 Proxy Statement, March 26,2004, p. 33.
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6,2,9 J, Paul Reason
J. Paul Reason joined the Wal-Mart hoard o f directors in 2001. He is president and chief 
operating office o f Metro Machine Corporation, an employee-owned ship repair company. From 
December 1999 to June 2000, he served as vice president ship systems for Syntek Technologies, 
Inc., a technical and engineering professional services firm. Before going into private industry, 
Reason had a 34-year career in the U.S. Navy, where he became the first African-American four- 
star admiral and commander in chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.
He was operations officer in the destroyer escort USS J. D. Blackwood and then, after receiving 
nuclear engineering training, moved to the nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser USS Truxtun 
and participated in the ship’s first deployment to Southeast Asia in 1968. In 1970, he earned a 
Master’s degree in the management of computer systems, He joined the aircraft carrier USS 
Enterprise in 1971, then served as combat systems officer on the USS Truxtun, and then became 
an assignment officer at the Bureau o f Personnel, He served as a naval aide to President Jimmy 
Carter from 1976 to 1979 and then had duties as executive officer o f USS Mississippi, 
commanding officer of USS Coontz, and commanding officer o f USS Bainbridge.
From 1986 to 1988, he was commander, Naval Base Seattle, where he was responsible for all 
naval activities in Washington, Oregon, and Alaska, In mid-1988, he shifted to command of 
Cruiser-Destroyer Group One and led Battle Group Romeo through operations in the Pacific and 
Indian Ocean regions and the Persian Gulf, He then became commander, Naval Surface Force, 
U.S. Atlantic Fleet, following selection to three-star rank. In 1994, he became deputy chief of 
Naval Operations (Plans, Policy and Operations), and upon promotion to four-star rank, he 
assumed duties as commander in chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet in December 1996. He retired in 
September 1999.
Reason’s awards include the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Navy 
Commendation Medal, the Venezuelan LaMedalla Naval Almirante Luis Brion Medal, and the 
Republic of Vietnam Honor Medal,393
Reason led the Navy’s investigation into the unbecoming conduct by male Navy and Marine 
Corps personnel at the 1991 “Tailhook” convention in Las Vegas. Pentagon investigators 
concluded that dozens o f male officers assaulted or molested 83 women, some o f them Navy 
officers, at the convention, mostly on the third floor o f the convention hotel where the men lined 
the hallway and grabbed women as they tried to pass. Of the 140 men involved, the military 
dropped charges against 70 almost immediately for lack o f sufficient evidence, fined or 
disciplined about 50, and dropped most o f the rest. Only fpur cases went to trial, and the military 
judge, Captain William T. Vest Jr., dismissed them, because the circumstances o f the trial were 
unfair. He concluded that Admiral Frank B. Kelso, the chief o f Navy operations, witnessed the 
misconduct, did nothing to stop it, and then tried to shield himself from blame. Despite his 
involvement, he assigned the person to lead the investigation, vice admiral Reason, which 
compromised the investigation. Further, the judge felt the officers should not face charges for 
what Admiral Kelso did and got away with: failing to stop the assaults. Reason refused to appeal
393 http://raahistorv.com/inilitarv/naw/reason.htni. accessed January 27,2006.
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the judge’s decision and carry on the prosecution, meaning not a single officer stood trial for 
misconduct.394
Reason is a director of Amgen Inc. and Norfolk Southern Corporation. He graduated from the 
U.S. Naval Academy in 1965.
6.2.10 Jack C. Shewmaker
Jack C. Shewmaker joined the Wal-Mart board o f directors in 1977. He is president of J-Com, a 
consulting firm. Though he is a former Wal-Mart executive, he is an independent board member 
according to the New York Stock Exchange and Institutional Shareholder Services. They 
consider a former executive to be independent after a “cooling-off’ period, and Shewmaker 
retired in 1988. However, he remained on the board the entire time, and he is its longest-serving 
member. Therefore, his independence is at least questionable.395
Shewmaker joined Wal-Mart in 1970, after a series o f jobs, including sales supervisor of a lawn 
mower company in Lamar, Missouri; manager of a Montgomery Ward store in Sikeston, 
Missouri; training director o f the Coast to Coast hardware chain; and manager o f a Kroger 
supermarket in LaPorte, Indiana. He began supervising store openings, and writing a training 
manual for store managers. He became a vice president in 1973 and then executive vice president 
of operations, personnel, and merchandise in 1976, just when David Glass joined to head up 
finance and distribution. He was creative and good at spotting trends, and he had numerous 
merchandising successes, including the idea to sell kitchen appliances that fit under cabinet 
shelves. Many credit him with institutionalizing “everyday-low-pricing,” which eliminated 
promotions, cut advertising costs, cut labor costs, and “cherry-picking,” where customers only 
buy goods on promotion.396
Shewmaker became president and chief operating officer of Wal-Mart in 1978, a year after 
becoming a director, He, like David Glass, then CFO, had been an early champion of technology, 
including computers, checkout scanners, and the satellite network. Wall Street Journal reporter 
Bob Ortega credits Shewmaker with convincing Sam Walton to invest in the satellite system by 
telling the boss that he could give a speech to all his stores at once. Also like Glass, Shewmaker 
was a candidate to succeed Walton. Unlike Glass, however, Shewmaker socialized with Walton. 
They hunted and played tennis together. And, Shewmaker was a retailing genius and he had the
394 Jack Dorsey, New Commander Lined Up For Atlantic Fleet A Job Shuffle Is Under Way As The New Chief O f 
Naval Operations Prepares To Take The Helm,” The Virginian-Pilot and The Ledger-Star (Norfolk), April 13,1994; 
Tim Weiner, “The Navy Decides Not to Appeal Dismissals o f  Last Tailhook Cases,” New York Times, February 12, 
1994; Eric Schmitt, “Judge Dismisses Tailhook Cases, Saying Admiral Tainted Inquiry,” New York Times, February 
9,1994; Jack Dorsey, “Ruling Means Tailhook Scandal Could Be Over Charges Dropped Kelso Sunk Vest; Admiral 
Kelso Manipulated The ... Investigative Process... In A Manner Designed To Shield His Personal Involvement In 
Tailhook ’91,” The Virginian-Pilot and The Ledger-Star (Norfolk), February 9, 1994.
395 Institutional Shareholder Services, “Proxy Analysis,” http://www.issnroxv.com/pdfAyaI-Mart.pdf. accessed 
January 27,2006.
396 Bob Ortega, In Sam We Trust: The Untold Story o f Sam Walton and How Wal-Mart is Devouring America (New 
York: Times Business/Random House, 1998), p. 94-95,134; Sam Walton with John Huey, Sam Walton: Made In 
America (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), p. 158 (quote), 259-260.
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president’s position. He seemed a shoe-in. But he was also arrogant, imperious, and stubborn. He 
angered subordinates and too often fought with Walton. A few years later in his autobiography, 
Walton wrote, “Jack may have been the most controversial guy we ever had in senior 
management.” Glass, by contrast, had a “smoother manner.” In 1984, Walton switched Glass and 
Shewmaker, with Glass becoming president and Shewmaker becoming CFO. It was a demotion 
for Shewmaker, even though Walton appointed him vice chairman. Still, he did not resign. 
Instead, he hung on for another four years, retiring in 1988, when Walton retired and appointed 
Glass CEO.397
Since his retirement, Shewmaker has done consulting work,
6.2.11 Jose H. Villarreal
Jose H. Villarreal joined the Wal-Mart board o f directors in 1998. He is a partner in the San 
Antonio office o f the law firm o f Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. He is politically 
well connected.
Villarreal was co-chair of the Kerry-Edwards Campaign and served in 2000 as national treasurer 
of the Gore-Lieberman presidential campaign. In 1992, he served as deputy campaign manager 
of the Clinton-Gore presidential campaign. He served as associate director in the White House 
Office of Presidential Personnel following the 1992 campaign.
Earlier in his career, Villarreal was an assistant attorney general in the Public Finance Division 
of the Texas attorney general’s office, where he was responsible for reviewing and approving the 
full range o f public finance transactions submitted to the Texas attorney general for approval. He 
has represented a broad range o f governmental subdivisions in the issuance o f public debt. 
Currently, he represents corporate clients and trade associations on a variety o f public law and 
policy matters.
Villarreal is active in civic affairs, serving on the governing boards o f numerous organizations, 
both public and private. He recently completed service as chairman o f the board o f directors of 
the National Council o f La Raza and as vice chair o f the board of the U.S, Congressional 
Hispanic Caucus Institute. He is a director at the Close-Up Foundation, a civic education 
organization. From October 1993 to May 1999, Villarreal was a presidential appointee to the 
board o f directors o f Fannie Mae.
He is a director at PMI Group, one o f the largest private mortgage insurers in the United States, 
Australia, New Zealand, and the European Union, and the largest mortgage guaranty re-insurer 
in Hong Kong. Villarreal earned a B.A. from Purdue University (1975) and a J.D. from the 
Indiana University School o f Law (1979). He is a member o f the State Bar of Texas.
6.2.12 Christopher J, Williams
397 Ortega, In Sam We Trust, p. 132-139.
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Christopher J. Williams joined the Wal-Mart board o f directors in June 2004. He is chairman and 
CEO of The Williams Capital Group, L.P., an investment bank he founded.
Wal-Mart paid Williams Capital Group $103,325 during fiscal 2005, prior to when Williams 
joined the board. Wal-Mart has said it will not engage Williams Capital Group to perform any 
investment banking services during the tenure of his directorship. The timing o f the payments 
and the directorship undermine Williams’s independence.398
Williams’ career includes nine years with Lehman Brothers in New York, where he was senior 
vice president with responsibilities in areas including debt capital markets as well as the trading 
of derivatives and fixed income securities. He then formed Williams Financial Markets, a 
division o f Jefferies & Company, which specialized in structuring debt financings for investment 
grade corporate borrowers. During that time Williams published two academic textbooks that 
outline the uses of financial derivatives in the capital markets.399
In 2002, Fortune selected Williams as one of the 50 most powerful African-American in 
corporate America. That year, Black Enterprise ranked Williams Capital as the largest minority- 
owned investment bank in the U.S. In 2003, Crains New York Business listed Williams as one of 
the top 100 minority business leaders.400
Williams is director of The Partnership for New York City, an organization of corporate CEOs 
who are actively involved in New York City civic initiatives. He is a director of the National 
Association o f Securities Professionals and the New York District of Securities Industry 
Association, and he is a member o f The Economic Club of New York. He is a director of the 
National Dance Institute, WNYC Radio, and Alvin Ailey Dance Foundation.401
Williams holds an M.B.A. in finance from the Amos Tuck School at Dartmouth College, and a 
Bachelor o f Architecture from Howard University.
Williams is a director at Harrah’s Entertainment.
6.2.13 Linda S. Wolf
Linda S. Wolf joined the Wal-Mart board o f directors in June 2005. She is the retired chairman 
and CEO of Leo Burnett Worldwide, Inc., an advertising agency and division o f Publicis Groupe 
S.A. She served in various positions with Leo Burnett and its predecessors since 1978.
She is a member o f the exclusive Commercial Club o f Chicago, a non-profit organization of “the 
leading men and women o f Chicago’s business, professional, cultural and educational
398 Wal-Mart, 2005 Proxy, April 15,2005, p. 26.
399 http://investor.harrahs.com/corpgov/corpgov-bio.cfm7icN5643. accessed January 27, 2006.
400 http,7/investor. harrahs. com/corpgov/corpgov-bio. cfm?id=5643. accessed January 27, 2006.
401 http://investor.harrahs.com/corpgov/corpgov-bio.cfin?id=5643. accessed January 27,2006.
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communities.”402 W olf is a trustee o f the Field Museum in Chicago and board member of the 
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.403
6.3 Stockholders
Wal-Mart had 4,163,490,196 shares o f common stock outstanding as o f November 2 2 ,2005.404 
The Walton family owns about 40% of them, mostly through their family company, Walton 
Enterprises, L.L.C, Helen Robson Walton, Sam Walton’s widow, and their children control 
Walton Enterprises, with equal shares. S. Robson (Rob) is the eldest son, followed by John, who 
died in June 2005, Jim, and Alice. Presumably, John’s widow Christy now controls his stake in 
Walton Enterprises.
At January 27,2006, Wal-Mart shares traded for approximately $45.85, meaning the Waltons’ 
Wal-Mart holdings were worth about $77 billion. The family has other holdings, including a 
bank with $7.5 billion in assets, a set o f 19 community newspapers, a printing business, real 
estate holdings, and other businesses. For comparison, Forbes estimated that Bill Gates, whom 
the magazine dubs the world’s richest man, had a total net worth of $46.5 billion.405 The table 
below lists the shareholdings o f the Walton family.
Walton Family Shareholdings406
Total Shares Walton Enterprises Sole Control Shared Control
Alice L. Walton 1,689,562,614 1,680,506,739 6,976,420 1,682,586,194 39.90%
Helen R. Walton 1,681,270,819 1,680,506,739 764,080 1,680,506,739 39.70%
Jim C. Walton 1,693,060,118 1,680,506,739 10,476,462 1,682,583,656 39.98%
John T. Walton* 1,696,588,830 1,680,506,739 11,967,204 1,684,621,626 40.06%
S. Robson Walton 1,685,821,163 . 1,680,506,739 2,876,600 1,682,944,563 39.81%
*Deceased
The family exercises joint control over Walton Enterprises, generally making decisions by 
consensus. They do the same when it comes to Wal-Mart. After Sam Walton’s death, the Walton 
family “made a real strong commitment to keeping his name and his philosophy in the top of 
minds around the company,” said Rob Walton. The Waltons have remained active in Wal-Mart. 
Two of Sam’s children have been on the board and the others may attend board meetings. The
402 http://www.commerdalclubchicago.org/members/index.html. accessed January 27,2006.
403 http://www.fieldmuseum.org/museum info/trustees.htm. accessed January 27,2006; 
http://www.ccfr.org/about/leadership.html. accessed January 27,2006.
404 Wal-Mart, Form 10-Q, December 2 ,2005 , p. 1.
405 Forbes.com,
http.7/www.forbes.com/static/bill2005/LIRBH69.html?nassListId=;10&passYear:=2005&passListTvpe=::Ferson&uniq 
ueId~BH69&datatvpe=:Person. accessed January 27, 2006.
406 SEC Schedule 13G, February 7,2005; Wal-Mart, 2005 Proxy, p. 23. Control refers to voting control and 
dispositive power. Total Shares does not equal sole control + Walton Enterprises shares, because family members 
have trusts and partnerships in which they have shared voting and dispositive power over some shares. John T. 
Walton died in June 2005; presumably his heirs, most likely his wife and children, have voting and dispositive 
control o f  his shares. The table assumes 4,234,867,066 outstanding, the number outstanding at the time o f the report 
on which it is based. The number o f  shares outstanding has decreased since this report, due to Wal-Mart share 
buybacks, meaning that unless the Walton’s have sold shares, their percentage o f  ownership has increased.
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family, including Sam’s widow Helen and her grandchildren, meets three times a year to discuss 
Wal-Mart over the course of two or three days, They get reports from Wal-Mart executives and 
the grandchildren are included so they can learn how to be responsible shareholders.407 So far, no 
major disagreements within the family have erupted into public view.
In addition to the Waltons, Wal-Mart has approximately 331,000 shareholders of record.408 The 
largest shareholders are large investment institutions, particularly those that run large indexes 
and exchange traded funds that track the indexes. Barclays Global Investors owns just under 3% 
of Wal-Mart, followed by Fidelity Management (2.4%), State Street (1.9%), and Vanguard 
Group (1.4%).409
Activist shareholders have submitted numerous proposals to a vote at the last three annual 
meeting. Three types o f groups have been involved: (1) labor unions and their affiliated pension 
and benefit funds; (2) religious organizations; and (3) socially-responsible investment funds. Of 
these, labor-related groups made the largest number o f proposals, with 7 out of 14 (50%) in 2004 
and 2005.410
Shareholder resolutions fell into four general categories:
• Increasing shareholder control in relation to the Board o f Directors, through, for example, 
a director election majority vote standard and shareholder approval o f participation in the 
officer deferred compensation plan);
•  Monitoring and promoting racial and gender diversity, through, for example, equal 
employment opportunity and equity compensation reports;
• Tying executive and director pay to corporate performance, through, for example, 
indexed stock options and specific executive compensation frameworks; and
• Promoting greater corporate social responsibility, through, for example, restrictions on 
genetically engineered foods, a sustainability report, and adoption of International Labor 
Organization standards.
Voters defeated all shareholder resolutions, but some were more popular than others were. The 
list above ranks the four categories in order of support. Measures seeking to increase shareholder 
control received around 20% of the vote, diversity initiatives polled in the high teens, 
compensation resolutions in the low teens, and social responsibility measures in the single digits.
6.4 Lenders
Wal-Mart has a very high credit rating, so it borrows at very low rates. To get an idea o f how 
low, compare two five-year revolving line o f credit facilities in June 2000, one taken by Target 
and one by Wal-Mart, Target paid 16 basis points over LIBOR (London Inter Bank Overnight
407 Robert Slater, The Wal-Mart Decade: How a New Generation o f leaders Turned Sam Walton 's Legacy into the 
World’s #1 Company (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2003), p. 77-80.
408 Wal-Mart, 2005 Animal Report, p. 22.
409 Bloomberg Data.
4,0 Note, Wal-Mart’s 2003 proxy does not state who made that year’s shareholder proposals.
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Rate). Wal-Mart paid 10 basis points.411 Wal-Mart did take out a larger line o f credit, but that is 
not all that explains the difference. Wal-Mart carries an AA/Stable/A-1+ credit rating from 
Standard & Poor’s. Target is A+/Stable/A-1,
Virtually every major bank lends money to Wal-Mart. In May 2005, Citibank was the 
administrative agent and Goldman Sachs the syndications agent on a six-month, $1.25 billion 
revolving line o f credit. In June 2004, Wal-Mart lined up an $8.1 million deal that included a 
$2.75 billion 364-day facility, a $2.75 billion five-year revolving credit facility, and a $2.6 
billion standby letter o f credit. JP Morgan was the administrative agent. BankAmerica, Citibank, 
and Wachovia were syndications agents. Managing agents included Credit Suisse First Boston, 
Deutsche Bank Alex Brown, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Barclays Bank, Morgan Stanley 
Senior Funding, Royal Bank o f Scotland, BNP Paribas, Banco Santander Brazil, Sumitomo 
Mitsui, Union Bank, and Wells Fargo. Bank o f America was the administrative agent, Lehman 
Brothers the documentation agent, and Bank One the syndications agent on a 1999 $10 billion 
revolving line of credit to back the acquisition o f ASDA.412
6.5 Business and Competitive Strategies
A company the size of Wal-Mart has many strategies and tactics for building its business and 
improving it productivity and profitability. This report has touched on many of them. Here we 
focus on the company’s growth strategy in two areas o f the business: U.S. expansion and 
International growth.
6.5.1 United States Expansion
Wal-Mart wants to add 335 to 370 stores in the United States in 2006 and it plans to accelerate 
the pace o f store openings in the period from 2007 to 2010. The company has two basic 
strategies to accomplish this. The first is to “fill-in” areas where it already has a number of 
stores. The second is to move into new territories, particularly in the Northeast and West.
The fill-in strategy originally focused on Neighborhood Markets and urban markets. The idea 
was to have multiple Neighborhood Markets surround a single Supercenter in urban areas. This 
would allow further penetration into urban markets where land is scarce or big-box opposition 
high. Then Wal-Mart had a minor epiphany. As CEO Lee Scott remarked, “We’ve found that a 
smaller population than what we originally had thought can support a Supercenter. So you can 
put two Supercenters -  Rogers (Arkansas) and Fayetteville -  roughly four miles apart. Same 
thing is true in Dallas, Houston, Atlanta.”413 This dramatically increases the opportunity to 
expand within familiar territory.
411 DealScan data.
4,2 Loan Pricing Corporation, “Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,” Loan Connector Detail Report, May 20,2005, June 18,2004, 
and June 25, 1999.
413 Jerry Useem, Julie Schlosser, and Helen Kim, “One Nation Under Wal-Mart,” Fortune, Vol. 147, Iss, 4, March 3, 
2003, p. 64.
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There is a risk, however, that the new stores will cannibalize existing store sales. Wal-Mart 
claims that over time, sometimes as soon as a year, sales return at the old store. Meantime, 
overall sales growth more than make up for the loss. At a meeting in 2005, CFO Thomas 
Schoewe gave an example from northwest Arkansas. The company started with two 
Supercenters and two Neighborhood Markets. Then, it opened an additional Supercenter in 
Pineville, located slightly north of the existing northwest Arkansas store base. While same-store 
sales decreased $4.1 million, or 5.4%, at the bases, total sales actually increased $14.3 million, or 
18.6%. Schoewe added that Wal-Mart recognizes the fact that new stores cannibalize existing 
stores and only considers the incremental cash generated in its investment decisions. Then 
Schoewe acknowledged perhaps the best reason to fill-in existing markets: it increases market 
share and squeezes out the competition.414
The cannibalization problem underscores Wal-Mart’s drive to move into more urban centers, 
particularly outside the South and Southeast. Besides, one analyst calculated that Wal-Mart has 
four times as many Supercenters in relation to population in “red” states as in “blue” states, 
meaning the “blue state” opportunity is at least four times as large.415 Here, the strategy is 
rapidly evolving as the company has come to the realization that its big box stores provoke 
community opposition not just from bleeding heart liberals, but also from merchants, workers, 
residents, and public officials affected by its arrival. There are many more of these people per 
square mile in urban centers than in suburban areas, and they have more to protect.416
In response to the mounting community opposition, Wal-Mart has revamped itself from top to 
bottom, H, Lee Scott’s personal public relations campaign, the establishment o f a public relations 
war room, the introduction of upmarket goods and ethnic merchandise, and the Acres for 
America program (see Section 7.2 Environmental) are all part of this drive to remake Wal-Mart 
more palatable to urban communities. More specifically, Wal-Mart has reorganized its store 
operations and its real estate organization to handle community relations better. At its analyst 
day in October 2005, Eric Zorn, president o f Wal-Mart Realty, indicated that the Wal-Mart 
community affairs division currently has “half a dozen or so” people who “troubleshoot around 
the country for us. They help us with some of the referendum processes. They help us with some 
of our political issues in communities, but they are troubleshooters, and we recognize that we 
had to change,” So Zorn’s organization will hire a full-time community affairs employee for 
every single real-estate manager in the country. Why?
We want them to be the voice of Wal-Mart in our communities. They’re going to live 
there. They are going to work through the entitlement process with us. They are going to 
build the relationships in those communities and they will be our voice in the future at all
414 Michael Hiltzik, “Wal-Mart Up Against a Stagnant Stock Price,” Los Angeles Times, November 21,2005; 
Christine Augustine, Dana Telsey, and Monika Sieber, “The Wal-Mart Show: How Far Can It Go?” Bear Stearns 
Equity Research, November 18,2003; Gregory Melich, Bruce Missett, Gregory Fowlkes, Kristina Westura, and 
Ronald Mackey, “Wal-Mart: Yes, They Can, If Allowed,” Morgan Stanley Equity Research North America, 
February 11,2004.
415 Red states voted Republican in the 2004 election and blue states voted Democratic. Michael Hiltzik, “Wal-Mart 
Up Against a Stagnant Stock Price,” Los Angeles Times, November 21, 2005.
416 Michael Hiltzik, “Wal-Mart Up Against a Stagnant Stock Price,” Los Angeles Times, November 21,2005.
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of these public hearings -  not some consultant that isn’t necessarily related to Wal-Mart.
They will do that for us, and we think help speed the entitlement process up.417
Wal-Mart is doing the same thing in the store operations segment o f  the company. Every market 
(district) manager will have a community affairs person.418 Wal-Mart Realty is also developing 
more flexible store prototypes; it actually calls one Supercenter design “99 Flex.” Wal-Mart will 
build a Supercenter in Chicago without a parking lot.419
Wal-Mart’s use o f  the term “entitlement process” is ironic, though not intentionally so. The 
company refers to the legal and regulatory procedures involved in buying land and building new 
stores and distribution centers, hurdles like zoning boards, county commissions, city councils, 
and environmental review procedures. Yet, much o f Wal-Mart’s work in the “entitlement 
process” is its attempts to bilk local and state governments out o f millions o f dollars in subsidies. 
A study by Good Jobs First (GJF) found 91 Wal-Mart stores that had received a total of $245 
million worth o f public assistance. The average per store was $2,8 million, but deals ranged from 
less than $1 million to about $12 million. In addition, 84 of the 91 distribution centers GJF 
studied received public assistance, to the tune of $624 million, for an average o f $7.4 million per 
distribution center, with individual deals ranging as high as $46 million. Wal-Mart hired Carter 
& Burgess Inc., based in Fort Worth, Texas, to find locations and negotiate many o f the 
distribution center project subsidies with local officials. 420
Wal-Mart pursues subsidies of several kinds: free or reduced-price land, infrastructure 
assistance, tax increment financing, property tax breaks, state corporate income tax credits, sales 
tax rebates, enterprise zone status, job training and worker recruitment funds, tax-exempt bond 
financing, and general grants. There is no excuse for subsidizing a company with $10 billion in 
annual profits, but local officials and the company cite the jobs and tax revenue Wal-Mart 
supposedly creates, Most studies that have assessed the job creation and wage impact o f Wal- 
Mart suggest that it does not increase the overall number o f jobs over time, lowers local wages in 
urban areas, increases wages in rural areas, and increases public health care outlays.421
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418 See the presentation o f  Pat Curran, “2005 Wal-Mart Twelfth Annual Analysts’ Meeting Day 1 -  Final,” October 
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421 Philip Mattera and Anna Purinton, “Shopping for Subsidies: How Wal-Mart Uses Taxpayer Money to Finance Its 
Never-Ending Growth,” Good Jobs First, May 2004; Arindrajit Dube and Steve Wertheim, “Wal-Mart and Job 
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6.5,2 International Expansion
Wal-Mart is expanding rapidly overseas, with mixed results so far. The largest operations, those 
in Canada and Mexico, have done well. ASDA in the United Kingdom, another large operation, 
has been a modest success. Wal-Mart had to pull out o f Hong Kong and Indonesia in the 1990s 
after sustaining heavy losses.422 Its investment in Japanese retailer Seiyu remains unprofitable 
after nearly five years of work.423 It has experienced supply chain difficulties in China. Stores in 
Argentina and South Korea have failed to take hold with consumers.424 France stymied its 
expansion into that country, and its experience in Germany can only be categorized as 
disastrous.425 Brazil has been more successful.
This pattern o f success in North America but difficulty elsewhere is partly explained by the time 
duration of each investment. Wal-Mart went to Mexico and Canada first, then South America, 
Asia, Europe, and Central America. Thus, it has had more time in North American than 
elsewhere. Competition also explains the difficulty overseas. Even with the December 2005 
purchase o f an interest in CARHCO (Central America), Wal-Mart now has operations in 15 
countries, compared to 30 countries for French rival Carrefour and 28 countries for German 
competitor Metro AG . These retailers have more experience abroad. Then there are “cultural” 
differences that cause problems. Wal-Mart had no understanding of German and Japanese 
consumers or the organization of retail operations in those countries.426
Wal-Mart’s strategy for international expansion has been to acquire a retail chain, learn the 
specifics of the local market, and integrate the chain into the Wal-Mart logistics and distribution 
network. Brazil is a good example. After the company bought multi-format retailer, Bomprefo, 
in 2004 it noticed that the chain was strong in the Northeast but did not have a price advantage 
versus the competition. This did not fit with Wal-Mart’s identity of everyday low prices, so the 
company experimented with store product assortment, streamlined its distribution network to 
make sure store shelves always remained stocked, and tapped into the company’s global 
procurement operation. Most importantly, it immediately brought in its private-label products,
422 David B. Yoffie, "Wal-Mart, 2005," (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Business School, 2005).
423 Martin Fackler and Jennifer Bayot, "Wal-Mart Realigns to Expand Overseas," New York Times, October 1 2005, 
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30 2005, Ian Rowley, "Japan Isn't Buying the Wal-Mart Idea,” BusinessWeek Online, February 28 2005.
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including George, Great Value, and Mas por Menos. Now, it has a price advantage.427 Wal-Mart 
hopes to repeat this pattern in other countries.
In Central America, Wal-Mart bought one third o f CARHCO, Its partners are two family-run 
businesses that supposedly have the same discount service orientation o f Sam Walton. Though 
Wal-Mart will not consolidate the company’s revenue and earnings, it will contribute its global 
procurement and logistics operations to help the company improve its productivity.428
In Mexico, the growth model mirrors that o f the United States: open more stores. The company 
has identified 371 cities that could support a store and 280 o f them do not have Wal-Mart, yet. 
The difference is that Wal-Mart de Mexico is finding multiple formats, not just Supercenters, to 
be successful. For example, a small store, called Bodega, has worked well in small towns. When 
it starts to overflow, Walmex converts it to a Supercenter,429 Walmex has been something o f a 
model for Wal-Mart as a whole, one reason why John Menzer heads Wal-Mart Stores U.S.A. and 
Eduardo Castro-Wright is his COO, It is also a possible model in that 30% o f its stock floats. 
That means Walmex can give stock options to employees. It also helps with government 
relations, since the company has stronger local roots,430
In China, Wal-Mart has about half the sales of Carrefour. To expand into the Northeast, the 
company has a joint venture with China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) 
of Shanghai, In 2005, the company planned to open 10 to 15 stores, mostly in Beijing and 
Shanghai in the North and Guangzhou in the South. This would bring the total to about' 55 stores. 
Another acquisition in China could help the company move into the interior,431
To get Seiyu back on track in Japan, Wal-Mart is exercising its options to buy all o f it by 2007, It 
is also retooling management,432
In Europe, Wal-Mart seems to have written off Germany and France.433 It awaits retail 
“liberalization” that would open up those markets. Rumors are the company will buy into Italy
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with the purchase o f Esselunga. The company has announced plans to expand into Eastern 
Europe,4 4 ASDA is now the second-largest retail in Britain. It is experimenting with a 
merchandise-only store, since stores without food seem to have an easier time getting zoning 
approval.
7, Outside Stakeholders
7.1 Safety and Health
Wal-Mart’s safety and health care record has brought it both trouble with federal oversight 
agencies and intense public scrutiny. Perhaps more than any aspect of the company’s 
problematic record, its health care policies have sparked the most public concern. Activist 
groups, the AFL-CIO, and state governments have pushed an aggressive and successful 
campaign to force Wal-Mart to increase its health care benefits. In a recent and stunning defeat 
for the company, the Maryland legislature passed, over the governor’s veto, a law (the Fair Share 
Health Care Act) that requires employers in the state with more than 10,000 employees to spend 
at least 8% o f their payrolls on health insurance, or else pay the difference into a state Medicaid 
fund. Wal-Mart is the only company in Maryland with 10,000 employees.43 35
The defeat comes when Wal-Mart -Mart is looking to cut health care costs, despite its public 
rhetoric to the contrary.436 An internal memo leaked to Wal-Mart Watch and then to the media in 
December 2005 revealed that the company is moving to cut health benefits by hiring healthier 
people, reducing 401k plans, and discouraging long-term employment at the company. Written 
by M. Susan Chambers, executive vice president of risk management and benefits 
administration, the memo recommends that the company hire more part-timers and discourage 
unhealthy people from entering the Wal-Mart workforce. “The cost of an associate with seven 
years o f  tenure is almost 55% more than the cost of an associate with one year of tenure,” the 
memo explains, “yet there is no difference in his or her productivity.” Chambers recommends 
that all Wal-Mart jobs require “some physical activity” in order to discourage the infirm from 
applying. The memo admits that 46% of the dependent children o f Wal-Mart employees either 
have no insurance, or are on publicly subsidized programs such as Medicaid (jointly funded by 
state and federal revenue). Finally, Chambers suggests increases in the premiums workers pay 
for spouse healthcare coverage and cuts in the company’s life insurance plan.437
The memo was a huge embarrassment to the firm and the Maryland law only rubbed salt in Wal- 
Mart’s wounds. Labor and health care activists hope to use the momentum from the Maryland 
victory to take similar measures to at least thirty other states; Washington and New Hampshire
434 Upbin, "Wall-to-Wall Wal-Mart." Jonathan Birchall, Tobias Buck, and Elizabeth Rigby, "Wal-Mart Sets Sights 
on Europe," Financial Times, June 27 2005.
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are the likely next battlegrounds. Already, activists have introduced similar measures in 
Colorado, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin.438
Wal-Mart has a checkered workplace safety record, too. The company has illegally locked 
workers inside stores, blocked emergency exits, created unsafe working environments in the 
stores and their parking lots, and taken a combative approach to workers’ compensation claims. 
West Virginia’s Employment Programs Performance Council went so far as to vote to put Wal- 
Mart into the “adverse risk” pool, raising the premiums by 15%. Only employers with unusually 
high accident rates enter the pool.439
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld a $5,000 fine 
against a Wal-Mart store in Hoover, Alabama, for blocking emergency exits. The court upheld 
the decision o f an Occupational Health and Safety administrative law judge who found that a 
portable conveyer system for unloading freight, together with stacked boxes, had improperly 
obstructed the exits,440
In January 2004, the New York Times exposed Wal-Mart’s fifteen-year practice of locking 
cleaning and stocking workers inside Sam’s Clubs stores overnight. Wal-Mart claimed that the 
practice protected workers in high crime areas, but former managers said it flowed from the 
company’s obsessive concern with stopping “shrinkage,” or theft.441 A few days earlier, the 
newspaper reported that an internal Wal-Mart audit o f one week’s time-clock records for roughly 
25,000 employees found 1,371 instances in which minors apparently worked too late at night, 
worked during school hours, or worked too many hours in a day. It also found 60,767 apparent 
instances o f workers not taking breaks, and 15,705 apparent instances of employees working 
through meal times. If the same rate o f violations were found throughout Wal-Mart, it would 
translate into tens of thousands of child-labor violations each week and more than one million 
violations of company and state meal and break regulations.442
In some case, state officials have caught Wal-Mart violating labor laws, including working 
children excessive hours and having them operate dangerous machinery. In March 2003, Maine 
fined Wal-Mart $205,650 for 1,436 violations o f child labor laws during the period 1995 to 1998. 
Arkansas, Connecticut, and New Hampshire fined Wal-Mart a total of $135,540 for child labor 
violations. In 2005, the Connecticut Department o f Labor fined Wal-Mart $3,300, or $300 per 
incident, for 11 violations o f child labor laws in Hartford, Norwalk, and Putnam. The violations 
included illegally assigning youngsters to work on hazardous equipment such as compacters and 
vehicles, and working them past 10 p.m.443
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A jury in Alameda County, California, found that Wal-Mart routinely denied lunch breaks to its 
employees and ordered the company to pay to $57 million in damages, as well as punitive 
damages, to 116,000 current and former California employees who worked at Wal-Mart from 
2001 to 2005. Wal-Mart appealed the case.444
Wal-Mart takes an extremely combative approach to workers’ compensation claims. Over 
several years in the late 1990s, the state of Washington’s Department o f Labor and Industries 
audited Wal-Mart, fined it, issued directives, put it on probation, and finally, in 2001, seized 
control of Wal-Mart’s entire injured worker programs. “Time and again [Wal-Mart has shown 
itself] unwilling or unable to manage its workers’ comp program as required by law,” said Gary 
Moore, who headed the department. “This is not an action we take lightly. We worked with Wal- 
Mart for several years to improve their program. But they failed to make the necessary progress.” 
Wal-Mart challenged the decertification o f its program and later agreed to have a third-party 
insurer process its workers’ compensations claims.445
In 2001, ArkansasBusines.com described Wal-Mart as “the state’s most aggressive” challenger 
of workers’ compensation claims, saying it “stands far above any other self-insurer in challenges 
to employee claims.”446
7.2 Environmental
Wal-Mart stores and distributions centers currently occupy approximately 75,000 acres in the 
United States. Wal-Mart plans to double this in the next ten years.447 The environmental 
concerns of such an undertaking include the destruction of open space, wetlands, and other 
unique landscapes; the deterioration of air quality caused by increased traffic and sprawl; the 
blighting of the built environment; and the excess consumption o f scarce resources, such as 
groundwater and timber. Wal-Mart says it will protect the environment, but its environmental 
record is poor.
In May, 2004, the Department of Justice and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, along 
with the U.S. Attorney’s office for the District of Delaware and the states o f Tennessee and Utah 
reached a Clean Water Act settlement for storm water violations at Wal-Mart store construction 
sites across the country. Under this Clean Water Act settlement, Wal-Mart agreed to a pay $3.1 
million civil penalty, to contribute $250,000 toward a project protecting sensitive wetlands and 
waterways in one of the states, and to reduce storm water runoff at its sites by instituting better 
control measures. The new controls include compliance with storm water permitting 
requirements and rigorous oversight of Wal-Mart’s 150 contractors. The company must use 
qualified personnel to oversee construction, conduct training and frequent inspections, report to 
EPA, and take quick corrective action. Storm water runoff is one of the most significant sources
444 Jason Dearen, “Employee lunch costs Wal-Mart $172 million,” Oakland Tribune, December 23,2005.
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of water pollution in the nation, comparable to contamination from industrial and sewage 
sources.448
The 2004 settlement represented at least the second time Wal-Mart faced enforcement actions for 
violations o f the Clean Water Act, In 2001, Wal-Mart and several contractors entered into a 
settlement with the U,S, to address storm water violations at seventeen sites in several states. The 
settlement included a penalty o f $1 million and required Wal-Mart to develop a storm-water 
training program for its contractors and to inspect and oversee storm water controls at 
construction sites. The EPA subsequently determined through inspections that Wal-Mart had not 
achieved consistent compliance at construction sites.449
In 2004, Florida fined Wal-Mart $765,000 for violating Florida’s petroleum storage tank laws at 
its automobile service centers. Wal-Mart failed to register its fuel tanks, failed to install devices 
that prevent overflow, did not perform monthly monitoring, lacked current technologies, and 
blocked state inspectors,450
The Pennsylvania Environmental Protection Department fined Wal-Mart $100,000 in 1999 for 
polluting rivers,451 Georgia fined Wal-Mart about $150,000 for water contamination,452
In 2005, as part o f a settlement for clean air violations, Wal-Mart agreed to undertake a national 
effort to reduce diesel truck idling at its 4,000 facilities across the U.S. The anti-idling project 
results from a Clean Air Act enforcement action in Massachusetts and Connecticut brought by 
EPA’s New England regional office. The EPA settlement will result in Wal-Mart taking action 
across the country to address truck idling, by training Wal-Mart drivers, posting signs at all Wal- 
Mart facilities, and notifying other delivery companies o f Wal-Mart’s policy to prohibit idling. 
Under the consent agreement, Wal-Mart will also pay a $50,000 penalty. This is the first multi­
state enforcement that addresses idling violations.453
The U.S. Attorney alleges that Wal-Mart has been illegally shipping hazardous material from 
California to a facility in Las Vegas -  items such as open containers o f paint, nail polish 
remover, oil, and aerosols that have been returned. State and federal regulations require 
hazardous materials be transported in trucks that are certified to transport hazardous waste. But 
the U.S, Attorney, along with the district attorneys in San Diego and San Joaquin counties, are
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453 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Wal-Mart Settles Clean Air Violations with Campaign to Reduce Diesel 
Pollution,” Press Release, November 1,2005,
http://vosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/1367c4195702dl6a85257018004c771c/455f461efc96324c852570ce0Q4b 
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alleging Wal-Mart has been using its own trucks and illegally transporting the waste to help save 
money by avoiding additional fees in California. 454
Wal-Mart sells a number o f products made from illegally sourced timber, taken from Indonesia 
forest preserves. Wal-Mart carries three lines o f outdoor furniture made o f nyatoh. Logging for 
nyatoh and other high-value woods is driving Indonesia’s rainforests toward extinction. Logging 
is the largest cause o f destruction o f rainforests in Southeast Asia, with the wood going to 
everything from plywood to pencils. Under pressure from retail giants like Wal-Mart, many 
companies find themselves unable to compete without capitalizing on this low-cost source.455 456
Earthworks is a non-profit organization dedicated to protecting communities and the 
environment from the destructive impacts o f mineral development. It has a consumer campaign 
against gold jewelry, and Wal-Mart is the largest seller o f jewelry in the world. Gold mining in 
developing countries often involves human rights abuses, armed conflict, torture, imprisonment, 
and environmental devastation. In Ghana, for example, mining displaced 30,000 people between 
1990 and 1998. In the U.S., mines generate waste equivalent in weight to nearly nine times the 
trash produced by all U.S. cities and towns combined. The production o f a single 18-karat gold 
ring weighing less than an ounce generates 20 tons of mine waste. Metals mining employs less 
than one tenth o f one percent of the global workforce, but it consumes 7% to 10% of the world’s
456energy.
Wal-Mart is becoming an expert at “greenwashing,” the equivalent o f white washing when it 
comes to environmental abuse. The company makes small gestures o f environmental 
consciousness to deflect attention from its overall destructive impact. In 2005, the company 
announced “Acres for America,” in which the company promises to offset every acre it destroys 
building a store or distribution center by buying an acre for preservation. The National Fish and 
Wildlife Foundation, a group Congress created, will run the program, which should cost Wal- 
Mart about $35 million. NFWF counts ExxonMobil and Alcoa as “partners,” The aere- 
conserved-for-every-acre-developed leaves the impression that Wal-Mart’s donation fully 
mitigates its environmental impact, but an acre-for-acre exchange fails to address the actual 
ecological impact o f a Wal-Mart store, such as the amount o f the earth’s resources necessary to 
build and operate the store. At the very least, Acres for America should have a higher ratio of 
land preserved to land destroyed. The program also fails because it provides no guarantee that 
the preserved land will be o f similar interest or value as the land destroyed.457
Wal-Mart’s donations to conservative, anti-environmental politicians illustrate the hollowness of 
its environmental commitments. These legislators actively undermine the Endangered Species 
Act, the National Environmental Protection Act, the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and 
others.
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7,3 Legal/Regulatory
By its own admission, Wal-Mart faced 4,851 lawsuits in 2000, meaning plaintiffs sued the 
company once every two hours, every day o f the year. Juries decide a case in which Wal-Mart is 
a defendant about six times every business day, usually in favor o f the company. In 2001, Wal- 
Mart lawyers listed about 9,400 open cases. Wal-Mart probably faces more lawsuits than any 
entity other than the United States government.458
Most lawsuits against Wal-Mart are liability cases that involve injury in its stores and attacks, 
robberies, and assaults in its parking lots. An increasing number are class-action suits; Wal-Mart 
had only one in 1998, but ninety as o f October 2002. No matter what kind o f lawsuit, Wal-Mart 
fights. “In courts from Maine to California, you sue Wal-Mart and they fight you on everything,” 
says Bruce Kramer, a Memphis attorney who heads Association o f Trial Lawyers of America, a 
group of 75 lawyers who specialize in suing Wal-Mart. “It’s annoying, it’s frustrating, and I’ve 
concluded it’s intended to be that way,”459
“Like its marketing plan, Wal-Mart’s legal strategy is value-oriented,” wrote USA Today reporter 
Richard Willing. The company saves money by using outside lawyers who receive a flat fee of 
about $2,500 to $10,500 a case. They routinely file motions to have cases shifted to federal 
courts, where judges do not need to run for re-election. They file protective orders to keep key 
company papers private. If it must pay, Wal-Mart keeps the amount secret through 
confidentiality agreements,460
One author claims that Wal-Mart has a new, more flexible approach to its litigation, which 
translates to a greater willingness to negotiate settlements. Supposedly, the company is also 
moving to prevent the occurrence of events -  accidents and assaults -  that end up in litigation,461 
The company did apologize for its “discovery abuse,” the practice o f refusing to disclose 
documents during the discovery phase o f trials, but its legal department remains small for such a 
huge company with so many lawsuits and its supposed new willingness to compromise has not 
shown up in class action litigation, where it keeps fighting.462
The class-action suits fall into several categories. One category is gender discrimination. Here 
the major case is a whopper, Dukes v. Wal-Mart, in which a judge has certified a class of more 
than one million current and former female Wal-Mart employees who accuse the company of 
systematic discrimination in pay and promotion. Another lawsuit within this category is Mauldin 
v, Wal-Mart, which involves current and former female employees in Georgia who are suing to 
change Wal-Mart’s health care plan to cover prescription contraception. The EEOC is leading a 
class-action suit against Wal-Mart, EEOC (Janice Smith) v. Wal-Mart, demanding back pay for
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women denied transfers to the company’s distribution centers, as well as injunctive and 
prospective affirmative relief to keep the company from continuing discrimination.
Wal-Mart has appealed the class certification in Dukes v. Wal-Mart, so it will be years before the 
case is decided. Nonetheless, the case has revealed much about gender discrimination at the 
company. The lawsuit alleges Wal-Mart denied female employees advancement and training 
opportunities, paid them less than men for the same or comparable work, steered them to lower 
wage departments, subjected them to a sexually hostile work environment, and retaliated against 
them when they attempted to address sex discrimination.463 In 2001, while more than two thirds 
of Wal-Mart’s hourly workers were female, women held only one third o f managerial positions 
and constituted less than 15% of store managers, despite having, on average, longer seniority and 
higher merit ratings than their male counterparts.464 Women managers earned, on average, 
$14,500 less than their male counterparts did. Female hourly workers earned, on average, $1,100 
less than male counterparts did. For the same job classification, women earned 5% to 15% less 
than men, even after taking into account factors such as seniority and performance.465
Another category o f lawsuit involves wage and hour violations, usually involving Wal-Mart’s 
failure to pay for breaks or overtime, often by forcing employees to work off the clock. Wal- 
Mart listed 44 such cases at January 31, 2005. Plaintiffs have had mixed success in these cases, 
often because they cannot win class certification. A Pennsylvania judge did grant class-action 
status in January, 2006, to a lawsuit contending that Wal-Mart pressed employees to work 
through breaks and after hours off the clock. Initially filed in 2002, the suit could include as 
many as 150,000 current or former employees in Pennsylvania who have worked at a Wal-Mart 
store or at the company’s Sam’s Club warehouse chain between March 1998 and 2002.466 A 
court in Gallup, New Mexico, ordered Wal-Mart to pay $500,000 to 120 workers in the city, and 
400 workers in 27 stores in Oregon for violating wage and hour laws in 2002.467
A third category o f lawsuit involves so-called dead peasant insurance, in which the company, 
without the knowledge or consent o f employees, took out life insurance naming itself as the 
beneficiary in the event o f their deaths. These go under the name COLI cases, for Corporate- 
Owned Life Insurance.468
Another type of lawsuit has the name ‘‘exempt status case.” These suits involve assistant store 
managers challenging their exemption from the Fair Labor Standards A ct469
463 “Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores,” Equal Rights Advocates_ http://www.equalrights.org/professional/walmart.asp
464 Neil Buckley and Caroline Daniel, “Wal-Mart vs. the Workers: Labour Grievances Are Stacking Up Against the 
World’s Biggest Company,” Financial Times, November 20,2003.
465 Richard Drogin, “Statistical Analysis o f  Gender Patterns in Wal-Mart’s Workforce,” 2003.
466 “Judge OKs class-action status for Wal-Mart suit,” MSNBC.com, http://msnbc.msn.eom/id/l 0809396/, January 
11,2006.
467 Representative George Miller (D CA), “Everyday Low Wages: The Hidden Price We Pay For Wal-Mart,” A 
Report By The Democratic Staff O f The Committee On Education And The Workforce U.S. House O f 
Representatives, January 16, 2004.
468 Wal-Mart, 2005 Annual Report, p. 46.
469 Wal-Mart, 2005 Annual Report, p. 45.
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Wal-Mart has faced a number of race discrimination cases, and lost. In 1998, Wal-Mart fired an 
employee for interracial dating. The U.S. Court o f Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a Texas 
jury that awarded $19,000 in compensatory damages to the employee, though the court reduced 
the jury’s punitive damages award to $75,000 from $100,000. Two employees in Alabama won a 
case in which one claimed management denied her a promotion and allowed co-workers to 
harass her for her race and the other claimed management demoted her in favor of white 
employees. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the jury’s awards of 
compensatory damages of $75,000 and $50,000, respectively, for the two employees. An 
employee sued Wal-Mart for racially motivated harassment in which the manager singled him 
out for over a year for frequent, intrusive searches of his personal cany-bag and his person. The 
jury returned a verdict for $12,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive 
damages,470
Wal-Mart has faced several disability discrimination lawsuits. In 2001, Wal-Mart and the EEOC 
reached a $6,8 million consent decree which resolved thirteen lawsuits the commission had 
pending against the corporation in eleven states, including Missouri. A short time later, a U.S. 
District court in Arizona fined Wal-Mart $720,200 and ordered it to produce a TV advertisement 
stating that Wal-Mart had violated the ADA. The court also ordered Wal-Mart to reinstate 
William Darnell, a hearing impaired employee, to a full-time receiver/unloader position and 
directed the corporation to accommodate Darnell’s disability in all activities of his job. In 
another case, a jury found that Wal-Mart intentionally refused to hire an applicant as a cashier 
because he used a wheelchair, and awarded him more than $3.5 million in damages, 
subsequently reduced to comply with the ADA’s statutory caps, which do not apply to other 
protected minorities. A jury awarded $157,500 to an applicant due to Wal-Mart’s unlawful pre­
employment inquiry and refusal to hire him because of his disability, an amputated arm. The 
verdict included a $100,000 punitive damage award, the largest ever levied against a company 
for asking an unlawful medical question under the ADA.471
In accordance with accounting regulations, Wal-Mart has made accruals with respect to the 
litigation it faces. Wal-Mart’s total accrued liabilities were $12.2 billion at January 31, 2005, and 
we suspect that a significant portion o f those liabilities are for the potential cost o f litigation.472
The regulatory process for building a Wal-Mart store or distribution center varies from 
municipality to municipality, involving the alphabet soup o f state and local agencies. The 
procedures involved are numerous, depending on the location and the project. For example, in 
the Denver, Colorado, area, Wal-Mart proposed one project that required the use o f eminent 
domain to remove a group o f small businesses from its desired site and another project that 
called for the condemnation o f a lake so the company could drain it. Public officials stopped the 
first and courts stopped the second.473 In Monroe, Louisiana, citizens voted against a plan that
470 Lewis L, Laska, “99 Verdicts Against Wal-Mart,” Wal-MartLitigation.com http://www.wal- 
martliti nation.com/99verdic ,htm. accessed January 31,2006.
471 Marta Russell, “A Brief History o f Wal-Mart and Disability Discrimination” ZNet, February 15, 2004, accessed 
January 28,2006.
472 Wal-Mart, 2005 Annual Report, p. 34,45.
473 Philip Mattera and Anna Purinton, “Shopping for Subsidies: How Wal-Mart Uses Taxpayer Money to Finance Its 
Never-Ending Growth,” Good Jobs First, May 2004.
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would require the city to annex land, and in Gresham, Oregon, the city planner and a hearings 
officer denied Wal-Mart’s Supercenter plan based on safety and traffic concerns.474
7.4 Community
Wal-Mart has had an enormous impact on thousands of communities where it has built stores or 
distribution centers. Its presence changes shopping patterns, tends to force small business out, 
drives down local wages, effects the local ecology by increasing traffic, contributes to sprawl, 
and brings with it a destructive ecological footprint, a metric that measures the impact on the 
environment by individuals and businesses. Wal-Mart’s aggressive growth through store 
expansion across the country also comes with a high price in the form o f state and local 
subsidies, which forces taxpayers to bear some o f the burden for Wal-Mart’s success. Wal- 
Mart’s impact has not gone without resistance from a wide range of disparate groups across the 
political spectrum. From trade unionists to environmentalists, from small business owners to 
religious leaders, from conservative Republicans to liberal Democrats, Wal-Mart has gone a long 
way toward helping create one o f the most diverse and interesting movement coalitions that has 
emerged to fight a giant corporation in several decades.
Wal-Mart’s impact on the average wages in a community is not always negative. The 
construction o f a distribution center, often placed in rural communities with high unemployment, 
can increase wages. However, the entry o f Wal-Mart stores into urban communities does often 
bring down wages. And this has multiplier effects. For instance, in 1999, Southern California 
municipalities estimated that for every dollar decrease in wages in the southern California 
economy, $2.08 in spending was lost -  the $1 decrease plus another $1.08 in indirect multiplier 
effects.475
Kenneth Stone, a scholar of Wal-Mart and urban development, found that sales in general 
merchandise stores declined immediately after Wal-Mart stores opened. After ten years, sales 
declined by a cumulative 34%. In town after town throughout Iowa, Wal-Mart drove out 555 
grocery stores, 298 hardware stores, 293 building supply stores, 161 variety stores, 158 women’s 
apparel stores, 153 shoe stores, 116 drug stores, and 111 men’s and boys’ apparel stores over a 
ten year period.476 Market research firm Retail Forward found that for every Supercenter that 
opens two neighborhood supermarkets close. Since many neighborhood supermarkets anchor
474 A1 Norman, "Wal-Mart Loses Referendum Due to Anti-Wal-Mart Hysteria,” Sprawl-Busters.com, April 6,2005; 
The voters o f  Monroe, Wisconsin A1 Norman, "Honey I Shrunk the Store,” Sprawl-Busters.com, December 2, 
2005.
475 Arindrajit Dube, Barry Eidlin, and Bill Lester, "Impact o f Wal-Mart Growth on Eamings throughout the Retail 
Sector in Urban and Rural Counties,” Institution o f Industrial Relations Working Paper Series, Paper iirwps. 126.5, 
October 2005; David Neumark, Junfu Zhang, and Stephen Ciccarella, "The Effects o f Wal-Mart on Local Labor 
Markets,” National Bureau o f Economic Research Working Paper No. 11782, November 2005; Marlon Boamet and 
Randall Crane, "The Impact o f  Big Box Grocers in Southern California: Jobs, Wages, and Municipal Finances,” 
Orange County Business Council, September 1999, http.7/bcn.boulder.co.us/communitv/lrrd/lrrdbig box studv.pdf 
accessed January 28,2006.
476 Stone, Kenneth, “Impact o f the Wal-Mart Phenomenon on Rural Communities,” Iowa State University, Farm 
Foundation 1997.
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local shopping strips, their exit hurts neighboring businesses that rely on foot traffic. The 
resulting vacancies create blight and drive down property values.477
Wal-Mart is the poster child for suburban sprawl, defined by the National Trust for Historic 
Preservation as “poorly planned, low-density, auto-oriented development that spreads out from 
the center o f communities. ”478 Wal-Mart is not the only contributor to this trend, just the biggest. 
Its Supercenters’ huge service areas draw customers from long distances, placing significant 
stress on regional road and freeway systems, contributing to air pollution. A study of 
Supercenters in the San Francisco Bay area concluded that there would be up to an additional 
238 million vehicle miles traveled per year at a cost to local communities of up $ 256 million in 
infrastructure repair and environmental degradation.479 480
Wal-Mart’s drive for expansion often conflicts with community sensibilities. In Mexico, the 
company built a 73,000-square-foot Supercenter in Teotihuacan, just a kilometer from the 
famous Aztec pyramids that form one o f the most significant archeological sites in the world. 
The store provoked opposition throughout the country. In Arizona, Wal-Mart built a store near 
the Casa Grande Ruins, again provoking opposition. The company wants to build a store at the 
base of Pike’s Peak, in Woodland Park, Colorado. As one resident put it, “If Wal-Mart is 
successful its existence will change our quaint town inextricably.”4 0
These assaults on community sentiment have sparked a backlash that has taken largely local 
form but has succeeded in many instances in stopping the Wal-Mart’s expansion.481 There has 
been no clear blueprint for defeating Wal-Mart. What may start out as an opposition to a Wal- 
Mart request for a zoning change may end up as an election campaign to recall local politicians 
who support the company. Local necessities require specific tactics. But one common key to 
success has been thorough research and knowledge o f the local approval process and local 
resources, including community groups, urban planning experts, and lawyers.
In Rosemead, California, residents unseated two pro-Wal-Mart city councilors in an election, 
after the councilors voted to approve a Wal-Mart Supercenter. The struggle created an enduring 
movement, and as o f this writing Rosemead’s grassroots organization, Save Our Community, is 
campaigning against two more pro-Wal-Mart city councilors. The group collected enough 
petitions to have a recall election, but the city council, at an emergency meeting, canceled the 
election based on a Santa Ana, California, court ruling that challenged a recall petition not
477 “How Big Box Stores Effect the Community,” Sierra Club, 
http://www.sierraclub.org/sprawl/reuorts/big box.asp.
478 A1 Norman, Slam Dunking Wal-Mart, Sprawl-Buster, 1999.
479 “Supercenters and the Transformation o f  the Bay Area Grocery Industry: Issues, Trends, and Impacts,” Bav Area 
Economic Forum. 2004.
480 “Mexican wrath over Wal-Mart store,” BBC News, October 15,2004,
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/business/3747580.stm. accessed January 28,2006; A1 Norman, “Wal-Mart and Pike’s 
Peak -  Defiling National Treasures,” Sprawl-busters.com, November 19,2004; Richard Ruelas, "Casa Grande 
Ruins Stand In Peril: Development Threatens Monument,” The Arizona Republic, November 22,2004.
481 Sprawl-busters.com has an almost-daily record o f efforts to stop Wal-Mart.
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translated into multiple languages. Save Our Community returned to the streets with its recall 
petition in four languages. 2
California has been a strategic focus for Wal-Mart, but it has been the site o f many battles. One 
of the most important to date was in Inglewood, in 2004, The Inglewood battle is unique in many 
ways, but it does demonstrate how a well-organized community can sustain a struggle against 
Wal-Mart through varying shifts in strategy and campaigns. In March 2002, the Los Angeles 
Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE) -  a nonprofit organization that seeks to improve 
conditions for low-wage workers and low-income communities -  discovered that Wal-Mart had 
purchased an option to develop land in Inglewood. LAANE had a development monitoring 
process that allowed them to move quickly when, the following month, Wal-Mart announced a 
plan to build forty Supercenters in California. The Inglewood property was the largest 
undeveloped piece of land in Los Angeles.
Immediately LAANE met with Inglewood community leaders, faith-based organizations, council 
members, union leaders, and others to plan a strategy. The Coalition for a Better Inglewood 
(CBI) decided for a citywide Supercenter ban, after considering various other options, including 
offering Wal-Mart a community benefits agreement that would set out Wal-Mart5s contribution 
to the community, such as infrastructure improvements and hiring guarantees, in exchange for 
approval.
The city council passed an ordinance banning Wal-Mart by a vote of 4-1, but Wal-Mart 
challenged the ban through a referendum, as they have done in the past. The company paid for 
signature gatherers and qualified the referendum for the ballot. When the city attorney ruled that 
the banning ordinance was possibly illegal, the city council withdrew it, and Wal-Mart, on 
August 11, 2003, filed a 72-page initiative with the city clerk. The initiative had language 
allowing the Wal-Mart project to be built without any city oversight or public review, and 
required a super majority (two thirds of the vote) to be repealed. It would allow what one council 
member termed “a city within a city.”
CBI launched a classic organizing campaign by bringing faith-based, union, elected officials, 
teachers, and other broad-based community organizations together in opposition to what was 
framed as a David and Goliath struggle against an arrogant and outsider corporation. LAANE 
provided technical assistance, including campaign organizing, research and media help, as well 
as education about how to wage an effective campaign with a clear and compelling message. A 
parallel legal strategy challenged the Wal-Mart initiative in the courts,
LAANE and CBI walked door-to-door with fact sheets about Wal-Mart’s health care and labor 
practices, wages and benefits, and the race and sex discrimination suits filed against it. The 
groups shaped each fact sheet for different segments o f the community. The Los Angeles County 
Federation o f Labor added precinct walking and a direct mail effort. Two weeks prior to election 
day, LAANE kicked off its media plan, which would include press conferences, a business 
leaders’ street party, and a teach-in linking Martin Luther King’s legacy to the current fight 482
482 A1 Norman, “Rosemead, CA. Citizens Organize Recall Effort In Four Languages” Sprawl-Busters.com, January 
19,2006, httt?://www.sprawl-busters.com/search.php?readstory=2207. accessed January 30, 2006.
126
against Wal-Mart. The media strategy also included editorial board meetings, opinion pieces, and 
talk shows, all o f which helped generate what became a tidal wave o f national and international 
press coverage.
The involvement o f political leaders gave opponents o f the measure a huge boost. Four of the 
five Inglewood City Council members and an array o f county, state, and federal legislators 
opposed the ballot measure. On April 6,2004, with the entire country watching, Inglewood 
residents voted 60.6% to 39.3% to reject the initiative. A month later Wal-Mart purchased the 
land for its proposed development, but no project can go forward without the permission of the 
people of Inglewood and its elected representatives.483
7.5 Political
Prior to the 2002 election cycle, Wal-Mart did not spend vigorously on political causes at the 
national level. Things have changed. In 2004, Wal-Mart’s political spending soared as part o f its 
effort to fend off hostile legislation and regulation. It is now the third-largest corporate PAC in 
Washington. In the 2004 election cycle, the company donated $2,1 million to candidates and 
campaigns, nearly double its 2002 total o f $1.3 million, triple its 2000 total o f $576,050 in 2000, 
and more than any other retailer. “They’ve really geared up a lot in the last three or four years,” 
Representative John Boozman, a Republican who represents Wal-Mart’s home district in 
Arkansas and was a recipient o f $10,000 from its PAC in 2003. He rewarded Wal-Mart by 
backing a bill to extend truckers’ workday. Most donations to the Wal-Mart PAC come from 
Wal-Mart management.484
Eighty percent o f Wal-Mart’s donations go to Republicans, according to OpenSecrets.org. And 
they appear to pay off. In one o f several visits to Wal-Mart during the 2004 election campaign, 
Vice President Dick Chaney said in a speech, “The story of Wal-Mart exemplifies some of the 
very best qualities in our country -  hard work, the spirit o f enterprise, fair dealing, and 
integrity.”485
During the 2004 election cycle, Wal-Mart’s Political Action Committee, called Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. PAC for Responsible Government, gave to members o f Congress who have jurisdiction over 
agriculture, banking, trade, taxes, and commerce. Wal-Mart gave $165,500 to 29 o f the 41 
members o f the House Ways and Means Committee, which handles corporate tax and trade bills. 
It gave another $165,000 to 29 members of the 57-member House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, including donations totaling $10,000 to committee chairman Joe Barton, R-Texas. 
Wal-Mart also donated $225,000 to 34 members o f the 70-member House Committee on 
Financial Services, which oversees the securities, insurance, and banking industries. The 
Republican committee chairman Michael Oxley, from Ohio, received $8,500. A leadership PAC
483 Barken, Tracy Gray, “Southern California’s Wal-Mart Wars,” Social Policy Fall 2004 Vol. 35 no 1.
484 Jeanne Cummings, “Joining the PAC: Wal-Mart Opens for Business In a Tough Market: Washington -  Famously 
Apolitical Retailer Plunges Into Lobbying And Becomes Top Donor -  A  Big Defeat On B a n k i n g Wall Street 
Journal, March 24,2004; A1 Norman, "Washington, D.C. Wal-Mart’s PAC Is Number One in Political Donations,” 
Sprawal-Busters.com, January 19,2004, http://www.sprawl-busters.com/search.php?readstorv= 1335. accessed 
January 30,2006.
485 Jay Nordlinger, “Uncle Dick Goes to Wal-Mart,” National Review, Vol. 56, No. 10, May 31,2004, p. 27.
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he operates got another $7,500, On the Senate side, Wal-Mart gave $98,000 to 11 members of 
the 21-member Senate Committee on Finance, which addresses such issues as Medicare and 
taxes. Seven of the 11 recipients were Republicans. Ten of the 21 members o f the Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs received $67,500 in donations.486
In addition to direct contributions to politicians, Wal-Mart spent $440,000 on its own company 
lobbyists in the first six months of 2003, and another $240,000 on outside lobbyists.487 The 
company has five lobbyists on its payroll and its “hired guns” include Thomas Hale Boggs, Jr., 
of Patton Boggs. “It’s hard to go to a fund-raiser in Washington for a member of the [House] 
Financial Services Committee without running into one or two or three Wal-Mart lobbyists,” said 
Ron Ence, a lobbyist for community bankers. 488
Jay Allen, Wal-Mart’s senior vice president of corporate affairs, said political donations are a 
normal course and Wal-Mart owes it to shareholders, employees, and customers to be involved 
in the political process. “If you don’t have a seat at the table, you’re probably not going to like 
the meal,” said Allen, who is treasurer o f the Wal-Mart PAC. “You have to be there to represent 
your interests. Nobody else will and we learned that,” Wal-Mart said it gives money to 
candidates whom it considers “pro-business.” “We are supportive of incumbents and people that 
are generally appreciative of the role business plays in the country and open to discussing those 
issues,” Allen noted.489
W al-Mart Stores PAC Contributions to Federal Candidates by 
Party, 2000 ,2002,2004,2006 Cycles490
Democrats Republicans Democrats Republicans
2000 $65,000 $388,050 14% 86%
2002 $239,500 $841,500 22% 78%
2004 $367,500 $1,299,000 22% 78%
2006 $95,800 $225,500 30% 70%
The Walton family has also stepped up its political contributions. These go almost exclusively to 
conservative causes and politicians. The family gives as individuals and through the Walton 
Family Foundation (WFF). Two favorite candidates are Republicans John Thune of South 
Dakota and David Vitter o f Louisiana, both first-time Senators elected in 2004. Others include 
Arnold Schwarzenegger, whose California Recovery Team PAC received $1 million in 2004, 
just as he was vetoing legislation aimed at labor abusers like Wal-Mart, One favorite cause is
486 A1 Norman, “Washington, D.C. The Most ‘Responsible’ Government Wal-Mart Can Buy,” Sprawal- 
Busters.com, October 31,2004, http://www.sprawl-busters,com/search.php?readstorv=1617. accessed January 30, 
2006.
487 Norman, “Washington, D.C. Wal-Mart’s PAC Is Number One in Political Donations.”
488 Cummings, “Joining the PAC: Wal-Mart Opens for Business In a Tough Market.”
489 Norman, “Washington, D.C. The Most ‘Responsible’ Government Wal-Mart Can Buy.”
490 http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/pacgot.asp?strID=C00093054&Cvcle^2002: 
http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/pacgot.asp7str ID~C00093054&Cvcle=:;2004: 
httP.V/www.opensecre ts.org/pacs/pacgot. asp?strID=C00093054&Cvcle=!2000:
http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/pacgot.asp?strID=C00093054&Cvcle=2006: accessed January 20,2006.
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cutting taxes, including lower capital gains taxes and repeal o f the estate tax. In 2004, Alice L. 
Walton donated $2.6 million to the influential Republican PAC Progress for America. Her male 
siblings have given to the Committee for the Preservation o f Capitalism and the various 
Republican national committees,491 492
From 1998 through 2003, the WFF contributed $25,000 to the Heritage Foundation, $15,000 to 
the Cato Institute, $125,000 to the Hudson Institute, $155,000 to the Goldwater Institute, 
$70,000 to the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, $300,000 to the Mackinac 
Center for Public Policy, $185,000 to the Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, and 
$350,000 to the Evergreen Freedom Foundation. The WFF gave away $106.9 million in 2003, 
much of it in tiny lots; its IRS 990 form is 2,239 pages long. A favorite cause is “free market” 
education, including support for vouchers, charters schools, and merit pay. Other recipients of 
the family’s largesse included communities where Wal-Mart encountered opposition to building
4 Q 2
a new store.
491 Jim Hopkins, “Wal-Mart, Walton family support Schwarzenegger agenda with $1M; Public documents show 
donations occur around vetoes by governor,” USA Today, October 31,2005; Jim Hopkins, “Wal-Mart family funds 
causes, candidates backing tax cuts,” USA Today, April 6 ,2005. For a convenient list o f  political contributions for 
each Walton family member see www.newsmeat.com. Alice Walton:
http //www.newsmeat.eom/billionaire political donations/Alice Walton.nhn: Helen Walton:
http //www.newsmeat.com/billionaire political donations/Helen Walton.phn: Jim Walton:
http //www.newsmeatcom/billionaire political donations/Jim Walton.php: John Walton:
http //www.newsmeatcom/billionaire political donations/John Walton.php: and S. Rob Walton:
http //www.newsmeat.com/billionaire political donations/S Robson Walton.php.
492 Lisa Featherstone, "On the Wal-Mart Money Trail,” The Nation, November 21,2005; Jim Hopkins, “Wal-Mart 
family funds causes, candidates backing tax cuts,” USA Today, April 6 ,2005, p. B l. See also National Committee 
for Responsible Philanthropy, “The Waltons and Wal-Mart: Self-Interest Philanthropy,” Report, September 2005, 
http://www.ncrp.org/nublications/index.aso.
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8, Appendices
8.1 Appendix A -  Organization and Operations
8.1.1 Facilities Listing
W al-Mart U.S. Facilities & Employment by Country & Form at493
State
%
o
n>
3
-o
o'
9
9
v s
g
S3*n
999
Vs
<■*•O>19
VS
VS
9
r>9s
«T
2
Vs9
S.
v s
Q
99*
v s
3
2.3Q*p*9*oT5TOo
p.
§tom
Sf2
VS
Vs
r *o
9
Ho
<■*.
ST
2  
v s* 
(■*
!2.2s
ao9
n«9r+9
2
CO9
3.
VS
Q
S’9*
a
n
CA
*
o
2
no91»o
£
I.o9
Vs
9
o
Ö
o
Ho
»
CA
Alabama 40,275 18 71 11 2 102 3 0 0 3
Alaska 2,833 7 0 3 0 10 0 0 0 0
Arizona 30,291 18 33 11 5 67 2 1 0 3
Arkansas 46,887 26 54 5. 6 91 9 1 0 10
California 73,787 149 3 33 0 185 7 0 1 8
Colorado 25,382 15 40 15 0 70 1 1 0 2
Connecticut 9,451 28 4 3 0 35 0 0 0 0
Delaware 4,230 3 4 1 0 8 1 0 0 1
Florida 95,853 53 116 38 6 213 4 0 1 5
Georgia 54,626 23 88 21 0 132 8 0 0 8
Hawaii 4,583 7 0 2 0 9 0 0 0 0
Idaho 6,972 3 14 1 0 18 0 0 0 0
Illinois 46,467 78 45 28 0 151 2 0 0 2
Indiana 38,647 31 56 15 4 106 5 1 0 6
Iowa 18,011 20 33 7 0 60 1 0 0 1
Kansas 20,136 19 34 6 3 62 1 0 0 1
Kentucky 32,249 • 26 52 5 2 85 2 0 0 2
Louisiana 38,110 26 56 12 1 95 2 0 0 2
Maine 7,350 11 11 3 0 25 0 0 0 0
Maryland 16,988 33 6 13 0 52 1 0 0 1
Massachusetts 11,608 42 2 3 0 47 0 0 0 0
Michigan 30,181 41 30 24 0 95 1 0 0 1
Minnesota 19,171 33 16 13 0 62 0 1 0 1
Mississippi . 26,801 14 51 6 1 72 2 0 0 2
Missouri 44,641 46 70 14 0 130 3 0 0 3
Montana 4,656 4 7 1 0 12 0 0 0 0
Nebraska 10,882 8 16 3 0 27 1 0 0 1
Nevada 12,045 9 12 5 4 30 1 0 0 1
493 As of October 2005. Compiled from www.walmartfacts.com.
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New Hampshire 8,772 19 7 4 0 30 1 0 0 1
New Jersey 13,847 38 0 9 0 47 1 0 0 1
New Mexico 14,341 3 24 5 0 32 1 0 0 1
New York 35,671 53 27 18 0 98 4 0 0 4
North Carolina 49,956 41 65 19 0 125 3 0 0 3
North Dakota 2,745 8 0 2 0 10 0 0 0 0
Ohio 50,068 69 45 27 0 141 4 0 0 4
Oklahoma 31,611 33 49 8 14 104 1 0 0 , 1
Oregon 11,035 20 7 0 0 27 1 0 0 1
Pennsylvania 49,861 49 60 21 0 130 3 0 1 4
Rhode Island 2,214 7 1 1 0 9 0 0 0 0
South Carolina 27,401 16 45 9 0 70 2 0 0 2
South Dakota 4,912 5 5 2 0 12 0 0 0 0
Tennessee 41,017 21 75 15 4 115 2 0 0 2
Texas 151,994 80 219 69 28 396 11 2 1 14
Utah 15,805 4 24 7 5 40 2 0 0 2
Vermont 728 4 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
Virginia 39,782 22 56 13 0 91 3 0 0 3
Washington 16,609 24 13 3 0 40 1 0 ,0 1
West Virginia 12,054 6 23 4 0 33 0 0 0 0
Wisconsin 27,864 38 • 37 11 0 86 2 0 0 2
Wyoming 3,690 2 7 2 0 11 0 0 0 0
U.S. Totals 1,385,090 1,353 1,713 551 85 3,702 99 7 4 110
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W al-Mart International Employment and Facilities494C
ountry
# of em
ployees
D
iscount Stores
Supercenters
Sam
's C
lubs
N
eighborhood M
arkets
O
ther
Store T
otals
D
istribution C
enters
Argentina 4,573 0 11 0 0 0 11 7
Brazil 50,000 0 17 12 0 266 295 7
Canada 70,000 256 0 6 0 0 262 ?
China 27,000 0 38 3 2 0 43 6
Costa Rica 6,990 0 0 0 0 124 124 N/A
El Salvador 3,150 0 0 0 0 57 57 N/A
Germany 12,000 0 91 0 0 0 91 ?
Guatemala 7,390 0 0 0 0 120 120 N/A
Honduras 1,460 0 0 0 0 32 32 N/A
Japan 35,426 0 0 0 0 405 405 N/A
South Korea 3,600 0 16 0 0 0 16 N/A
Mexico 112,000 0 104 68 0 584 756 ?
Nicaragua 1,050 0 0 0 0 30 30 N/A
Puerto Rico 14,000 9 4 9 0 32 54 ?
United Kingdom 140,000 0 0 0 0 313 313 ?
Int’l Totals 488,639 265 281 98 2 1,963 2,609 58
Int’l w/o Seiyu & 
CARHCO 433,173 265 281 • 98 2 1,195 1,841
Grand Totals 1,873,729 1,618 1,994 649 87 1,963 6,311 168
494 Ibid.
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W al-M art International Stores by Country and Format495
Country Store Name(s) Stores Employees Entry
Argentina Wal-Mart Supercenters 11 4,573 N ov-1995
Brazil Total: 295 50,000 May-1995
Wal-Mart Supercenters 22
Sam’s Club 15
Todo Dia 2
Bompreco Hypermart 28
Bompreco Supermarket 70
Bompreco Mini-Market 8
Balaio (Bompreco) 7
Magazine (Bompreco) 3
BIG Hypermarkets 37
Nacional Supermarkets 67
Mercadorama Supermarkets 24
Maxxi Atacado Wholesale Clubs 11
Maxxi Distribuicao 1
Canada Total: 263 70,000 N ov-1994
Wal-Mart Supercenters 257
Sam’s Club 6
China Total: 56 27,000 Aug-1995
Wal-Mart Supercenters 51
Sam’s Club 3
Neighborhood Markets 2
Costa Rica* Total: 124 6,990 Sep-2005
Pali 93
Max X  Menos 23
Maxi Bodegas 5
Hiper Mäs 3
El Salvador* Total: 57 3,150 Sep-2005
Dispensa Familiar 24
Despensa de Don Juan 31
Hiper Paiz 2
Germany Wal-Mart Supercenters 88 12,000 Jan-1998
Guatemala* Total: 120 7,390 Sep-2005
Dispensa Familiar 74
Supertiendas Paiz 27
Hiper Paiz 6
Maxi Bodegas 5
Club Co. 1
Other 7
Honduras* Total: 32 1,460 Sep-2005
Dispensa Familiar 25
Supertiendas Paiz 5
495 As o f January 2006. Calculated from links accessed via
http ://walmartstores. com/GI obalWMS toresWeb/navi gate .do? catg=369. accessed January 18,2006.
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Maxi Bodegas 2
Japan Total: 408 35,426' May-2002
Seiyu Supermarkets 305
Seiyu GMS 83
LIVIN Department Stores 12
Seiyu Supercenters 2
Other 6
Korea (South) Wal-Mart Supercenters 16 3,600 Jul-1998
Mexico Total: 774 112,000 N ov-1991
Wal-Mart Supercenters 105
Sam’s Club 69
Bodega 187
Mi Bodega 16
Superama 55
Suburbia 53
VIPS Restaurants 287
Mercamas 1
Mi Bodega Express 1
Nicaragua* Total: 30 1,050 Sep-2005
Pali 25
La Union 5
Puerto Rico Total: 54 14,000 Aug-1992
Wal-Mart Stores 9
Wal-Mart Supercenters 4
Sam’s Club 9
Supermercados/Amigo 32
United Kingdom Total: 315 140,000 Jul-1999
ASDA/Wal-Mart Supercenters 21
ASDA Supercenters 236
George 10
ASDA Living 5
ASDA Small Town 43
Total Wal-Mart Maiority- or Wholly Owned 2,280 468,599
♦Total Minority-Owned 363 20,040
Total International Units 2,643 488,639
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8.2 Appendix B -  Financial Analysis
8.2.1 Income Statement
' 1/31/2005 1/31/2004 1/31/2003 1/31/2002 1/31/2001
Total revenues 288,189.000 258.681,000 231,577,000 205,823.000 193,116,000
Gross sales 285.222.000 256.329,000 229,616,000 204,011,000 191,329,000
Adjustments/excise tax n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Net sales 285,222.000 256.329,000 229.616,000 204.011.000 191,329,000
Other revenues 2,967,000 2,352,000 1,961,000 1,812.000 1,787,000
Cost of Goods Sold 215,493,000 195,047,000 175.099,000 156,397,000 147,387,000
Research & Development expenses n,a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n,a.
Other Operating Items -51,305.000 -44,909.000 -39.983.000 -35,147.000 -31.550,000
EBITDA 21,391,000 18,725,000 16.495,000 14,279,000 14.179,000
Total Depreciation, Amort. & Depl, -4,300.000 -3,700,000 -3,200.000 -2,700.000 -2.868,000
Depreciation -4,300.000 -3,700,000 -3,200,000 -2,700.000 -2.868.000
Amortization & Depletion n.a. n.a. n.a, n.a. n.a.
Operating Income After Deprec. & Amort. 17,091,000 15,025,000 13,295,000 11,579,000 11,311,000
Unusual/Exceptional Items n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Earnings Before Interest & Tax 17,091,000 15.025,000 13,295,000 11,579.000 11,311,000
Interest income 201,000 164,000 132,000 171,000 188.000
Interest expenses -1,187,000 -996,000 -1,059,000 -1.354,000 -1,383,000
Net interest -986,000 -832,000 -927,000 -1,183.000 -1,195,000
Other non Oper,/Financial lnc./Exp, n.a. n.a. n,a. n.a. n.a.
Earnings before tax 16,105.000 14,193,000 12,368,000 10,396,000 10,116.000
Income taxes -5,589.000 -5.118,000 -4,357,000 -3,765,000 -3,692,000
Earnings after tax 10,516,000 9,075,000 8,011,000 6,631.000 6,424,000
Minority interest -249,000 -214,000 -193,000 -183.000 -129,000
Other n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Extraordinary items after tax 0 193,000 137,000 144.000 0
Preferred dividends n.a. n,a, n.a. n.a. n.a.
Net Profit 10,267,000 9,054,000 7,955,000 6,592,000 6,295,000
Ordinary dividends -2,214,000 -1,569,000 -1,328,000 -1,249,000 -1,070,000
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8.2.2 Balance Sheet
1/31/2005 1/31/2004 1/31/2003 1/31/2002 1/31/2001
ASSETS
Total Current Assets 38,491,000 34.421,000 30.722.000 27,878,000 26.555.000
Net Stated Inventory 29.447.000 26,612,000 24,401,000 22,614,000 21.442.000
Raw Materials n.a. n.a. n.a. 22.614.000 21,442,000
Work In Progress n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Finished Goods n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Inventory Prepayments n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Net Accounts Receivable 1,715.000 1.254.000 1.569.000 2.000,000 1.768,000
Accounts Receivable n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a, n.a.
Doubtful Accounts n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Others 7.329.000 6.555.000 4.752,000 3.264,000 3.345.000
Other Current Assets n.a. 0 1,179.000 n.a. n.a.
Prepaid Expenses & Advances 1.841.000 1.356,000 837.000 1.103,000 1,291,000
Deferred Charges n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Total Cash & Short Term Investment 5,488.000 5,199,000 2,736.000 2.161,000 2,054.000
Cash or Equivalent 5.488.000 5.199,000 2,736.000 2.161,000 2,054.000
Short Term Investment n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Fixed Assets 81.732.000 70,984.000 64,086.000 55,649.000 51,575,000
Net Properly. Plant & Equipment 68,567.000 59,023.000 51.374.000 45.750.000 40.934,000
Land 14,472.000 12.699.000 11,202,000 10,241,000 9,433.000
Total Land Depreciation n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Net Stated land n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Buildings 46,582.000 40.192,000 33,345,000 28,527,000 24,537,000
Total Buildings Depreciation n.a. n.a. n.a, n.a. n.a.
Net Buildings n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Plant & Machinery 22.991.000 19,203.000 16,739.000 15.224.000 13,843,000
Plant & Machinery Depreciation n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Net Stated Plant & Machinery n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Transportation Equipment n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Transportation Equipment 
Depreciation n.a. n,a. n.a. n,a. n.a.
Net Transportation Equipment n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Leased Assets 4997000 4286000 4814000 4626000 4620000
Leased Assets Depreciation n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Net Leased Assets n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other Property Plant & Equipment n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other Property Plant & Equip. Deprec. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Net Other Property Plant & Equipment n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Accumulated Deprec., n.e.s. -20.475.000 -17.357.000 -14,726.000 -12.868.000 -11.499.000
Intangibles 10,803.000 9.882,000 9,389.000 8.566,000 9,059.000
Goodwill 10,803.000 9.882.000 9,389,000 8.566,000 9,059,000
Other Intangibles n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other fixed assets 2.362.000 2,079,000 3,323.000 1.333,000 1.582.000
Exploration n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Long Term Receivables n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Investments n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Long Term Associated Companies n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Investment Properties n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other Long Term Assets 2,362.000 2,079.000 3.323.000 1.333.000 1582000
Total Assets 120,223,000 105.405,000 94,808.000 83.527.000 78,130.000
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1/31/2005 1/31/2004 1731/2003 1/31/2002 1/31/2001
LIABILITIES
Total Current Liabilities 42.888.000 37.840.000 32,519,000 27,282,000 28.949.000
Loans 3.969,000 3,100,000 4,712,000 2405000 4375000
Current Long Term Debt 3.969.000 3.100,000 4,712,000 2405000 4375000
Trade Creditors (payables) 21,671.000 19,425,000 16,829,000 15,617,000 15.092,000
Other 17,248,000 15.315,000 10,978,000 9.260.000 9.482.000
Other Short Term Debt 3.812,000 3.267,000 1.079,000 743,000 2,286,000
Other Creditors n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Income Tax Payable 1,281,000 1,377,000 748,000 1,343,000 841,000
Social Expenditure Payable n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Dividends Payable n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other Current Liabilities 12.155,000 10,671,000 9,151.000 7,174.000 6,355,000
Non Current Liabilities 27,939,000 23,942,000 22,828,000 21,143,000 17,838,000
Total LT Interest Bearing Debt 23,669,000 20,099,000 19,597,000 18.732.000 15.655.000
Bank Loans 20,087,000 17,102,000 16,597,000 15,687,000 12,501,000
Debentures & Convertible Debt n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Lease Liabilities 3.582,000 2,997.000 3.000,000 3,045,000 3.154,000
Other Long Term Interest Bearing Debt n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other non-current liabilities 4,270,000 3.843,000 3.231,000 2,411,000 2,183,000
Pension Fund Provisions n,a. n.a. n.a. n,a. n.a.
Deferred Taxes 2,947,000 2,359,000 1,859,000 1,204,000 1,043,000
Provisions n,a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Deferred Revenue n.a, n.a. n,a. n.a. n,a.
Other LT Non-Interest Bearing Debt n.a, 0 10,000 n.a. n.a.
Minority Interest 1,323,000 1,484,000 1,362,000 1.207,000 1,140,000
Total Liabilities and Debt 70,827,000 61,782,000 55,347,000 48,425,000 46,787,000
Total Shareholders Eguity 49,396,000 43,623,000 39,461,000 35,102,000 31,343,000
Share Capital 423,000 431,000 440,000 445,000 447,000
Common Stock/Shares 423,000 431,000 440,000 445.000 447,000
Participation Shares n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Preferred Shares n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Redeemable Prefered Shares n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other 48,973.000 43.192.000 39.021,000 34,657,000 30.896,000
Share Premiums 2,425,000 2,135,000 1,954,000 1,484,000 1,411,000
Treasury Shares n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Revaluation Reserves n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Retained Earnings 43.854,000 40,206,000 37,576.000 34441000 30.169.000
Other Shareholders Reserves 2,694,000 851,000 -509,000 -1.268,000 -684,000
Total Liabilities and Eguity 120,223,000 105.405,000 94,808.000 83,527.000 78,130,000
Net Assets 50,719,000 45.107,000 40.823.000 36.309.000 32,483,000
Net Debt -5,488,000 -5,199,000 -2,736,000 -2,161,000 -2,054,000
Enterprise Value 225,690,012 232,376,100 212.636,552
268,091,00
4
253,869,87
0
Number of Employees 1,700.000 1,500,000 1,400,000 1,383,000 1,244,000
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8.2.3 Cash Flow Statement
1/31/2005 1/31/2004 1/31/2003 1/31/2002 1/31/2001
Operating Cash Flows
Net Income 10,267,000 8,861.000 7,818.000 6,448.000 6.295,000
Depreciation 4.405,000 3,852.000 3.364,000 3,228,000 2,868,000
Depletion n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Depreciation/Depletion 4,405.000 3.852,000 3,364,000 3,228.000 2,868,000
Amortization of Intangibles n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Amortization of Acquisition Costs n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Amortization n.a, n.a. n.a. n,a. n.a.
Deferred Taxes 263.000 177,000 474,000 140,000 342,000
Accounting Change n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 0
Discontinued Operations 0 50.000 82,000 36.000 n.a.
Extraordinary Item n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Unusual Items n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Purchased R&D n.a, n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Equity in Net Eamings/Loss n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n,a.
Other Non-Cash Items n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Non-Cash Items 0 50,000 82,000 36.000 0
Cash Receipts n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cash Payments n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Accounts Receivable -304.000 373.000 -159,000 -212,000 -422,000
Inventories -2,635,000 -1,973,000 -2,219,000 -1,125,000 -1,795,000
Prepaid Expenses n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other Assets n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Accounts Payable 1,694,000 2,658.000 1,848,000 416.000 2.061.000
Accrued Expenses 976,000 1,800,000 1,088,000 1,120,000 11,000
Pavable/Accrued n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Taxes Payable n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other Liabilities n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other Assets & Liabilities, Net 378.000 198,000 709,000 468,000 244,000
Other Operating Cash Flow n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Changes in Working Capital 109,000 3,056,000 1,267,000 667,000 99,000
Total Cash from Operating Activities 15.044,000 15,996.000 13,005,000 10.519,000 9,604,000
Investing Cash Flows
Purchase of Fixed Assets -12,893,000 -10,308.000 -9,245,000 -8,285,000 -8.042,000
Purchase/Acquisition of Intangibles n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Software Development Costs n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Capital Expenditures -12,893,000 -10,308,000 -9,245,000 -8,285.000 -8.042,000
Acquisition of Business n.a. n.a. n,a. 0 -627.000
Sale of Business 0 1,500.000 0 n.a. n.a.
Sale of Fixed Assets 953,000 481.000 311,000 248.000 n.a.
Sale/Maturlty of Investment n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Investment, Net n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Purchase of Investments n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sale of Intangible n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Intangible, Net n.a, n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other Investing Cash Flow -411,000 15,000 -905,000 814,000 -45,000
Other Investing Cash Flow Items, Total 542,000 1,996,000 -594,000 1.062.000 -672,000
Total Cash from Investing Activities -12,351,000 -8,312,000 -9,839,000 -7,223,000 -8,714,000
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1/31/2005 1/31/2004 1/31/2003 1/31/2002 1/31/2001
Financing Cash Flows
Other Financing Cash Flow 113,000 111,000 -62,000 113,000 176,000
Financing Cash Flow Items 113,000 111,000 -62,000 113,000 176,000
Cash Dividends Paid - Common n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cash Dividends Paid - Preferred n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a, n.a.
Total Cash Dividends Paid ■2,214,000 -1,569,000 -1,328,000 -1,249,000 -1,070,000
Sale/lssuance of Common n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 581.000
Repurchase/Retirement of Common -4,549,000 -5,046,000 -3,383,000 -1,214,000 -193,000
Common Stock, Net -4,549,000 -5,046,000 -3,383,000 -1,214,000 388,000
Sale/lssuance of Preferred n.a, n.a. n.a. n.a. n,a.
Repurchase/Retirement of Preferred n.a, n.a. n,a. n.a. n.a.
Preferred Stock, Net n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sale/lssuance of Common/Preferred n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Repurch./Retlrement of Common/Preferred n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Options Exercised n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a, n,a.
Warrants Converted n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Treasury Stock n.a, n.a. n,a. n.a. n,a.
Issuance (Retirement) of Stock, Net -4,549,000 -5,046,000 -3,383,000 -1,214,000 388,000
Short Term Debt Issued n.a. n.a. n.a, n.a. n.a.
Short Term Debt Reduction n,a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Short Term Debt, Net 544,000 688,000 1,836,000 -1,533,000 -2,022,000
Long Term Debt Issued 5,832.000 4,099,000 2,044,000 4.591.000 3.778,000
Long Term Debt Reduction -2,131,000 «3,541,000 -1,261,000 -3,519,000 -1,519,000
Long Term Debt, Net 3,497,000 253,000 567,000 905,000 2,086,000
Total Debt Issued n,a. n.a. n.a. n.a, n.a.
Total Debt Reduction n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Issuance (Retirement) of Debt, Net 4,041,000 941,000 2.403,000 -628,000 64,000
Total Cash from Financing Activities -2,609,000 -5,563,000 -2,370,000 -2,978,000 -442,000
Balance
Foreign Exchange Effects 205,000 320,000 -199.000 -211,000 -250,000
Net Change in Cash 289,000 2,441,000 597,000 107,000 198,000
Net Cash - Beginning Balance 5,199,000 2,758,000 2,161,000 2,054,000 1,856,000
Net Cash ■ Ending Balance 5,488,000 5.199.000 2,758,000 2.161.000 2.054,000
Supplemental
Depreciation, Supplemental 4,405,000 3.852.000 3,364,000 3,228,000 2,868,000
Cash Interest Paid, Supplemental 1,163,000 1,024,000 1,085,000 1,332,000 1,319,000
Cash Taxes Paid, Supplemental 5,593,000 4,358.000 4,539,000 2,613,000 3,509,000
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8.2.4 Key Financial Ratios
Liquidity 1/31/2005 1/31/2004 1/31/2003 1/31/2002 1/31/2001
Current ratio 0.90 0.91 0.94 1.02 0.92
Quick ratio 0.17 0,17 0,13 0.15 0.13
Liquidity ratio 0.21 0,21 0.19 0.19 0.18
Working capital ratio -0.04 -0,03 -0,02 0,01 -0.03
Profitability
Return on equity 22.08% 21,79% 21.34% 19.84% 22,02%
Return on assets 9.10% 9,04% 8.92% 8,16% 8.48%
Gross margin 22,94% 22,46% 22.35% 22,02% 21,47%
Operating margin 5.99% 5.86% 5.79% 5.68% 5,91%
Net margin 3.56% 3,50% 3.44% 3,20% 3,26%
Activity
Asset turnover ratio 2,53 2.56 2,58 2,52 2,58
Days Sales Outstanding (DSO) 1.90 2.01 2.84 3.37 2.75
Inventory turnover 7,69 7,65 7.45 7.10 7.65
Revenue per employee (000 $) 167,78 170.89 164,01 147.51 153.80
Capital Structure
Debt/Equity (gearing) 143,39% 141.63% 140.26% 137,96% 149.27%
Interest coverage ratio 14.40 15,09 12,55 8.55 8.18
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8.2.5 Peer Comparison
Total revenues (mil S)
2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
WAL MART STORES 288.189 258.681 231.577 205.823 193.116
METRO 78,864 69,497 55,642 45,426 45,491
COSTCO WHOLESALE 48,107 42,546 38,762 34,797 32,164
TARGET 46,839 42.025 37,410 39,826 36.851
AEON COMPANY 40,229 32,534 26,212 21,916 23,528
PPR 32,980 30.768 28,709 24.499 23,040
Net Profit (mil
2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
WAL MART STORES 10.267 9.054 7,955 6,592 6,295
TARGET 3.198 1,809 1,623 1,368 1,264
PPR 1,281 814 1,667 663 714
METRO 1,122 623 461 351 331
COSTCO WHOLESALE 882 721 700 602 631
AEON COMPANY 595 507 435 -121 193
Gross Marnin (%i
2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
PPR 38.95 37.69 38.68 38,23 40.15
AEON COMPANY 35,86 36,12 36.52 36,34 35.63
TARGET 31,29 30,73 30,16 30.68 30.79
METRO 26.26 26,13 26.24 26.85 37,46
WAL MART STORES 25.23 24.60 24.39 24.01 23.68
COSTCO WHOLESALE 13.42 13.40 13,21 12.93 12.74
EBIT Marain (%)
2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
PPR 7,78 5.20 11,34 7,00 7.51
TARGET 7,69 7.52 7.51 6.73 6.73
WAL MART STORES 5.93 5.81 5.74 5,63 5.86
METRO 3.18 2,31 2,20 2,09 2.13
AEON COMPANY 2.91 3,45 4.01 0,17 2.68
COSTCO WHOLESALE 2.88 2.72 2.92 2.85 3,23
Profit Marain (%i
2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
TARGET 6.47 6.19 5.95 5.54 5.57
PPR 6.34 3.91 9.83 5.49 6.45
WAL MART STORES 5.59 5.49 5.34 5.05 5.24
AEON COMPANY 3.26 3.55 4.00 0,21 2.62
COSTCO WHOLESALE 2.91 2.72 2.94 2.88 3,27
METRO 2.32 1,48 1,56 1,31 1,54
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Iß
ODeratina Revenue oer Thousand Emolovees /$)
2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
AEON COMPANY 787 631 608 527 516
COSTCO WHOLESALE 774 688 421 405 825
PPR 401 301 253 211 208
METRO 302 276 227 189 194
WAL MART STORES 170 172 165 149 155
TARGET 143 128 122 142 145
ROE (%i
2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
TARGET 24.55 16.25 17,19 17.40 19.39
WAL MART STORES 20,79 20.76 20.16 18.78 20.08
METRO 17.39 11.85 10.63 9.54 8.76
PPR 12.23 9,34 24.57 13.22 17,60
COSTCO WHOLESALE 11.57 11,00 12.29 12.33 14.89
AEON COMPANY 7.45 8,44 8.87 -3.07 4,37
ROA
2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
TARGET 9.90 5.76 5.67 5.66 6,49
WAL MART STORES 8.54 8,59 8.39 7.89 8.06
COSTCO WHOLESALE 5.85 5.47 6.02 5.97 7,31
PPR 4.10 2.62 5.29 2,15 2.42
METRO 2,93 1.85 1.92 1.78 1.59
AEON COMPANY 2.26 2.12 2,55 -0,82 1.19
Current ratio
2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
TARGET 1.69 1.56 1,59 1.37 1.16
PPR 1.21 1,09 1.77 1.68 1.64
AEON COMPANY 1.19 1.10 1.08 1.04 0.98
COSTCO WHOLESALE 1,18 1,14 1,04 0.94 1.02
WAL MART STORES 0.90 0.91 0.94 1.02 0.92
METRO 0.79 0,75 0.86 0,85 0.95
Liauiditv ratio
2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
TARGET 1.04 1.01 0,95 0,74 0,49
AEON COMPANY 0.91 0.84 0.81 0.76 0.67
PPR 0,90 0.75 1.35 1.36 1.33
COSTCO WHOLESALE 0,59 0.47 0.34 0.28 0.29
METRO 0.35 0.31 0.39 0.40 0.47
WAL MART STORES 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.18
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Interest Coveraae
2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
COSTCO WHOLESALE 37,8 31,3 38.9 31.0 26.4
AEON COMPANY 21,2 17,8 15,9 12.4 8.9
WAL MART STORES 14.4 15.1 12.6 8.6 8.2
TARGET 6,3 5,7 4,8 5.7 5,8
PPR 3,9 3.3 3.6 3.1 3.7
METRO 2.0 1,6 2,3 1,2 1.1
Gearina (%)
2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
METRO 196,1 226.7 175.0 166,2 186.2
AEON COMPANY 120,9 153,2 131.6 146.4 130,0
TARGET 88.6 115.3 133,6 129,1 115,5
PPR 88.2 109.2 226.0 307.5 359,5
WAL MART STORES 64,6 62.0 69,8 67.1 70.9
COSTCO WHOLESALE 21.0 24.9 25.9 22.4 23,3
EV/EBITDA
2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
WAL MART STORES 10.55 12.41 12.89 18.78 17.90
AEON COMPANY 9.26 10.62 8,39 9,61 11,49
TARGET 8.97 7.88 6.54 10,33 9,73
PPR 8.33 8.47 6,95 12.22 16.95
COSTCO WHOLESALE 8.19 8.11 9,42 12.24 11,27
METRO 6,23 6.71 4,62 6,91 9.07
Number of emolovees
2004 2003 2Q02 2001 2000
WAL MART STORES 1.700,000 1,500,000 1,400,000 1.383.000 1.244,000
TARGET 328,000 328,000 306,000 280,000 254,000
METRO 261,438 252,037 245,164 240,769 234,351
PPR 82,150 102,381 113,453 115,935 110,862
COSTCO WHOLESALE 62,150 61,800 92,000 86,000 39,000
AEON COMPANY 51,147 51,584 43,114 41,624 45,605
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8.2.6 Segment Analysis
Sales by Segment, Fiscal 2005
{Source: Osiris, Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing)
Operating Income by Segment, Fiscal 2005
{Source: Osiris, Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing)
International
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Operating Margin by Segment, Fiscal 2005
(Source: Osiris, Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing)
0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0%
Sales by Geography, Fiscal 2005
(Source: Osiris, Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing)
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*  WMT.H Price Chart
8,2.7 Stock Analysis
44
54
52
Source: http://www-investor.reuters.com/Charts.aspx?ticker^WMT.N&taraet=%2fstocks%2fquickinfo%2fhistorica1chart. January 23,2006.
Valuation 10/31/2005 1/31/2005 1/31/2004 1/31/2003 1/31/2002 1/31/2001
Stock price 47.31 52.40 53.85 47.80 59.98 56.80
Tangible book value (000 $) 39,451,000 38,593,000 33,741.000 30,072,000 26,536,000 22,284,000
Price to tangible book value 5,03 5.99 7,04 7,16 10,18 11.48
Enterprise value 242,186,000 225,690,012 232,376,100 212,636,552 268.091.004 253.869,870
Enterprise value to EBITDA 10,55 10.55 12.41 12.89 18.78 17.90
Earnings per share 2.58 2.33 2.05 1.77 1.46 1.40
Price earnings ratio 18,37 22.52 26.24 27.07 41.00 34.21
Dividend yield (diluted) 1.27% 0.96% 0.66% 0.62% 0.46% 0.50%
Price to sales 0.65 0.81 0.93 0.94 1,32 1.34
PEG Ratio 1.84 2.00 2.26 2.16 6.19 2.15
Analyst Recommendations
1-5 Linear Scale January 20, 2005 1 Month Ago 2 Months Ago 1 Year Ago
(1) BUY 9 9 8 10
(2) OUTPERFORM 8 8 7 7
(3) HOLD 12 12 12 9
(4MJNDERPERFQRM 0 0 0 2
(5)SELL 0 0 0 0
No Opinion 0 0 0 0
Mean Rating 2.1 2.1 2,15 2.11
Consensus Recommendation: Outperform 
Source:
http://www.investor.reuters.com/CompanvEstimates.asPx?ticker=WMT&target=%2fstocks%2fprofessionalanalvsis • 
%2frecommendations. January 23,2006.
146
8.3 Environment
W al-Mart Environmental Abuse Time Line 1999-2004 496
Date Agency Violation Fine Location
March
1999
Pennsylvania 
Department of 
Environmental 
Protection
Violated water quality 
laws during 
construction (repeated 
violations, three stop 
work orders); wetlands 
violations
$100,000; $75,000 o f  
which must be used for 
“worthy improvement 
projects in northeastern 
Pennsylvania”; upgrade 
environmental 
construction practices
Pennsylvania
September
1999
U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service
With U.S.F.W.S. 
permission, destroyed 
habitat o f endangered 
Scrub Jay and Eastern 
Indigo Snake
Rather than preserve 
habitat on site, paid to 
preserve habitat elsewhere
Florida
May 2000 Connecticut 
Department o f  
Environmental 
Protection
Pesticide and fertilizer 
pollution runoff from 
parking lots at 11 
stores into rivers and 
streams
Connecticut
April 2001 Pennsylvania 
Environmental 
Protection Agency 
and US Army 
Corps o f Engineers
Erosion and 
sedimentation o f  
creek; excessive 
wetland destruction
$25,000; $75,000 towards 
community environmental 
project; $200,000 to 
nonprofit agency towards 
purchase o f  local wetland 
conservation areas
Pennsylvania
June 2001 U.S.
Environmental 
Protection Agency
Violation o f  National 
Pollutant Discharge 
and Elimination 
System
$1 million fine; $4.5 
million to set up 
environmental 
management plan
17 locations in 
Massachusetts, 
Texas, and 
Oklahoma
June 2001 Residents Against 
Inappropriate 
Development and 
the. Sierra Club
Failure to control soil 
arsenic runoff, excess 
wetland destruction
Judge sided with 
developer
Hamilton, 
New Jersey
December
2003
New York 
Department o f  
Environmental 
Conservation
Failure to comply with 
wastewater regulations
$70,000 civil penalty; 
required to publicize need 
to comply with wastewater 
regulations
New York
May 2004 US Environmental 
Protection Agency
Clean Water Act 
violations; failure to 
obtain permits; failure 
to maintain runoff 
plans; failure to 
control discharges;
$3.1 million; required to 
improve runoff controls at 
200 sites per year; 
$250,000 to protect 
wetlands or waterways in 
one o f  the affected states
24 sites in
California, Colorado, 
Delaware, Michigan, 
New Jersey, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas, and Utah
November
2004
Florida Department 
o f  Environmental 
Protection
Violated state law on 
oil storage tanks; tanks 
not registered; no 
valves installed to stop 
overflow spills; state
$765,000 fine ($19,000 for 
each violation)
75 Tire and Lube 
outlets in Florida
496 From the Sprawl-Busters Database, put together and provided by Laura Lynch, Sierra Club, New Jersey Chapter, 
2004.
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inspectors blocked
8.4 Wal-Mart Research Web-Sites
• Wake Up Wal-Mart (http://www.wakeupwalmart.com/): Run by the United Food and 
Commercial Workers Union (UFCW), this group is one o f the leaders of the anti- 
Wal-Mart movement.
• Wal-Mart Watch (http://walmartwatch.comA: Funded by the Service Employees 
Intematinoal Union (SEIU) and other organizations, this website is particularly useful 
for its document clearinghouse, where you can download confidential internal 
company memos regarding numerous aspects of Wal-Mart’s policies.
• LabourStart Wal-Mart page (http://www.labourstart.org/wal-mart/): A great 
compendium of the latest news stories about Wal-Mart.
• Wal-Mart Stores corporate website (http://www.walmartstores.comh Has company 
news releases, financial information, executive profiles, and other useful information.
•  Wal-Mart Facts website (http://www.walmartfacts.com): Wal-Mart’s PR site, where 
it responds to many of the main criticisms opponents level against it.
• AFL-CIO Wal-Mart page
(http://www. aflcio. org/corporatewatch/walmart/walmart 8. cfm)
• Wal-Mart Versus Women (www.walmartvswomen.com) : Keeping tabs on treatment 
of female employees.
• Wal-Mart Class Action Lawsuit (www.walmartclass.com): Run by the Impact Fund, 
the lead plaintiff law firm in the Dukes v. Wal-Mart case.
• Against the Wal (http://www.againstthewal.net): Run by a group o f residents of 
northwest Arkansas who are opposed to Wal-Mart.
• Sprawl Busters (http://www.sprawl-busters.com/) : “An International Clearinghouse 
on Big Box Anti-Sprawl Information” run by anti-big box retailer activist A1 Norman.
• International Labor Rights Federation (http://www.laborrights.orgA: Website for the 
International Labor Rights Federation “an advocacy organization dedicated to 
achieving just and humane treatment for workers worldwide.” Contains information 
about Wal-Mart’s use of sweatshops.
• Wal-Mart Sucks (http://forum. walmartsucks, com/): Forum for Wal-Mart workers
• Job Tracker (http.7/www.workingamerica.org/iobtracker/): Not specifically related to 
Wal-Mart, but a great resource for researching NLRB and OSHA violations at 
specific stores.
• Reclaim Democracy (http://reclaimdemocracv.org/walmart/links.php) has a more 
comprehensive (though not exhaustive) set of links to other Wal-Mart related 
websites.
• Wal-Mart Alliance for Reform Now (WARN) (http://wamwalmart.org) : Website for 
a Florida-based labor-community alliance helping to organize Wal-Mart workers in 
that state. Affiliated with the Wal-Mart Workers Association (WWA).
• Wal-Mart Workers Association (WWA) (http://walmartwork.org/): Website for a 
Florida-based organization of current and former Wal-Mart workers who are fighting 
to improve wages and working conditions at the company.
• Wal-Mart Workers of America (WWOA) (http://www.wakeuPwalmart.com/wwaA: 
Website for a UFCW-backed association o f current and former Wal-Mart workers.
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• National Labor Committee (http://www.nlcnet.orgL’ Works to defend the human 
rights o f workers in the global economy and exposes the hypocrisy o f Wal-Mart’s 
supplier standards.
• The Writing on the Wal (http://www.thewritingonthewal.netA: A useful blog with 
thoughtful posts on recent developments at the company,
•  Wal-Mart Watch Blog (http://walmartwatch. com/blo gL The blog section of the 
organization’s larger website.
•  Wake Up Wal-Mart Blog (http://blog.wakeupwalmart.comA: The blog section o f the 
organization’s larger website.
• Always Low Prices (http://alp.tmekandbarter.eom/l: No longer active as of 
November 2005 (the result o f Wal-Mart threats over use o f the “Always Low Prices” 
slogan), and not written from an organizing perspective, but nevertheless has a large 
amount of interesting and useful data about the company,
• Wal-Mart Space (http://walmartspace.blogspot.comA: Again, not written from an 
organizing perspective, but useful for perspectives on Wal-Mart’s financial situation.
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